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Introduction

T

HIS BOOK has been a long time in the making. More than a
decade ago, as I completed Bonds of Loyalty: German Americans and World War I, I began to examine other countries for
parallels to the American experience. I was particularly attracted
by the possibilities offered by Brazil as another historical case
study to illuminate social behaviors in periods of national crises,
especially war, as they relate to immigrant peoples. Like the United
States, Brazil had received a large European immigration in proportion to its total population, beginning about 1825 and building
up somewhat inconsistently until World War I. As a Latin and
Catholic country, Brazil was especially attractive to immigrants
form Spain, Italy, and Portugal, but a large contingent of Germans, substantially Protestant in religion and north European in
culture, settled in the southernmost states of Brazil-Rio Grande
do SuI, Santa Catarina, and Parana-and in major cities such as
Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and Sao Salvador (Bahia). By 1914,
when war in Europe began, nearly 400,000 persons of German origin resided in Brazil. Most lived in relatively exclusive ethnic enclaves located in both urban and rural districts. Although some
German immigrants were well integrated into Brazilian society,
the majority remained largely unassimilated in language, culture,
and politics.
Studying Brazil was attractive to me for several reasons. Years
ago I had offered Latin American history as a minor field in my
doctoral program. Thus, Brazil was not entirely terra incognita for
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me. Moreover, the German-Brazilian experience was unique in
that Brazil was the only South American country that declared
war on Germany in World War I. Its history seemed especially
suited for comparisons with the United States with respect to its
treatment of its German ethnic minority.
As I explored the relevant bibliography I soon discovered that
American scholars had published very little on German immigration to Brazil and that they knew practically nothing about the
German-Brazilian experience in World War I. I remembered a hastily produced book, The Germans in South America, by Clarence H.
Haring, that included a long chapter on the Germans in Brazil
during the war. Haring had written this book immediately following his return from a trip to Brazil, Argentina, and Chile in 1918
or 1919. Although his vision was clouded by the intense emotions
generated by the Great War, his fragmentary study has remained
until now the fullest account in the English language of the impact of the war on German-Brazilian society.
English-language materials treating the Germans in Brazil generally were almost as sparse-a paragraph here, an article there. By
far the best work was a series of articles by the Brazilian-American
anthropologist, Emilio Willems, an authority on the assimilation
of German Brazilians. Virtually all other secondary sources are in
either German or Portuguese, though one of the truly outstanding works on the subject is in French: La colonisation allemande et Ie
Rio Grande do Sui (1959), by Jean Roche. A glance at Roche's eightypage bibliography reveals the extent of books and articles, as well
as primary sources, published on the German Brazilians in the
German language. Since many of these titles are not available in
the United States, it became clear that if I were to study Germans
in Brazil, I needed to go to Germany, where much of this extensive material could be found.
Research in Germany was made possible by the award of a Fulbright senior research fellowship in 1974-75. I worked primarily
at the Institut fUr Auslandsbeziehungen in Stuttgart, which has
an outstanding collection on Germans who emigrated to other
lands, including Brazil.
While in Stuttgart I was able to examine a substantial body of
material in the German language-newspapers, reminiscences,
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letters, anniversary booklets, and publications such as yearbooks,
annuals or calendars, reports, bulletins, and catalogs, produced
by German-Brazilian individuals, churches, schools, societies,
publishers, and commercial associations, in addition to an extensive collection of secondary works on German immigration.
This research was later supplemented by work in Brazil, chiefly at
the Instituto Hans Staden in Sao Paulo, made possible by grants
from the American Philosophical Society and the University of
Nebraska.
It had long since become obvious to me that the idea of a brief
comparative study, such as I had originally planned, was not
viable. In order to make meaningful comparisons between the experiences of Germans in the United States and in Brazil, I needed
to discover and synthesize basic information about the latter country that was not otherwise available in the English language. Events
that emerged from ethnocultural conflict cannot be understood
without some command of the context-the social structure, the
institutions, and the attitudes and beliefs of the immigrants, in
addition to the responses of the most or receiving society to these
strangers in their midst. Obviously, no attempt can be made here
to provide a comprehensive profile of the German Brazilians in
the manner of Jean Roche and the French annalistes or other advocates of systematic social history. Instead, my purpose is to provide enough information to render German-Brazilian behavior
understandable. Thus my project was transformed from an article in comparative history to a book treating the German ethnic
experience in Brazil in the era of World War I-a parallel volume
to Bonds of Loyalty.
Comparisons between the Brazilian and the American experiences are by no means absent from this book, but they are less
central, comprehensive, and systematic than I had originally intended. Before I could draw any meaningful contrasts, I found
that I had to present basic historical information about German
immigrants in Brazil and their place in Brazilian society. Comparisons are therefore included, not to provide the bases for generalizations about ethnic group conflict in time of national crises,
but rather to examine this period of Brazilian history from another
perspective.
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The first three chapters establish the historical context for understanding what happened to the Germans in Brazil during the period of the war in Europe and its immediate aftermath, 1914 to
1920. The large pattern of German settlement in Brazil, offered in
Chapter I, is followed by a study of German ethnic institutionschurches, schools, societies-and the German-language press to
reveal literacy levels, religious and linguistic characteristics, and
the measure of assimilation (or lack thereof) into Brazilian society.
Ethnic group relations, perceptions, and images, along with attendant concerns and fears, are analyzed next to show how and
why the Brazilian majority (or, more properly, the governing elite)
acquired a distorted image of the Germans.
The long period of Brazilian neutrality in the European war
from 1914 to 1917 is treated in the next section, beginning with
Chapter 4. It was a time of incubation of ethnic tensions as the
Portuguese-language press became a vehicle for anti-German
atrocity propaganda and as the German-language press countered
with propagandistic efforts of its own. The German ethnic community was rejuvenated with a new sense of self-esteem as the
verbal conflict caused German-Brazilian institutions to surge with
vitality. The climax of this trend, treated in Chapter 5, came in
April, 1917, as the Brazilian government broke off diplomatic relations with Germany in response to its policy of unrestricted submarine warfare. German districts in several Brazilian cities were
thereupon visited by riotous mobs. Homes were ransacked, commercial structures put to the torch, and German-language printing presses were destroyed. This wave of anti-Germanism, which
came at a time when Brazil was technically still neutral, was much
more destructive than anything experienced by Germans in the
United States. The events of the summer of 1917 leading to the
declaration of war are treated briefly in Chapter 6.
The war itself and its aftermath are treatell in the final section,
beginning with Chapter 7, which describes a second round of destructive anti-German riots and the efforts of the Brazilian government to cope with the problem of the German ethnic minority,
many members of which were enemy aliens. This is followed by
an analysis of the German Brazilians' response to the wartime repression that they were forced to endure, and the final chapter in-
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cludes a series of comparisons with the experiences of Germans
in the United States.
My usage of certain terms requires explanation. I think of this
book as cultural history or, perhaps more precisely, as sociocultural, in the way that anthropologists might use the term. That
means having some understanding of how a people think-or
having some notion of their hierarchy of values, how they make
sense of the world, and how their perception of reality is manifested in their behavior. The specific problem of the Germans in
Brazil during World War I is first of all a matter of differing cultures in conflict. Having studied German immigrant culture in
America for many years, I have felt reasonably confident in interpreting the behavior of the German Brazilians. It is another matter,
however, to understand the history of a people-non-German
Brazilians in this case-whose language and wellsprings of culture are much different from one's own. Consequently, some errors of fact or interpretation undoubtedly remain in my text.
Brazilian society, like the American, is an extraordinary amalgam of Indian, African, European, and Asian elements. Yet one
must cut through this complex heterogeneity to identify in a rather
simplistic way the characteristics of its core culture. The term
Luso-Brazilian is often used for this purpose in much the same way
that the foundation of American culture is frequently called AngloSaxon Protestant. Thus, Luso-Brazilian identifies the Portuguese origins of Brazilian culture, modified by five centuries of development in the New World. The Portuguese language and Latin
Catholic culture remain at the heart of Brazilian diversity. This has
been especially true of the educated, wealthy classes that have
dominated the country throughout most of its history. Although
Luso-Brazilian may refer to specifically Portuguese elements in the
Brazilian population, I do not intend generally to suggest such an
exclusive meaning in my usage of the term. As various Brazilian
and American scholars have shown, members of non-Portuguese
subgroups, including mulattoes and caboclos, could be fully accepted by Brazil's dominant classes, provided that standards of
wealth and education were met. Thus, I use Luso-Brazilian to identify (rather than to define) the dominant culture of Brazil and its
representatives, and to distinguish it from the Teuto-Brazilian,
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which is the term the German Brazilians use to identify themselves and their culture. Teuto-Brazilian is itself a "shorthand"
term, made in Brazil, that masks a rich diversity of provincial origin, dialect, religion, custom, and habit, as I hope to make clear in
the chapters that follow.

.1
A Century of German
Settlement in Brazil
A Survey, 1818-1918

T

HE IMMIGRATION of Germans to Brazil began in the wake
of the Napoleonic Wars. The Peace of Vienna (1815) introduced an extended period of relative stability that was favorable for the relocation of persons who were looking for ways to
improve their economic condition in other lands. Germans, especially in the southwestern states, were on the move. Russia was
attractive to many at first, but others went to the United States and
a few chose to settle in Brazil, where the ruling house of Portugal
had found refuge in 1808 when one of Napoleon's armies entered
Lisbon. Dom Pedro, crown prince of Portugal at the time and later
the first emperor of Brazil, was married to Archduchess Leopoldina of Austria. Inevitably her retinue included German-speaking
persons, many of whom remained permanently in Brazil. They
were followed by several hundred immigrants from Switzerland
and the Rhineland who in 1818 established the small colonies of
Leopoldina and Sao Jorge dos Ilheus in the province of Bahia and,
in 1820, Nova Friburgo near Rio de Janeiro. 1
1. Marcus Lee Hansen, The Atlantic Migration, 1607-1860, ed. Arthur M.
Schlesinger (Cambridge, Mass., 1940), 107-14; Carlos Fouquet, Der deutsche Einwanderer und seine Nachkommen in Brasilien: 1808-1824-1974 (Sao Paulo, 1974),
23-24, 46-47, 57; Karl Heinrich Oberacker, Jr., Der deutsche Beitrag zum Aufbau der
brasilianischen Nation (3rd ed., revised and expanded; Sao Leopoldo, 1978), 195203; Karl Heinrich Oberacker, Jr., "Die Deutschen in Brasilien," in Hartmut
Froschle (ed.), Die Deutschen in Lateinamerika (Tiibingen, 1979), 184-87; Ferdinand
Schroder, Brasilien und Wittenberg: Ursprung und Gestaltung deutschen evangelischen
Kirchentums in Brasilien (Berlin and Leipzig, 1936), 13-23; George P. Browne, "Government Immigration Policy in Imperial Brazil, 1822-187°" (Ph.D. dissertation,
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This movement, though generally opposed by the Brazilian
planter aristocracy, had been sponsored by the Portuguese king,
Joao VI. At first, immigration was limited to persons who professed the Roman Catholic faith, but this restriction was later removed when the first Brazilian constitution was promulgated in
1824, two years after Dom Pedro declared Brazilian independence. 2

The Historical Pattern of German Immigration
The first truly German settlement in Brazil received its impetus
from Dom Pedro I, who was eager to increase the population of
Brazil's southern frontier, a region that bordered on the former
Spanish colonies of La Plata. He hoped to establish a class of
farmers who would engage in diversified agriculture to balance
the huge cattle-raising operations in the area and the large-scale
sugar and coffee plantations farther north. Dom Pedro initially
feared that units of the Portuguese army stationed in Brazil would
resist the independence movement. He therefore believed that he
had to enlarge the number of Brazilian troops. To this end he dispatched Major Georg Schaffer, a German adventurer in his service, to Hamburg to recruit soldiers and settlers. Both groups
were expected to become permanent residents of Brazil. Schaffer
promised free passage and free land on the imperial domain on
the banks of the Rio dos Sinos at Sao Leopoldo, which was located
about twenty miles north of Porto Alegre in Rio Grande do SuI. 3
One hundred twenty-four persons-peasants, artisans, merCatholic University of America, 1972), 38-56. Although the settlers at Nova Friburgo were chiefly French Swiss of the Catholic faith, they were joined in 1823 by a
contingent of German Protestant families. Ferdinand Schroder, Die deutsche Einwanderung nach Siidbrasilien bis zum Jahre 1859 (Berlin, 1931), 31. Michael M. Hall,
"The Origins of Mass Immigration in Brazil, 1871-1914" (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 19~), treats Italian immigration primarily. For a general guide
to the literature, see Manfred Illi, Die deutsche Auswanderung nach Lateinamerika:
Eine Literaturiibersicht, Lateinamerika-Studien, II (Munich, 1977), 44-87.
2. Schroder, Die deutsche Einwanderung, 33-34, 46; Fritz Sudhaus, Deutschland
und die Auswanderung nach Brasilien im 19. Jahrhundert (Hamburg, 1940),21; Wilhelm
Monckrneier, Die deutsche iiberseeische Auswanderung (Jena, Germany: 1912), 209.
3. Carlos H. Oberacker, Jr., Jorge Antonio von Schaeffer: Criador da primeira corrente emigratOria alema para 0 Brasil (Porto Alegre, 1957); Browne, "Government Immigration Policy," 64-91; Dr. [Paul] Aldinger, Deutsche Mitarbeit in Brasilien (Curi-
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chants, and their families, plus a Protestant minister-constituted the first contingent of settlers. Arriving late in 1824, they
were greeted by the emperor and his wife as they stopped in Rio
de Janeiro on their way south. In Porto Alegre they were received
by Jose Pinheiro, president of the frontier province of Rio Grande
do SuI. 4 Unlike several other colonies of immigrants founded in
the 1820S, this one prospered, though not easily.
In the decades that followed, thousands of immigrants from the
German states settled in southern Brazil. By the end of the century, according to Jean Roche, between 150,000 and 200,000 German immigrants and their descendants resided in Rio Grande do
SuI alone. 5 It should be noted, however, that estimates of ethnic
populations by less meticulous scholars than Roche are sometimes inflated by including the children of exogamous marriages
and by failing to exclude the number of returnees.
The Brazilian government continued to foster immigration from
Europe in a variety of ways throughout the nineteenth century.
Among the earliest incentives it offered were free passage, plus
seeds, animals, and implements. Non-Catholics were tolerated so
long as their houses of worship did not bear the standard insignia
of churches-crosses, spires, and the like. At times, immigrants
were also lured by exemption from certain taxes or from military
service for a period of years. Later the government provided transportation from the port of entry to an immigrant settlement; loans
and grants went to colonization companies; salaries of clergymen
tiba, 1923); Mack Walker, Germany and the Emigration, 1816-1885 (Cambridge,
Mass., 1964), 38-41; Albert Schmid, Deutsches Siildnerschicksal in Brasilien: Die
Fremdenbataillone des Kaisers Dom Pedro 1, ihre Revolte und ihre Aufliising (Porto
Alegre, 1951).
4. For detailed data on founders, locations, crops raised, and exports of Sao
Leopoldo, see Ernesto Pellanda, A coloniza{:iio germanica no Rio Grande do SuI,
1824-1924 (Reparti{:iio de estatistica do estado do Rio Grande do SuI) (Porto Alegre,
1925),31-76.
5. Jean Roche, La colonisation allemande et Ie Rio Grande do SuI (Paris, 1959),
133-35; Fouquet, Der deutsche Einwanderer, 27-31; Oberacker, Der deutsche Beitrag,
289-92; Oskar Canstatt, Die deutsche Auswanderung, Auswandererfursorge und Auswandererziele (Berlin-Schoneberg, 1904), 253; Joachim Fischer, "Geschichte der
Evangelischen Kirche Lutherischen Bekenntnisses," in Joachim Fischer and
Christoph Jahn (eds.), Es begann am Rio dos Sinos: Geschichte und Gegenwart der Ev.
Kirche Lutherischen Bekenntnisses in Brasilien (Erlangen, W. Germany, 1970), 90-92.
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and teachers in certain colonies were paid; and various public
buildings were erected at government expense. 6
For several years after the establishment of the Sao Leopoldo
colony (until Dom Pedro was forced to abdicate in 1831), European immigration to Brazil numbered about a thousand persons
per year. 7 Then, during the turbulent first year of the regency, it
ceased altogether. In the late 1830S and 1840s, immigration resumed as the government attracted several hundred persons each
year, chiefly from Germany and Portugal. Following the European revolutions of 1848, however, the annual totals spiraled to
ten or fifteen thousand persons, of whom one-fifth were German.
By the 1870S, Brazilian immigration had expanded to include
thousands of persons from Portugal, Italy, and Spain, as well as
Austria, Russia, and Switzerland, many of whom were Germanspeaking. The high point was reached in 1891, when 216,000 persons were received from all sources. This substantial increase was
related to the abolition of slavery. As the children of slave mothers
were freed in 1871 and the slaves themselves were emancipated in
1888, immigration provided an adequate, inexpensive supply of
laborers to perform the manual work on the sugar and coffee
plantations. Moreover, there were some Brazilians with racist sentiments who welcomed the immigration as a means to augment
the white proportion of the population and thereby counterbalance the huge, newly freed black population. 8
6. For a summary of various Brazilian laws at the imperial as well as provincial
level, see Schroder, Brasilien und Wittenberg, 27-45. For a full analysis, see Browne,
"Government Immigration Policy." See also Fischer, "Geschichte der EKLB,"
87-88; and Monckmeier, Die deutsche uberseeische Auswanderung, 209.
7. See table summarizing Brazilian immigration from all countries, Jose Fernando Carneiro, Imigra¢o e coloniza¢o no Brasil (Rio de Janeiro, 1950), facing p. 60;
Schroder, Die deutsche Einwanderung, 155.
8. Imre Ferenczi (comp.) and Walter F. Willcox (ed.), International Migrations,
Vol. I, Statistics (New York, 1929),549-50: George P. Browne, "Politica Imigratoria
no Brasil Regencia," Blumenau em Cadernos, XVI (1975), 3-14; T. Lynn Smith, Brazil: People and Institutions (Rev. ed.; Baton Rouge, 1963), 118-33; Oberacker, Der
deutsche Beitrag, 286-8g; Thomas Holloway, "Immigration and Abolition: The Transition from Slave to Free Labor in the Sao Paulo Coffee Zone," in Dauril Alden and
Warren Dean (eds.), Essays Concerning the Socioeconomic History of Brazil and Portuguese India (Gainesville, 1977), 150-77. Carneiro, Imigrapio e coloniza~ao no Brasil,
also relates immigration to slavery and its abolition. F. de Leonardo Truda, A colonisac;ao allema no Rio Grande do SuI (Porto Alegre, 1930), 111-28; Thomas E. Skidmore, Black into White: Race and Nationality in Brazilian Thought (New York, 1974).
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During these decades of the late nineteenth century, German
immigration averaged only about two thousand per year, briefly
rising to five thousand in 1890 and 1891. No doubt the numbers
would have been higher had it not been for much bad publicity in
the German press about Brazil as a place for emigrants to settle.
The problem had come to a head in the 1850S and was directly
related to the fact that more than half of the Germans in Brazil
were Protestants, a tiny minority in an officially Catholic country.
Throughout the latter half of the century, many emigration pamphlets, books, and periodicals published in Germany, such as Der
Deutsche Auswanderer, described Brazil as undesirable or unattractive for Germans. Criticism was repeatedly leveled at abuses attributable to unscrupulous recruiting agents and the parceria system (a
sharecropping arrangement that perpetuated land monopoly),
but problems emerging from religious differences were perceived
as being especially troublesome. Moreover, at that time a Protestant marriage had no legality in Brazil and was treated as concubinage. Prussia, the large and powerful state from which a substantial proportion of the German emigration originated, saw
itself as the protector of Protestantism and hence instructed its
minister to Brazil to negotiate for the introduction of civil marriage. Several such bills were introduced in the Brazilian legislature in the late 1850S, but none was passed, due to conservative
opposition. 9
The Prussian government responded in 1859 to this inaction
with a directive sponsored by August von der Heydt, the minister
of the interior, that officially discouraged emigration to Brazil. The
Heydt'sche Reskript, as it was called in German, also curtailed the
recruitment activities of agents and shipowners. Prussia encouraged other German states to join in a united effort to get Brazil (1)
to recognize the legality of Protestant marriage, (2) to guarantee
inheritance rights of immigrants and their children, (3) to grant
Protestants equal rights with Catholics to erect their own churches
and schools, and (4) to end the parceria system.
9. Carneiro, Imigra¢o e coloniZllfiio no Brasil, table facing p. 60; Walker, Germany
and the Emigration, 127-29, 177-81; Sudhaus, Deutschland und die Auswanderung,
61-62; Hall, "The Origins of Mass Immigration," 13-20; Roche, La colonisation allemande, 515-17; Fischer, "Geschichte der EKLB," 89; George P. Browne, "Secularization and Modernization in Imperial Brazil: The Question of Non-Catholic
Marriage," Revista de Hist6ria de America, LXXXIII (1977), 121-33.
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In 1861, Brazil moderated its marriage law sufficiently to recognize the validity of Protestant marriages contracted before the immigrant partners arrived in Brazil. The new law, which went into
effect in 1863, also permitted Protestant clergymen to perform civil
marriage ceremonies, provided they were properly licensed by the
government. Nothing else was done about the German complaints
until 1890 after the emperor was exiled and the new republican
constitution was promulgated, and with it the institution of civil
marriage. Thus Prussia did not withdraw the Heydt'sche Reskript
until 1895.10
Nothing in the Prussian regulation actually prevented a person
from emigrating to Brazil if he wanted to do so. Hence there is no
reliable way of estimating the effect of such policies. Surely most
German emigrants of the late nineteenth century recognized that
the United States, rather than Brazil, offered the more congenial
cultural and economic environment. In the early 1880s, when
German emigration to the United States attained unprecedented
heights (25°,000 in 1882), there was no comparable increase in the
numbers of persons who chose to go to Brazil. Yet after 1896,
when the German government no longer officially discouraged
the movement, the number of emigrants to Brazil dropped to less
than 1,000 per year. Not until just before World War I, from 1908
to 1914, did the volume increase to nearly 5,000 per year. The
highest ever recorded was 8,004 in 1913.11
The census of 1920 provides a statistical summary of Germanborn persons in Brazil in the era of World War I. It shows that Germany ranked a distant fourth behind Italy, Portugal, and Spain as
a source of immigrants. It demonstrates further that Germans
were highly concentrated in the southern states of Rio Grande do
SuI, Santa Catarina, and Parana and in major cities, most notably
Porto Alegre, Sao Paulo, and Rio de Janeiro. Nearly 53,000 per10. Sudhaus, Deutschland und die Auswanderung, 99, 113, 119, 126, 177; Browne,
"Secularization and Modernization," 131; Schroder, Die deutsche Einwanderung, 79;
Fouquet, Der deutsche Einwanderer, 71; Fischer, "Geschichte der EKLB," 89; Canstatt, Die deutsche Auswanderung, 252. For a full discussion of the position of the
German government regarding emigration to Brazil, see Gerhard Brunn, Deutschland und Brasilien (1889-1914) (Cologne and Vienna, 1971), 127-54.
11. Ferenczi (comp.) and Willcox (ed.), Statistics, 550-51; Carneiro, Imigrar;iio e
colonizar;iio no Brasil, table facing p. 60.
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sons were counted as German nationals (Reichsdeutsche), but such
a datum has limited meaning because membership in the German
cultural group was far more important than was place of birth or
actual citizenship. According to one generous estimate made by a
German Brazilian, the number of persons of German birth and
descent in 1920 in Rio Grande do SuI, the most German of the Brazilian states, was between 360,000 and 400,000 in a total population of 2,142,000.12

The Spatial Distribution of German Settlements
The historical pattern of German settlement in the southern states
of Brazil is closely connected to the geography of the region. At
least three major topographic features must be considered-the
coastal plain (the littoral), the Great Escarpment, and the interior
uplands (the campanha). The coastal plains, often narrow and
swampy, had been occupied by Portuguese settlers from the earliest times. Here is where the seaports and most of the major cities
developed. This region is sharply delineated by the Great Escarpment, perhaps the most striking feature of Brazilian topography,
which begins near Bahia and stretches southwestward near the
coast to Rio Grande do SuI. In some places, most notably between
Santos on the coast and Sao Paulo on the plateau, the escarpment
rises abruptly to 2,600 feet in elevation. From this point a vast upland is tilted slightly toward the interior, so that it is drained by
rivers flowing north and west to the Rio Parana, which eventually
enters the sea near Buenos Aires. In Rio Grande do SuI, much of
this upland region was the cattle country of the gauchos; it was
sparsely settled and divided into huge estates called esttincias.
South of the state of Sao Paulo, the escarpment tends to broaden
into a hilly, heavily forested region called the serra. A series of
12. Karl Heinrich Oberacker, [Sr.], Die volkspolitische Lage des Deutschtums in Rio
Grande do SuI (Jena, Germany, 1936), 92-95. Heinz Kloss has summarized these
and other estimates in Statistisches Handbuch der Volksdeutschen in iibersee (Stuttgart,
1943),61-67. The larger context of European immigration to Brazil has been studied carefully in recent years. For useful introductions, see Smith, Brazil, 118-43;
and Thomas W. Merrick and Douglas H. Graham, Population and Economic Development in Brazil: 1800 to the Present (Baltimore, 1979),80-117. See also Hall, "The Origins of Mass Immigration"; and Browne, "Government Immigration Policy."
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Map 1. Areas of nineteenth-century German settlement in southern Brazil. Shaded
areas indicate heavy rural settlement. Names of cities and towns are restricted to
those mentioned in the text.

smaller ridges, less clearly defined, are broken by valleys and
rushing streams. North of Porto Alegre, the escarpment turns inland and crosses the state of Rio Grande do SuI from the coast
nearly to the Argentine boundary at the Rio Uruguay.13 This hilly
region, located in the central part of the state, is drained by the
I).

Preston James, Latin America (4th ed.; New York, 1969), 698-99, 800-804.
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Rio Jacu!, which flows eastward into a huge coastal lagoon, Lagoa
dos Patos, at Porto Alegre.
RIO GRANDE DO SUL

The largest number of German immigrants settled in Brazil's southernmost state, Rio Grande do SuI, which is roughly the size of
New York, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey combined. The first of
the many German settlements there was Sao Leopoldo, which is
located on the Rio dos Sinos, the first of several tributaries that
flow south out of the serra into the Rio Jacui. The region north and
west of Sao Leopoldo became the heartland of the German settlements, most of which were located along the terraces on the north
side of the Jacu! Valley. An area of nearly four thousand square
miles, the district stretches from Taquarcl at the eastern end to
Santa Cruz in the west, a distance of more than one hundred
miles. Its average width is twenty-five miles. 14
The Germans were the first Europeans to settle this region.
Since it was unsuited for grazing cattle and contained no lodes of
precious minerals or gems, it had been ignored by the Portuguese,
whose interest in the area had been limited to raising rice on the
Jacu! plain. Similarly, early immigrants from the Azores were attracted to the prairie grasslands south of the Rio Jacui. The Germans, in contrast, were strongly drawn to the forested lands. The
landscape was somewhat reminiscent of Germany and they liked
the abundance of wood, the reasonably fertile soil, the more than
adequate rainfall, and the opportunity to live as they pleased in
virtual isolation from other social and cultural groups. In the decades following the founding of Sao Leopoldo, the Germans spread
out across the serra to Santa Maria and eventually to Cruz Alta on
14. Truda, A colonisa¢o allemii, 31-44; Browne, "Government Immigration Policy," 92-101. The most detailed study of the German settlements in Rio Grande do
SuI is La colonisation allemande by Roche, a French historian of the annaliste school.
Roche provides an integrated analysis of the topography, climate, plant life, and
history of the region. His maps (pp. 91, 92, 1<>7) are especially helpful. Aurelio
Porto, Die deutsche Arbeit in Rio Grande do SuI (Sao Leopoldo, 1934), is a detailed
account, especially for the early years. Many statistics are provided in Pellanda, A
coloniza¢o germanica no Rio Grande do SuI. For a study that places the German ethnic group within the context of general European immigration to Rio Grande do
SuI, see Dietrich von Delhaes-Guenther, "La influencia de la immigracion en el
desarrollo y composicion ethnica de la poblacion de Rio Grande do Sui," Jahrbuch
fUr Geschichte von Staat, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Lateinamerikils, XIII (1976), 420-33.
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the plateau. From there they descended into the valley of the Rio
Iju! on the western slope near the Argentine border, establishing
colonies there and across the Rio Uruguay in the Misiones territory of Argentina. Some pushed on into Paraguay. 15
The early years were especially difficult for the Germans in
southern Brazil. Inevitably the immigrant group included a number of vagrants, impostors, and assorted scoundrels. The TeutoBrazilians, as they Came to be called, were frequently threatened
by bands of thieves, hostile Indians, and inhospitable Luso-Brazilians. Often harassed and exploited by corrupt local officials,
they had little legal protection and, except for paying taxes, they
were usually excluded from participation in government. 16 Often
they were caught up in frontier wars; at least four major conflicts
involved Rio Grande do SuI during the imperial era. In one instance, the Paraguayan War of 1867, more than forty soldiers were
recruited in the German settlement of Dois Irmaos, but only three
survived. 17
The majority of the Germans in Rio Grande do Sui were small
farmers who cultivated the soil with primitive equipment and
with the help of their typically large families. Living in isolated
clearings in the subtropical forest or in small, almost exclusively
German rural villages, they did not have to conform to established
15. Preston E. James, "The Expanding Settlements of Southern Brazil," Geographical Review, XXX (1940), 608-16; Porto, Die deutsche Arbeit, 64-91, 181-87.
Schroder, Die deutsche Einwanderung, 81-92, offers brief descriptions of each
colony and gives the names of settlers, their products, churches, origins in Germany, population data, etc. For an example of a study of a Single colony, see Klaus
Becker, "A funda¢o e os primeiros 30 anos de Teutonia," in I. Col6quio de Estudos
Teuto-Brasileiros (Porto Alegre, 1963), 217-27; and Joao Guilherme Correa de Souza,
"Uma comunidade Teuto-Brasileira: Aspectos de sua estrutura e organizac;ao sodais," in 1. Col6quio, 181-20l.
16. Karl von Koseritz, Bi/der aus Brasilien (Leipzig, 1885), 138; Truda, A coloniStlfiio allemii, 27; Joseph L. Love, Rio Grande do Sui and Brazilian Regionalism,
1882-1930 (Stanford, Calif., 1971), 13. For examples of friction in Sao Leopoldo,
see Porto, Die deutsche Arbeit, 158, 162, 240.
17. Porto, Die deutsche Arbeit, 104-12, 208-29; Heinz Dressel, Der deutschbrasilianische Kolonist im alten Siedlungsgebiet von Siio Leopoldo, Rio Grande do Sui: Eine
soziologische Studie unter besonderer BerUcksichtigung von Dois Irmiios (Neuendettelsau,
w. Germany, 1967), 18. A local uprising called the Muckerkrieg involved German
religious radicals with government troops in 1874. See Roche, La colonisation allemande, 511; and Canstatt, Die deutsche Auswanderung, 423-25.
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or preexisting social and cultural standards, except in border
areas. Linguistic acculturation was unnecessary. In general, their
situation required only minimal adaptation to the larger social
environment. 18
The physical environment was another matter. If a settler came
into the area and devoted all his energy to clearing the forest so
that he could farm as he had in Europe, he was almost sure to fail.
By the time he could accomplish the task of clearing the land of
trees, crucial planting seasons would have passed. Instead, the
German pioneers typically adapted the primitive slash-and-burn
techniques that they had learned from the caboclos, who were
poor, despised natives of mixed Indian and Portuguese blood.
Lacking capital and credit, as well as effective means of transportation, the typical German colono also turned to indigenous crops
such as manioc and maize, which he planted among the partially
carbonized tree trunks. When the fertility of a given clearing was
exhausted after several years, the pioneer would move to another
spot and start the process over again. Such primitive, subsistence
agriculture often became a more or less permanent part of the
German-Brazilian way of life and was sometimes continued long
after improvements in transportation and access to credit and
world markets rendered such methods obsolete. Emilio Willems,
an anthropologist who is the foremost student of German-Brazilian life, declares that the physical environment of the subtropical
rain forest had forced a radical break with German peasant traditions. ''Technology, food habits, dress, and housing patterns," he
observes, "had changed almost beyond recognition; instead of a
peasant village there were widely scattered farmsteads, transportation was by ox cart or mule train, and the settler's participation
in the money economy was marginal at best." 19
18. Liene Maria Martins Schutz, "Imigra¢o alema: Processo, costume e influencias," in Anais do 1° simp6sio de hist6ria de imigra¢o e coloniza¢o alema no Rio
Grande do Sui (Sao Leopoldo, 1974), 275.
19. Love, Rio Grande do Sui, 18; James, "Expanding Settlements," 608; Emilio
Willems, A acultura¢o dos a/emaes no Brasil: Estudo antropologico dos imigrantes
alemiies e seus descendentes no Brasil (Sao Paulo, 1946), 329ff. See also Emilio Willems,
"Social Change on the Latin American Frontier," in David H. Miller and Jerome O.
Steffen (eds.), The Frontier: Comparative Studies (Norman, 1977), 262-63 (quotation
on p. 264). Cf. Terry Jordan, German Seed in Texas Soil: Immigrant Farmers in Nineteenth Century Texas (Austin, 1966).
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A German-Brazilian farmer with his family in temporary quarters in the forested
serra of southern Brazil
Reprinted from Kahle, Deutsche Heimat in Brasilien

Nevertheless, the German cu1turallandscape remained distinctive.20 In areas where Germans were more densely clustered and
after decades of development, there were sharp contrasts between different ethnic group settlements. The landscape of the
Jacul floodplain, where Luso-Brazilians cultivated rice and customarily lived in temporary camplike structures, was noticeably
different from that of the German settlements to the north. Architectural forms and styles; the care bestowed upon the land, buildings, and flower gardens; and the types of crops raised-all reflected the cultural values of the Teuto-Brazilian community in the
20. I have analyzed the relative importance of environmental forces, such as
those emphasized by Emilio Willems, and the persistence of cultural forms in my
essay, "Regionalism and the Great Plains: Problems of Concept and Method,"
Western Historical Quarterly, XV (1<)84), 19-38. See also my comments on conceptual schemas based on the environmentalism of Frederick Jackson Turner in "Ethnic Minority Groups in the American West," in Michael P. Malone (ed.), Historians
and the American West (Lincoln, 1<)83), 387-413.
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A German-Brazilian school building in Neu-Bremen, with the teacher's residence
attached. Note the use of German Fachwerk (timbered framework with spaces filled
with bricks).
Reprinted from Kahle, Deutsche Heimat in Brasilien

serra. Similarly, the German district varied in appearance from the
zone of Italian colonies that formed on the crest of the transitional
area. There, extensive vineyards were the dominant feature. The
Italian homesteads were more substantial than the Luso-Brazilian, but generally less neat than the German. 21
German cultural characteristics were most dearly evident in the
Schneiss or Pikade, the names the Germans gave to the form of agricultural settlement common in the serra. The founders of a colony would make a long, straight cut through the forest (Urwald)
that would subsequently become a road. Individual settlers would
21. Roche, La colonisation allemande, provides a full description of GermanBrazilian housing forms. See also Alba Maria B. Gomes et al., "A colonizac;ao alema na area de Joaneta," in I. Col6quio, 166-76; and Oberacker, "Die Deutschen in
Brasilien," 190-93. James, "Expanding Settlements," 616; Dressel, Der deutschbrasilianische Kolonist, 30; Roy Nash, The Conquest of Brazil (New York, 1926),
182-83.
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A view of Estrela, Rio Grande do Sui, a strongly German community located in the
serra approximately fifty miles west of Porto Alegre on the Rio Taquari
Reprinted from Kahle, Deutsche Heimat in Brasilien

then receive long, narrow plots of land of one or two hundred
acres that stretched out at right angles from the road. Farmhouses
were built at the side of the road, thereby creating a strung-out
rural village. Several such Pikaden would constitute a colony. The
center of the colony was the Stadtplatz, a cluster of buildings including the church, school, civil offices, stores, workshops, and
the mill. This form of spatial organization was imported from central Germany, where the Waldhufendorf or Strassendorf was common. Occasionally German settlers in the United States attempted
to establish colonies organized in this way, but they certainly were
not typical, chiefly because the pattern of land sales as specified
by American law, beginning with the Land Ordinance of 1785
through to the Homestead Act of 1862 and subsequent amendatory legislation, worked against their formation. The first structures erected by the German colonists in Brazil were primitive,
and slash-and-burn techniques were used, but gradually over a
period of many years the people built more substantial structures
and adopted more conventional agricultural methods. Nevertheless, as Emilio Willems has emphasized, many of these commu-
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nities remained in poverty and extreme cultural isolation for generations, well into the twentieth century. 22
SANTA CATARINA

Isolation was also typical of many German colonies that were
founded in Santa Catarina, a state the size of Indiana that lies directly north of Rio Grande do SuI. Here the Great Escarpment was
broken by the Rio Itajaf and, on its northern border, the Rio
Negro. These rivers, plus several smaller streams, formed heavily
forested valleys between the coast and the interior plateau. As in
Rio Grande do SuI, wooded areas had been avoided by the LusoBrazilians, who preferred the coastal lowlands or the cattle-grazing
lands of the upland. Because the terrain did not encourage contiguous settlements like those on the terraces of Rio Grande do
SuI, the German colonies tended to be separated by intervening
ridges and valleys occupied by other ethnic groups, most frequently Italians. Pikaden were therefore less common in Santa
Catarina and individual holdings tended to be smaller than those
in Rio Grande do SuI. 23 Here also the Germans tended to concentrate in towns and hence to dominate the economic and social
structures of their local communities.
The earliest German settlements in Santa Catarina, such as Sao
22. Alfred Hettner, "Das Deutschtum in Siidbrasilien," Geographische Zeitschrift, VIII (11)02), 612-14; Roche, La colonisation allemande, 175-82; Leo Waibel,
"European Colonization in Southern Brazil," Geographical Review, XL (1950),
529-47; Oberacker, "Die Deutschen in Brasilien," 189-1)0; Hanns Porzelt, Der
deutsche Bauer in Rio Grande do Sui (Ochsenfurt am Main, Germany, 1937),41-43.
For studies of specific communities, see Gomes et al., "A colonizac;ao alema,"
151-62; Giralda Seyferth, A coloniza¢o alemil no vale do Itaja(-Mirim: Um estudo do
desenvolvimento economico (Porto Alegre, 1974), 47-51; and Dressel, Der deutschbrasilianische Kolonist. The latter is a detailed sociological study of the inhabitants of
Dois Irmaos, a Pikade called Baumschneis by the Germans, located on the Rio dos
Sinos upstream from Sao Leopoldo. For a brief description of the Pikade in En-

glish, see Terry G. Jordan, "Aspects of German Colonization in Southern Brazil,"
Southwestern Social Science Quarterly, XLII (1962), 346-53. Cf. Robert C. Eidt, Pioneer Settlement in Northeast Argentina (Madison, 1971), 163-65, 199-200 (Eidt's list
of advantages of the Waldhufendorf settlement form).
23. James, "Expanding Settlements," 616-17; Jordan, "Aspects of Colonization," 351. Carneiro, Imigra~iio e coloniza¢o no Brasil, 67-68, draws contrasts in patterns of colonization between Rio Grande do SuI and Santa Catarina.
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Pedro d' Alcantara and Rio Negro, were established in the late
on strategically important routes that led southward from
Sao Paulo to the southern border of Brazil. Virtually abandoned
by the Brazilian government in the 1830S, these settlements barely
survived until Santa Catarina captured the attention of a new generation of colonizers at mid-century. 24
The most renowned of the later colonies to be established in
Santa Catarina and perhaps the most successful in all Brazil was
Blumenau, founded in 1850 on the banks of the Rio Itajai by Dr.
Hermann Blumenau, who served as director of the colony until he
returned to Germany in 1880, by which time his colony had grown
to fifteen thousand inhabitants. It was thoroughly, though not exclusively, German. The German language was spoken everywhere
in Blumenau-in the homes, on the streets, and in stores, hotels,
schools, and churches. As late as World War I, at least two-thirds
of all the inhabitants of Blumenau spoke German as their mother
tongue, even though by that time few were German-born. The
proportion was even higher in the surrounding rural districts.
The two local newspapers were published in German; imported
German goods were everywhere in evidence. Even official government records were kept in German in the early days of the settlement. Like many of the Rio Grande do SuI colonies, Blumenau
was isolated well into the twentieth century by lack of transportation connections. Although roads within the district were satisfactory for the times, connections with coastal communities were
miserable. Water transportation on the Rio Itajai was the standard
mode, but the harbor facilities in the port city of Itajai were inadequate. In short, the isolated district of Blumenau was well suited for
the flowering of an immigrant German society on Brazilian soil. 25
1820S

24. Percy E. Schramm, "Die deutsche Siedlungskolonie Dona Francisca (Brasilien: St. Catharina) im Rahmen gleichzeitiger Projekte und Verhandlungen,"
Jahrbuch [iir Geschichte von Staat, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Lateinamerikas, I (1964),
309; Jose Deeke, "Erste Anfiinge der Kolonisation Santa Catharinas. Periode bis
1848," in Gottfried Entres (ed.), Der Staat Santa Catharina in Vergangenheit und
Gegenwart unter besonder Beriicksichtigung des Deutschtums: Gedenkbuch zur loo-Feier
deutscher einwanderung in Sta. Catharina (Florianopolis, 1929), 28-35, hereinafter
cited as Gedenkbuch; Browne, "Government Immigration Policy," 101-104.
25. R. A. Hehl, "Die deutsche Colonisation in Sud-Brasilien," Petermann's Mitteilungen, XXVIII (1882), 464; Jose Deeke, Das Munizip Blumenau (Sao Leopoldo,
1917); Jose Deeke, "Die intensiviere deutsche Kolonisation in Santa Catharina," in
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Joinville, founded at the same time as Blumenau, was the second major German colony in Santa Catarina. Located on the coast
in the northeastern corner of the province near Sao Francisco do
SuI, this settlement occupied lands purchased by the Hamburg
Colonization Company from the Prince of Joinville, son of the recently deposed King Louis Philippe of France. The prince had acquired the land as part of the dowry of his wife, Dona Francisca,
the sister of the Brazilian emperor, Dom Pedro II. From the beginning this colony, known at first as Dona Francisca, attracted not
farmers but urban dwellers-craftsmen whose skills provided a
foundation for industrial development-in addition to a number
of well-educated persons who left Germany for political reasons.
Like Blumenau, Joinville developed many voluntary associations,
a German-language newspaper, and numerous ethnic businesses.
By 1880, its population reached eighteen thousand. 26
By no means were the German settlements in Santa Catarina
limited to the Blumenau and Joinville districts. As in Rio Grande
do SuI, German frontiersmen spread throughout the forested
areas southward to Brusque and other communities, northward
to Sao Bento, and westward past the cattle country to the valley of
the Rio Uruguay, where in some districts they constituted as much
as a quarter of the population. Between 1880 and 1915, a substantial immigration of German artisans contributed to the further industrialization of Joinville, Blumenau, and other strongly German
cities of Santa Catarina.
Late in the nineteenth century the Germans were joined by
large numbers of other immigrants-Russians, Poles, Ukrainians,
as well as Italians-especially in the northern part of the province
Entres (ed.), Gedenkbuch, 40-52; Jose Ferreira da Silva, "Historia de Blumenau," in
Centenario de Blumenau, 1850-2 de Setembro-1950 (N.p., [1950]); Jose Ferreira da
Silva, Hist6ria de Blumenau (Florianopolis, [ca. 1972]); Oberacker, "Die Deutschen
in Brasilien," 185; Clarence H. Haring, The Germans in South America: A Contribution
to the Economic History of the World War (New York, 1920), 27-31; Fouquet, Der
deutsche Einwanderer, 31-37; Seyferth, A colonizapio alemil no vale do Itajai-Mirim,
87-98.
26. Hehl, "Die deutsche Colonisation in Siid-Brasilien," 461-62; Emesto
Niemeyer, Die Deutschen in Brasilien (Curityba, 1926),33-37; Sudhaus, Deutschland
und die Auswanderung, ~-75; Schramm, "Die deutsche Siedlungskolonie Dona
Francisca," 308-22.
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A view of Sao Bento, Santa Catarina, located on the Rio Negro. Many German
settlers moved north from Sao Bento into the state of Parana.
Reprinted from Kahle, Deutsche Heimat in Brasilien

near the Rio Negro. By the time of World War I, there were approximately 100,000 persons of German heritage in Santa Catarina; most were of Brazilian birth and citizenship. The total population of the state was 669,000, according to the census of 1920.27
PARANA.

The third southern Brazilian state with many German inhabitants
is Parana, located north of Santa Catarina across the Rio Negro.
Parana, a state about the size of Nebraska, was still a frontier region as late as 1920, when its population had reached only 685,000.
27· Carneiro, Imigra¢o e coloniza~iio no Brasil, 54-59; Gerd Kohlhepp, "Die
deutschstammigen Siedlungsgebiete im sudbrasilianischen Staate Santa Catarina," in Heide/berger Studien zur Kulturgeographie (Wiesbaden, 1966), 219-44. See
especially his maps (pp. 224, 230). For the economic development of the German
district in Santa Catarina, see Gerd Kohlhepp, Industriegeographie des nordiistlichen

Santa Catarina (Sudbrasilien): Ein Beitrag zur Geographie eines deutschbrasilianischen
Siedlungsgebietes (Heidelberg, 1968), 77-100.
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Although a German colony had been founded on the Rio Negro
as early as 1829, most settlements after 1870 consisted of extensions from Sao Bento and other German concentrations in Santa
Catarina. Other clusters of German families developed in the big
cities of the state, especially in Curitiba, the capital.
Outnumbered by Italian and Russian (i.e., Polish, Ruthenian,
and Ukrainian) immigrants, the German element in Parana was
enlarged by the arrival of Wolgadeutsche and Schwartzmeerdeutsche
from Russia, beginning in 1877. Many of these Germans from
Russia were Mennonite pacifists fleeing conscription into the Russian army. Accustomed to the rich soils and open spaces of the
Russian steppes, many farmers among them settled on the campos, the grasslands of the plateau, where they tried, without much
success, to raise wheat. As in the United States, the Germans
from Russia sought to establish colonies that were exclusively
Mennonite, Evangelical, Lutheran, or Catholic. Many of these
early settlers experienced severe problems, causing a strong emigration across the western border into Argentina and Paraguay. In
general, however, the Germans in Parana were either concentrated in the areas of Curitiba and Ponta Grossa or were widely
scattered across the state. More urban than rural and always a
small minority in this state, the Germans tended to assimilate
more rapidly here than they did in Santa Catarina or Rio Grande
do Sul. 28
OTHER GERMAN COLONIES IN BRAZIL

Compared with the huge settlements in the southern states, other
German colonies in Brazil were numerically insignificant. There
were clusters of German immigrants in the states of Sao Paulo, Rio
de Janeiro, Espirito Santo, and even as far north as Bahia and Per28. Wilhelm Fugmann, Die Deutschen in Parana: Das deutsche Jahrhundertbuch
(Curitiba, 1929), 3-33; Werner Aulich, Parana und die Deutschen: Versuch einer
charakterologischen Geschichtsschreibung (Curitiba, 1953); Friedrich W. Brepohl and
Wilhelm Fugmann, Die Wolgadeutschen im brasilinanischen Staate Parana (Stuttgart,
1927); Fouquet, Der deutsche Einwanderer, 37-39; Altiva Pilatti Balhana and Cecilia
Maria Westphalen, "0 Censo dos Alemaes do Parana em 1917:' Jahrbuch fUr
Geschichte von Staat, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Lateinamerikas, XIII (1976), 404-19;
Joseph W. Fretz, Immigrant Group Settlements in Paraguay (North Newton, Kan.,
1962).
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nambuco, but in most places their numbers were small, except in
the city of Sao Paulo. They were usually so mixed with immigrants from other countries that they usually failed to achieve a
strong identity in any given locality.
Espirito Santo, a small mountainous state located on the coast
northeast of Rio de Janeiro, provides an important exception.
Here the German-speaking people numbered seventeen or eighteen thousand in 1914, according to one estimate. Most were
farmers living in isolated areas and practicing a primitive agriculture. Few were engaged in commerce or industry. Except for their
churches, the Espirito Santo Germans and their descendants were
unable to create the complex organizational structures typical of
their compatriots in the southern states. 29
Most German immigrants avoided the huge coffee plantations
of Sao Paulo and the other states of the middle region. There were
some, of course, who tried to operate under the prevailing parceria
system, as, for example, at Rio Claro. A few were successful; after
several years of sharecropping, they acquired the means to settle
elsewhere. One of the largest coffee planters of Sao Paulo in the
pre- World War I period was Francisco Schmidt, who immigrated
from Germany as a youth, amassed one fortune as a coffee merchant, and made another as a planter. By 1914 his trees numbered
in the millions and his agricultural employees in the thousands.3D
29. Ernst Wagemann, "Das Deutschtum in Sudamerika. II. Die deutschen
Kolonisten in den tropischen Urwaldern Brasiliens," Deutsche Rundschau, CLXIII
(1915), 162 and passim; see also Ernst Wagemann, Die deutschen Kolonisten im
brasilianischen Staate Espirito Santo, Schriften des Vereins fur Sozialpolitik, Vol.
CXLVII, pt. 5 (Munich and Leipzig: 1915), 1-151. A translation into Portuguese, A
colonizat;tio alemii no Espirito Santo (Rio de Janeiro, 1949), was also published serially
in Boletim Geogrtifico, VI (1948-49). Fouquet, Der deutsche Einwanderer, 50-53. For a
folkloric study of the Espirito Santo Germans, see Renato Jose Costa Pacheco, "Assimilac;ao de alemaes no Espirito Santo," Sociolagia, XVI (June, 1954), 183-201; Renato Jose Costa Pacheco, "Colonos alemaes no Espirito Santo: Progresso ou estagnac;ao?" in 1. Co16quio, 239-45. This volume also contains two studies of German
communities in Pernambuco.
30. Warren Dean, Rio Claro: A Brazilian Plantation System, 1820-1920 (Stanford,
Calif., 1976), 92-104; Joseph 1. Love, Sao Paulo in the Brazilian Federation, 18891937 (Stanford, Calif., 1980), 49, 79, 203; Gilberto Freyre, New World in the Tropics:
The Culture of Modern Brazil (New York, 1966), 131; "Die grosste Kaffeeplantage der
Welt," in Uhle's Kalender fur das Jahr 1918 (Rio de Janeiro and Curitiba, [1917]),
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Map 2. Nineteenth-century German settlement in the coastal regions of Brazil
from Sao Paulo to Salvador (Bahia). Names of cities and towns are restricted to
those mentioned in the text.
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URBAN CONCENTRATIONS OF GERMANS

Such rural societies were a world apart from the ethnic communities that developed in the large towns where Germans constituted a majority, such as Sao Leopoldo, Blumenau, Joinville,
Brusque, and Sao Bento. In such places they were able to evolve
self-contained socioeconomic structures that included all the
strata-rich entrepreneurs and professional persons at the top,
supported by small merchants, clerks, skilled industrial workers,
and, at the lower levels, unskilled laborers and the farming population in the surrounding countryside. In such a society, as Emilio
Willems has pointed out, there was little economic interdependence and few incentives to develop social intercourse with LusoBrazilian society. 31
In some of the large coastal cities, most notably in Porto Alegre, Sao Paulo, and Rio de Janeiro, the Germans were numerous
enough to develop the complex of supporting voluntary organizations that gave coherence to their immigrant society-churches,
schools, commercial associations, and social clubs of many kinds,
as well as German-language newspapers and a variety of commercial enterprises catering to the ethnic trade. Both Porto Alegre and
Sao Paulo had approximately twenty thousand German-speaking
inhabitants in 1920; in Rio de Janeiro the number was considerably
less, about four thousand. 32 In such cities, however, the Germans
inevitably had many more interpersonal contacts with members
of the dominant Luso-Brazilian society as they went about their
daily tasks as merchants, industrialists, craftsmen, and laborers.
They learned Portuguese much more rapidly than did their isolated brethren. Assimilation in such a setting was relatively easy
for persons so inclined.
From the Brazilian point of view, these urban Germans were important because, together with Italians and other immigrants,
155-57; Oberacker, Der deutsche Beitrag, 420-21; Thomas Holloway, Immigrants on
the Land: Coffee and Society in Sao Paulo, 1886-1934 (Chapel Hill, 1980), 139.
31. Siegfried Endress, Blumenau: Werden und Wesen einer deutschbrasilianischen
Landschaft (Tiibingen, 1938); Emilio Willems, "Some Aspects of Cultural Conflict
and Acculturation in Southern Rural Brazil," Rural Sociology, VII (1942),379.
32. Kloss, Statistisches Handbuch, 66; Fouquet, Der deutsche Einwanderer, 49.
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they influenced the developing structure of the receiving society
in a positive way. Gilberto Freyre, the eminent Brazilian sociologist and historian, has noted that traditionalist "old stock" Brazilians of the upper classes preferred intellectual and bureaucratic
pursuits and often felt that they were above competing in the materialistic business world. They were thus unwilling to assume the
functions of the middle class in a dynamic, modernizing society.
By contrast, the skills and attitudes of the upwardly mobile urban
immigrants allowed them to move easily into the breach, thereby
expanding the emerging middle class and adding validity and
prestige to middle-class values through their accomplishments. 33
The commercial and industrial elite among the urban German
group experienced remarkable success. In 1915, firms in Rio
Grande do SuI that were identifiably German accounted for almost as much value of industrial production as did all firms
owned or managed by persons with Portuguese names. Germans
dominated the production of shoes, nails, glass, leather goods,
hats, candles, and chocolate. 34

Problems of Teuto-Brazilian Leadership
The leadership of the urban ethnic subsocieties naturally fell to
the wealthy, educated owners and managers of Teuto-Brazilian or
German-owned commercial and industrial firms; to engineers
and technicians; and to prominent clergymen, journalists, and
other professional persons. Business leaders especially were subject to strong cross pressures. Their daily activity in commerce or
industry automatically encouraged rapid assimilation, and, as upwardly mobile persons in an increasingly industrialized and urbanized country, they understood that the achievement and maintenance of economic, social, and political power depended upon
high status within the larger society, not within the ethnic subgroup. Moreover, they readily sensed that psychological dependence upon their fellow Germans could inhibit advancement. It
33. Freyre, New World in the Tropics, 89-90, 186; Gilberto Freyre, Order and Progress: Brazil from Monarchy to Republic, ed. and trans. Rod W. Horton (New York,
1970), 25134. Roche, La colonisation allemande, 391-92.
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could, in fact, become a source of social deprivation. At the same
time, as Enu1io Willems has observed, such persons were expected by their ethnic subsociety to defend the group interest
against the dominant native society. Thus, if they exercised leadership among their fellow Germans, they could hinder their own
upward movement within the larger social structure; if they failed
to defend their ethnic group interest, they would naturally lose
prestige and status within the subsociety.35 The alternative chosen by persons who were thus trapped depended, of course, on
unique circumstances and individual social and psychological
needs.
For leaders such as clergymen, whose ties with the German
subsociety were personally intimate, and for those whose interests were economically intertwined with the group, such as publishers of German-language newspapers, the dilemma scarcely
existed. For them, the maintenance of the German language, cultural traditions, and various ethnic institutions and associations
was essential. Inevitably they became the champions of immigrant ethnocentrism. Because they controlled the pulpits, the editorial columns, and the speakers' rostrums, their views were usually identified by the host society as those of the entire group.

Reichsdeutsche
The attitudes of the clergy resembled those of many Reichsdeutsche-subjects of the German kaiser-who disdained Brazilian citizenship. Many in this group were educated, middleclass persons. Not a few were associated with German fIrms in
Brazil and displayed the attitudes of sojourners in a strange land
who looked forward to the day when they could return to their
mother country. Some were excessively proud of their German
culture, which, they were convinced, was certainly superior to
Brazilian. Karl von Koseritz, a talented refugee of the revolutions
of 1848 who became an outstanding leader of the Germans in the
southern provinces, complained bitterly about the Rio de Janeiro
35. Emflio Willems, "Immigrants and Their Assimilation in Brazil," in T. Lynn
Smith and Alexander Marchant (eds.), Brazil: Portrait of Half a Continent (1951; rpr.
Westport, Conn., 1972), 214.

Karl von Koseritz, a' refugee of the revolutions of 1848 in Germany. He became a
leading figure among the German Brazilians of the nineteenth century.
Reprinted from Hundert Jahre Deutschturn
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Germans, many of whom were Reichsdeutsche. They know nothing of the Germans in Rio Grande do SuI and Santa Catarina, he
said, and they cared even less; they involved themselves in Brazilian affairs only insofar as such matters impinged upon their immediate economic interests; they were concerned chiefly with circumstances in Germany and with international politics as it affected
commerce. According to Koseritz, the Rio Germans had almost
nothing in common with the Germans of the south, who, he asserted, were in Brazil to stay; they became naturalized and participated in the political life of the state, won economic influence, and
earned the respect of Luso-BraziIians. 36
Although Koseritz drew his lines rather too sharply, he was at
least partly correct in his analysis of the urban Germans in comparison to the settlers of the Unoald. It is unlikely, however, that
Koseritz understood the extent to which both groups were merely
responding in their own way to radically different physical and
social circumstances.

Comparisons with the United States
The urban and rural environments of Brazil were different not
only from each other but even more from what the immigrants
would have encountered in the United States, had they chosen to
go there. 37 Located in temperate latitudes, the United States offered
a physical setting that was similar to what the immigrants had
known in Germany. But most of Brazil is in the tropics; inevitably
most Germans were attracted to the subtropical provinces of the
south where the differences, sharp though they were, seemed less
pronounced. In some respects, the German districts of Rio Grande
do Sul resemble the hill country of central Texas, which also had
many Germans among its earliest settlers.
36. Koseritz, Bilder aus Brasilien, 137-38; Carlos H. Oberacker, Jr., Carlos von
Koseritz (Sao Paulo, 1961), 52; Porto, Die deutsche Arbeit, 19B-201.
37. The best introduction to the history of Germans in the United States is the
brilliant essay, "The Germans," by Kathleen N. Conzen, in Haroard Encyclopedia
of American Ethnic Groups, ed. Stephan Thernstrom (Cambridge, Mass., 19&»,
405-25. But see also laVern J. Rippley, The German-Americans (Boston, 1976); and
Frederick C. Luebke, Bonds of Loyalty: German Americans and World War I (DeKalb,
ill., 1974), 27-81.
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There were other differences as well. Americans were accustomed to German immigrants in ways Brazilians were not. Although both the American and the Brazilian Germans emigrated
from the same parts of Germany and often for the same reasons,
America had received a substantial contingent in the colonial period who were well assimilated into American society by the time
the mass movement in the nineteenth century got under way.
Numerically the German-Brazilian immigration was only a
small fraction-less than a twentieth-of the 5.5 million Germans
who streamed to the United States between 1820 and 1920. But in
Brazil the Germans clustered in isolated rural colonies that easily
and naturally fostered the retention of immigrant language and
culture. It is true that in the United States, Germans were also
strongly attracted to farming; only Scandinavians exceeded them
in this respect. But it is also true that they were more urban than
was the American population generally in the nineteenth century
and much more so than were the German Brazilians, who, despite their relatively small numbers, became a sharply defined society within society and retained an identity as a separate people
that was much stronger than what was typical of Germans in the
United States.
The exclusive, rural concentrations of German immigrants were
at least partly the consequence of government policies. Throughout much of the nineteenth century, the Brazilian government
pursued policies aimed at attracting immigrants. Subsidies were
granted; transportation costs were sometimes paid; settlements
were founded and administered by the government; and the image of Brazil as a desirable place for immigrants was deliberately
developed. The United States government, by contrast, did nothing directly to promote immigration. Throughout much of the
century, it was an unrestricted activity, neither aided nor hindered. Moreover, while American land policy worked against the
creation of exclusive settlements, Brazilian policy had the effect of
encouraging it, especially in isolated areas. 38 Thus, the Strassendorf mode of settlement was common in Brazil, especially Rio
Grande do SuI, but was rarely even attempted in the United States,
38. Browne, "Government Immigration Policy," 217-47.
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so powerful were the effects of the American laws governing the
alienation of public land.
Brazilian conditions generally combined to slow the process
whereby German immigrants were absorbed into the receiving society. While they were forced to adapt to the subtropical environment, their isolation enhanced their capacity to withstand other
forms of assimilation. Germans in the United States, however,
seemed less subject to the physical environment, but more vulnerable to the assimilative power of the social environment. Thus,
the cultural landscape of the German districts in southern Brazil
was often distinctive, whereas in the United States physical marks
of German culture were usually less evident, except perhaps to
the practiced eye. 39
Questions about the pattern of settlement-when and why immigrants chose to come to a new land, where they settled, and
what the characteristics of their new physical and social environments were-are first steps toward understanding the behavior of
an immigrant group. But there are other equally important questions to pursue if their history is to be understood. One must ask
who the immigrants were in terms of wealth, education, occupation, and religion in comparison with members of the receiving
society; what kinds of institutions they succeeded in creating and
how well they sustained immigrant society and culture; what sort
of assimilation patterns emerged; and what variations in behavior
may be discerned among the internal elements of the group. In
short, their social structure also must be analyzed. 40
39. Cf· Charles van Ravenswaay, The Arts and Architecture of German Settlements
in Missouri (Columbia, Mo., 1977); and Russel L. Gerlach, Immigrants in the Ozarks:
A Study in Ethnic Geography (Columbia, Mo., 1976), 59-131.
40. Except for the work of Jean Roche and Emilio Willems, systematic research
into such questions is virtually nonexistent.
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Teuto-Brazilian Social
and Cultural Institutions

G

ERMAN IMMIGRANTS built a new society in Brazil that
was different not only from the life they had known in Germany but also from the established Luso-Brazilian society.
Over a period of nearly a century they had developed a fairly
distinctive ethnic community of nearly 400,000 persons, mostly
Brazilian-born and German-speaking, infused with a strong sense
of group identity and difference from other Brazilians, especially
those of Portuguese antecedents. Under conditions of considerable adversity, they had adapted their agricultural practices; built
churches, schools, and a complex of ethnic organizations; and
had developed a substantial German-language press-all in a
relatively high degree of isolation and with little help from others.
Most rural districts in which the Germans settled had the characteristics of a frontier area, even though nearby territories had
been inhabited by Europeans many years earlier. Population density was relatively low in the German areas; most of the settlers
were farmers and had spread out across the hilly, forested terrain.
Despite this dispersion, they were able to found and maintain
many of the auxiliary institutions that are customarily associated
with effective cultural maintenance.

The Role of the Churches
The institution most readily created in such a setting was the
church. By all accounts, it played a central role in the history of
the Germans in Brazil and in their assimilation. This is not to say
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that every German immigrant was a practicing Christian or that
the church was a pervasive influence in everyone's life-or even
that everyone in a given colony was a member of one church or
another. Yet the various churches, individually and collectively,
performed social roles that were crucial to the life of the community. In many cases, especially in isolated areas, there were no
other agencies, public or private, that could fulfill those roles
effectively. 1
The religious affiliation of the immigrants had always been a
significant issue, in Brazil more so than in the United States. Catholicism had been the state religion, and at first Protestants were
not welcome. As a central element in the development of LusoBrazilian culture, the Catholic church played a role not unlike that
of many Protestant denominations in the United States in early
American history. Inevitably, the process of assimilation was more
difficult for Protestants than it was for Catholic immigrants in Brazil. The government's opposition to Protestantism during the empire period, when most of the German colonies were established,
unquestionably contributed to the self-imposed segregation of
Protestant communities and fixed itself in their collective memories. Moreover, government schools were under the supervision
of the Catholic church during this time. Emilio Willems has observed that religion drew a line of cultural demarcation between
Catholics and Protestants among the Germans of Brazil. Differences in their philosophical conceptions and roles of behavior
may be traced to the churches' differing hierarchies of values regarding law, government, and economic pursuits. 2
Although the Protestants were a tiny minority in a great sea of
Brazilian Catholics, they constituted a majority in most GermanBrazilian communities. According to one estimate made in the
early 1920S, 54 percent of the Germans in Rio Grande do SuI were
Protestant, the remainder Catholic. Among individual governmental units (municipios, comparable to counties in the United
States), there was a great range. For example, German Protestants
1. Karl Heinrich Oberacker, [Sr.], 1m Sonnen land Brasilien: Bilder und Gestalten.
Erlebnisse aus Brasilien (Karlsruhe, 1932), 270; Roche, La colonisation allemande, 509.
For a brief survey, see Oberacker, "Die Deutschen in Brasilien," 238-44. ct.
Dressel, Der deutschbrasilianische Kolonist, 14.
2. Roche, La colonisation allemande, 516; Willems, A acultura(iio dos alemiies no
Brasil, 463.
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were estimated at 63 percent in Porto Alegre, 56 percent in Sao
Leopoldo, 84 percent in Cruz Alta, and 90 percent in Sao Lourenzo. Among the predominantly Catholic German communities
were Sao LUlz at 88 percent, Montenegro and Passo Fundo at 68
percent, and Lageado at 62 percent. The scattered character of the
population is indicated by the number of stations served in individual parishes. For example, in the municipio of Lageado, three
Catholic parishes served 13,500 persons in twenty-six stations,
and four Evangelical parishes served 6,534 persons in twenty-two
stations. Within a given municipio, there could be much variation.
The settlers of one valley might be almost entirely Protestant; just
a few miles away a neighboring nucleus could be exclusively
Catholic. 3
The conditions surrounding Catholic and Protestant churches
alike were primitive, especially in the early years. If the colonists
wanted a church, they had to provide it for themselves. At first
they worshiped in family groups in homes; later, small and often
crude chapels were erected. Catholics were served occasionally by
circuit-riding priests, but many of these clergymen were ignorant
of the German language. It sometimes happened that a person
would appear in a colony, claiming to be a clergyman, and then
turn out to be a rogue who was exploiting the wretched circumstances of the people for his own personal advantage. 4 In most
cases, small local groups were served effectively by dedicated
laymen. Such informal arrangements were more easily made by
Protestants than by Catholics, who permitted no one but a priest
to celebrate the mass, to baptize, and to consecrate marriages.
If the colonists in the Urwald wanted their children to receive
the rudiments of an education, they had to establish their own
schools, because the state and federal governments were usually
unable or unwilling to establish schools in the German districts.
The immigrants did the only thing they could under the circumstances: they recreated to the best of their ability what they remembered of their village schools in Germany. Thus, after a local
parish had been formed and the services of a bona fide clergyman
3. Souza, "Vma comunidade Teuto-Brasileira," 196-99; Hundert Jahre Deutschtum in Rio Grande do Sui, 1824-1924 (Porto Alegre, 1924),448,496. Cf. Silva, Hist6ria de Blumenau, 268-94, and see table (p. 136).
4. Such impostors were known as Pseudopfarrer. See Schroder, Brasilien und Wittenberg, 368-69.
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obtained, they would start a school, usually with the pastor as the
only teacher. The church school was in effect the public school;
there was no alternative. In Dois Irmaos, for example, Evangelical
clergymen served as the teachers of the school from 1868 to 1938a seventy-year period in which the education of the young in the
community was entirely in the hands of the church. Inevitably the
language of instruction and of the textbooks and other teaching
material in this school was German. Compared to modern schools
or to schools in Germany at that time, these were miserable affairs, but they were better than nothing. 5

The Catholic Church
As a general rule, the Catholics among the German Brazilians
were less exclusive or separatistic and less self-conscious than
were the Protestants. The Catholics shared the faith of the vast
majority of Brazilians; they were served by a church that, in fact as
well as in name, was universal. Ancient as Christianity itself, the
church embraced millions of adherents in many countries and
ministered in many tongues. While it may be argued that Catholicism was an intimate part of the culture of countries with Latinate
languages, such as Italy, France, Spain, and Portugal, it served
Germans, Poles, Irish, and many others equally well. The Catholic
church, in other words, was not a ready agency for the perpetuation of specific ethnocultural ideals. Consequently the barriers
separating Catholic Germans from Luso-Brazilian society were
not as formidable as were those surrounding the Protestants. The
Catholics were considerably closer to the Brazilian core culture
than were the Protestants.
The multinational character of the Catholic church was especially apparent in the clergy. During most of the early period the
few Catholic priests who ventured into the Urwald were ordinarily
not German. The Catholics of Dois Irmaos, for example, were
served for two decades by circuit-riding priests from other areas;
their first resident pastor, who came to the community in 1848,
was a Pole. In those days, priests read the mass in Latin, but other
ministrations, limited and inadequate though they may have been,
5. Oberacker, 1m Sonnenland Brasilien, 133-46; Dressel, Der deutschbrasilianische
Kolonist, 19; Brunn, Deutschland und Brasilien, 179.

Social and Cultural Institutions

39

were frequently in Portuguese, and thus, in effect, clerics advanced the linguistic acculturation of the people. In the towns the
Catholic parishes were often multi-ethnic, serving Luso-Brazilians, Italians, Spanish, Germans, and Poles; under such circumstances, Portuguese was used in church and school as the only
language common to all. There were, of course, exclusively German parishes also, especially later in the century, served in most
cases by German-born and German-trained clergy. Even in those
churches, however, the priests would often preach first in Portuguese and then repeat their message in German. 6
In general, the record of the German priests in Brazil was impressive. By the end of the century, German Catholic clergymen
(and Italian as well) far outnumbered those of Portuguese origins
in Rio Grande do SuI. A few years later, a priest named Johann
Becker, who had come to Brazil from Germany as a child, was
consecrated as archbishop of Porto Alegre. However, there was no
distinctively German seminary for the training of priests in Brazil.
A Jesuit seminary had been established in Sao Leopoldo, but Portuguese was the language of instruction there. 7
It is clear that among most German Catholics of Brazil, the church
came first and ethnicity second. Nevertheless, they founded distinctively ethnoreligious institutions in the early part of the twentieth-century, including an orphanage, a home for the aged, and,
later, a school for the training of teachers of German Catholic
schools, and they established a number of German-language publications. 8 Even though most German Catholics lived in close
proximity to German Protestants, they tended to remain separate
and often felt a closer bond with fellow Catholics of other ethnic
groups than with their German Protestant neighbors. 9
6. Dressel, Der deutschbrasilianische Kolonist, 19; Roche, La colonisation allemande,
520, 524; Oberacker, Die volkspolitische Lage, 58; Haring, The Germans in South Amer-

ica,38.
7. Fouquet, Der deutsche Einwanderer, 195; Roche, La colonisation allemande, 521;
Haring, The Germans in South America, 48; Oberacker, Die volkspolitische Lage, 58.
8. Brunn, Deutschland und Brasilien, 192-94; Roche, La colonisation allemande,
522; Oberacker, Die volkspolitische Lage, 59.
9. Souza, "Uma comunidade Teuto-Brasileira," 197. The division between
Catholic and Protestant antedates their arrival in Brazil by three centuries. Yet their
Brazilian experience had the effect of intensifying antipathies, as during the Farroupilha Revolt, or Farrapenkrieg, as the Germans called it. According to one sec-
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Protestant Denominations
For half a century, dozens of German Protestant congregations in
southern Brazil sustained their independence and pursued their
goals as best they could.1O But the task was greater than their resources. In the 1880s, individual congregations began to develop
closer ties with various Protestant missionary societies in Germany. The most important of these was the Gustav-Adolf Verein, which supported congregations of German Protestants anywhere outside Germany with contributions for the construction
of church buildings and schools and for various social programs.
Meanwhile, the Rheinische Missions Gesellschaft of Barmen sent
pastors and teachers to serve in Brazilian parishes. l l
Unlike their counterparts in the United States, Brazilian Protestants had been unable for decades to unite individual congregations into synods for the accomplishment of larger goals. No seminaries or colleges had been founded, nor was there any significant
measure of doctrinal unity. Gradually a network developed among
the widely dispersed Protestant clergymen, primarily because of
efforts of Dr. Hermann Borchard, a pastor sent to Brazil by the
Prussian state church in 1864. It was not until 1886, however, that
the German Evangelical Synod of Rio Grande do SuI was founded
under the leadership of Dr. Wilhelm Rotermund, pastor of the
Evangelical congregation in Sao Leopoldo. Patterned on the North
American synodical structure in which congregational autonomy
was not surrendered to the central church body, the Riograndenser Synod, as it was usually called, quickly became the largest
German Protestant organization in Brazil. 12 In Santa Catarina a
ondary source, this conflict, which raged in Rio Grande do Sui from 18}5 to 1845,
engulfed German settlers and tended to range Protestants against Catholics.
Gruesome tales of brutality and bitter obstinacy were then passed on to younger
generations. Oskar Canstatt, Brasilien: Land und Leute (Berlin, 1877), 41}.
10. Schroder, Brasilien und Wittenberg, 51-176, Fischer, "Geschichte der EKLB,"
94-95, 102-1O}.
11. Fischer, "Geschichte der EKLB," 97-101; Fouquet, Der deutsche Einwanderer,
190; Walter Mummelthey, "Santa Catarina," in Bruno Geissler (ed.), Die Kulturbedeutung der deutschen evange/ischen Kirche in Brasilien (Leipzig, 1922), 12-2}.
12. Fischer, "Geschichte der EKLB," 109-15; Erich Fausel, Dr. Rotermund: Ein
Kampf um Recht und Richtung des Evangelischen Deutschtums in Sudbrasilien (Sao
Leopoldo, 19}6); Schroder, Brasilien und Wittenberg, 195-2}5.

The German Evangelical church in Porto Alegre. This imposing structure was not
typical of Protestant church buildings, most of which were of more modest proportions. In terms of its architectural design, it might just as well have been built
in Germany or the United States.
Reprinted from Hundert Jahre Deutschtum
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conference of Evangelical pastors was organized in 1896, and
later, in 1911, a synod was established. A number of Lutheran
congregations joined together in 1905 to form the Evangelical Lutheran Synod of Santa Catarina, Parana, and Other States in South
America. North American influence was again apparent; the first
president of this body was Otto Kuhr, a German who had served
as a circuit-riding Lutheran preacher in the United States before
he was called to Brazil. Finally, in 191), a synod of Evangelical
congregations was organized in Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Espirito
Santo, and Minas Gerais. In contrast to the theological differences
between Lutherans and Evangelicals in the United States, there
were relatively few between these two Protestant groups in Brazil. 13

Protestant Links with Germany
In the midst of this flurry of organizational activity, the German
government took a step that eventually linked it closely to most
Evangelical churches in Brazil. By means of a law passed in 1900,
the Prussian state church (an amalgam of Lutheran and Calvinist
elements created in 1819 and known as the Evangelical church)
was granted supervision over German Evangelical congregations
in other countries. In return for subsidies and other forms of assistance, the churches of the German diaspora were to accept the
oversight of the Evangelischen Oberkirchenrat in Berlin. It was entirely a voluntary proposition, and the German Brazilians debated
the question at length. The result was that many individual EvangelIcal congregations, though not the synods, accepted affiliation
with the state church of Prussia. 14
Undoubtedly this organizational bond with the Prussian state
church and German bureaucracy helped to stimulate the development of auxiliary institutions in the Evangelical church, especially
in Rio Grande do SuI. Before long, the Riograndenser Synod developed a teachers association that had its own professional journal and founded a teachers college with help from Germany. An
association of local women's societies was established and periodicals were published for the laity. Because of the minority status
13. Schroder, Brasilien und Wittenberg, 344-52; Fischer, "Geschichte der EKLB,"
Cf. Luebke, Bonds of Loyalty, 37-39·
14. Fischer, "Geschichte der EKLB," 140-43; "Stimmen aus Kirche und Schule,"
Sao Leopoldo Sonntags-Beilage der Deutschen-Post, September 28, 1924.
116-20.
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of Protestantism in Catholic Brazil, the Evangelical churches had
always been closely identified with the pursuit of ethnocultural
ideals. The new ties with Germany sealed this relationship, and
the Riograndenser Synod became, in effect, the strongest agency
for the promulgation of cultural chauvinism in Brazil. Almost all
the pastors were now supplied, directly or indirectly, by the Prussian church; schools were subsidized by the German government;
and pastors, teachers, and their families became in some measure
representatives of Germany and German culture in Brazil. 1s
The tendency of the Evangelical church and its auxiliary agencies to serve as defenders of Deutschtum (a term they understood
to mean their ethnocultural heritage of language, custom, and belief) was enhanced by the ecumenical character of the church. Instead of holding to a distinctive or particular theology, as many
Lutherans in the United States did, the Evangelicals sought to include all German Protestants. 16 The desire to emphasize Deutschtum now became their common denominator.
The Reverend Martin Braunschweig, who was provost during
the pre-World War I years, later wrote that the German Evangelical church was by far the strongest and most comprehensive
agency for maintaining the German language and culture in Brazil
and argued that the tie with German culture was vital for the
church: ''The German Evangelical church can live only so long as
German Volkstum lives in Brazil." Max Dedekind, an Evangelical
pastor in Brazil, wrote that the Germans in Brazil wanted to remain German and especially to retain the German language in
their churches and schools. Even though the Brazilian government had given them no assistance, he continued, the Germans
would nevertheless remain loyal and true citizens, but within the
context of German cultural work. Another Evangelical pastor approached the outer limits of chauvinism in his defense of the cultural bond:
Our German Evangelical Church ... regards its German cultural heritage as a God-given gift to be held in honor and nourished in church
and school. Among the gifts the founders brought with them from
15. Emilio Willems, "Assimilation of German Immigrants in Brazil," Sociology
and Social Research, XXV (1940), 128; Porzelt, Der deutsche Bauer, 93; Oberacker, Die
volkspolitische Lage, 53.
16. Brunn, Deutschland und Brasilien, 187-91; Luebke, Bonds of Loyalty, 39.
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Germany are the deeply German conception of the Gospel, the German church services, the German language, and the rich treasures of
art, science, and theology. Evangelical beliefs and German nationalism
have been intimately bonded since Luther's times; they cannot be separated without injury. The German Evangelical Church in Brazil therefore wears its German dress consciously and proudly. . . . It can fill its
responsibility only when it is consciously a German national church.

Most leaders of the Evangelical synods in Brazil seemed to agree
that the relationship with the Prussian state church served to
strengthen, as one of them expressed it, "the preservation of the
German language, manners, and customs."17

Lutheran Links with the United States
In their emphasis on the cultural bond with Germany, the Evangelical pastors were diametrically opposed to the position taken
by German-speaking missionaries from the United States who
were sent to serve German Brazilians by the Lutheran ChurchMissouri Synod, a conservative Lutheran body then known as the
German Evangelical Lutheran Synod of Missouri, Ohio and Other
States. Even though the Brazilian branch of the "Missouri Synod"
was small in comparison with the Riograndenser Synod, it was
perceived as a major threat by the Evangelical leaders, and they
denounced it vehemently because of its stance on language and
culture.
In the United States the Missouri Synod had always promoted
the maintenance of the German language and culture as a means
to sustain its theological conservatism. Ever since its founding in
1845, it had stressed the importance of parish schools and synodical colleges and seminaries for the training of native pastors
and teachers. But in Brazil this position underwent a remarkable
transformation, beginning in 1899, when the first Missouri Synod
missionary arrived in Rio Grande do SuI. Offering itself as an alternative to the Evangelical synods and their close nationalistic
17. Martin Braunschweig, "Die brasilianische Diaspora und die neue Zeit," in
Geissler (ed.), Die Kulturbedeutung, 46; Max Dedekind, Deutschtum und Evangelium
in Brasilien (Leipzig, 1929), 37, 45; Wilhelm Teschendorf, "Mittel-Brasilien," in
Geissler (ed.), Die Kulturbedeutung, 11. For other expressions of Deutschtumspolitik,
see Brunn, Deutschland und Brasilien, 187-91; and Oberacker, 1m Sonnenland
Brasilien, 270 and passim.
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ties with Germany, the Missouri Synod stressed the progressive
abandonment of the German language and the gradual adoption
of Portuguese, especially in the cities. Emphasizing its strong
confessional orientation in contrast to the ecumenism of the Evangelicals, it grew rapidly, and by 1920, there were thirty-one Missouri Synod pastors serving sixteen thousand adherents. It quickly
established a small seminary in Porto Alegre for the training of a
native clergy; there, in a monthly periodical, Professor Johann
Kunstmann articulated his church's position. 18 During the early
decades of the century, however, most of the Missouri Synod pastors were American-born and trained. Despite the importance
they placed on adopting Portuguese, few acquired a skillful command of the language in those early years, and they continued to
minister to their people in the German language.
Few Protestant churches other than the Evangelical and Lutheran existed among the Germans of Brazil in the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries. A number of German-Russian Mennonite congregations had been founded, particularly in Parana.
Small clusters of the German Baptists and Adventists could be
found here and there-perhaps a dozen or more congregations,
especially in Rio Grande do SuI-but they were relatively unimportant. Several North American denominations established missions in Brazil in the early years before World War I. Presbyterians
were the most numerous, followed by the Baptists. Congregationalists, Methodists, and Episcopalians were also present, but
among these denominations, only the Baptist group included a
large number of Germans. 19
18. Carlos H. Warth, "Die Evangelisch-Lutherische Kirche Brasiliens," in Fischer
and Jahn (eds.), Es begann am Rio dos Sinos, 75-80; Hundert Jahre Deutschtum,
440-42, 445, 492-93, 496; Schroder, Brasilien und Wittenberg, 379-83; Dedekind,
Deutschtum und Evange/ium, 45; Oberacker, Die volkspolitische Lage, 59; Porzelt, Der
deutsche Bauer, 94; Brunn, Deutschland und Brasilien, 191-92; Oberacker, 1m Sonnenland Brasilien, 141-42. For a detailed exposition of the Missouri Synod's position, see Johann Kunstmann, "Vom Deutschtum der Missourier," EvangelischLutherisches Kirchenblatt fUr Sad-Amerika, XIV (May 1, August 15, September 1,
1917),114-16,121-24,130-34. The annual report of the synod's seminary in Porto
Alegre shows that Portuguese was taught in every class. See Kirchenblatt, XIV
(January 1, 1917).
19. Koseritz' Deutscher Volkskalender far Brasilien auf das Jahr 1917 (Porto Alegre,
[1916]); Hundert Jahre Deutschtum, 448; Aulich, Parana und die Deutschen; Schroder,
Brasilien und Wittenberg, 383.
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Unchurched Teuto-Brazilians
Although church historians might create the impression that all
German Brazilians were members of one denomination or another, this certainly was not the case, especially in the cities, where
diversity rather than homogeneity was the typical pattern. It is all
but impossible to calculate the proportion of persons who ignored
or opposed the churches and their domination of German immigrant society. No doubt some people who were counted as members in fact participated only rarely in the church's functions.
Nonmembers were proportionately more numerous among those
immigrants who were better educated and more highly skilled in
the crafts and professions. Some, like Karl von Koseritz, were
strong advocates of cultural maintenance and, at the same time,
resolutely anticlerical. 20 Others, for individual psychological and
social reasons, were simply eager to assimilate as rapidly as possible into Brazilian society. They learned Portuguese quickly,
tended to marry outside the group, and divested themselves of
the obvious marks of their German ethnicity. Because they wanted
to disappear as Germans, they left few traces. 21
Such rapid assimilators were rare enough in the solidly German
districts, but in the marginal areas and in the large cities they
were not uncommon. Mark Jefferson, an American geographer
who traveled through southern Brazil in 1918, observed that in
Santa Maria, located at the western end of the German district in
Rio Grande do SuI, a high level of linguistic and marital assimilation had occurred; the architecture revealed no German influence
and the German language was not heard on the streets and in
public places. 22 In large cities such as Porto Alegre and Sao Paulo,
where the Germans were a small minority, there were greater op20. The freethinking Koseritz was especially opposed to clerical influence.
A former student at the University of Heidelberg, he fled to Brazil after the unsuccessful revolution of 1848, served in the Brazilian army against the Argentine dictator Manuel Rosas, and then settled in Rio Grande do SuI, first in Pelotas and later
in Porto Alegre, where he was unusually influential as a journalist and political
leader. In several respects his career bears a resemblance to that of Carl Schurz in
the United States. See Oberacker, Carlos von Koseritz. Cf. Hans Trefousse, Carl
Schurz: A Biography (Knoxville, 1982).
21. Luebke, Bonds of Loyalty, 30 , 45.
22. Mark Jefferson, "Pictures from Southern Brazil," Geographical Review, XVI
(1926), 521 -47.
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portunities for submersion into the mainstream. It is unlikely,
however, that rapid assimilation was as common in Brazil as it was
in the United States, where the German settlements were much
less exclusive and the cultural differences between the German
immigrants and the host society were not as great.
In contrast to the rapid assimilators, the anticlerical element
constituted a strong force in support of German cultural maintenance, especially in the cities and larger towns. Many people were
influenced by well-educated, articulate political refugees such as
Koseritz, who felt that Brazilian Deutschtum was being enervated
by a pervasive materialism and indifference to the German cultural
heritage. Their remedy for what was in fact an entirely normal social process was to stimulate the formation of non-church-related
voluntary associations, such as singing societies, marksmen's or
rifle clubs, gymnastic organizations (Turnvereine), and the like. 23

Clubs and Societies
It must be said, however, that the various Vereine would have ap-

peared even if there had been no Forty-eighters like Koseritz
among the German immigrants. Societies were created wherever
German Brazilians were numerous enough in one place to organize and maintain them. Thus they were most common in the
cities and towns, such as Porto Alegre and Blumenau, but they
could also be found in the Pikaden and Strassendorfer of Rio Grande
do SuI. Dois Irmaos, for example, had a Schiitzenverein (rifle club)
modeled directly on the German pattern, a Hilfsverein (charitable
society), and a Leseverein (library association). 24
Most of the German ethnic societies combined a variety of purposes. Some of the Turnvereine, for example, offered programs in
singing, theater, and literature. Other organizations served purely
social and recreational purposes-shooting, bowling, dancing,
and card playing. 25 Still others, such as mutual benefit insurance
23. Schroder, Brasilien und Wittenberg, 124-30.
24. Souza, "Uma comunidade Teuto-Brasileira," 184; Seyferth, A coloniza~tio
alemti no vale do Itajai-Mirim, &}-94; Dressel, Der deutschbrasilianische Kolonist,
19-20. Cf. Silva, Historia de Blumenau, 242-55.
25. For a sociological study of bowling clubs in one community, see Jose Fraga
Fachel, "Os grupos de bohio e os 'Kranzchen' em Santa Cruz do Sui," in I. Coloquio, 311-38.
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The imposing clubhouse of the Germania Society in Porto Alegre as it appeared a
year before its destruction in the anti-German riot of April 16, 1917
Reprinted from Uhle's Kalender: 1917

associations and commercial and professional organizations,
added social activities to economic goals. One of the largest societies in Brazil was the Handwerker-Unterstutzungs-Verein of
Curitiba, Parana, with nearly nineteen hundred members in 1913.
Essentially a mutual benefit society for life and health insurance,
it had a Turnersektion in addition to a variety of social and cultural
functions. Like the smaller Deutscher Sangerbund ofCuritiba, this
Verein provided a clubhouse for its members. In Rio de Janeiro, the
Germania Society, which had been founded in 1821, built a broad
program around a nucleus of members in commerce. In Porto Alegre, a union of German Vereine maintained a hospitaP6
26. Fugmann, Die Deutschen in Parana, 100-105; Heinrich Hinden, Deutsche und
Deutscher Handel in Rio de Janeiro: Ein hundertjiihriges Kulturbild zur Zentenar Feier der
Gesellschaft "Germania," 1821-1921 (Rio de Janeiro, 1921); Fischer, "Geschichte der
EKLB," 149.
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Among the Germans both in Brazil and in the United States,
anticlericalism was strongest in the Turnvereine, but other secular
societies attracted substantial numbers of church members. The
churches often tended to see the clubs as competitors and charitable purposes, but also for economic activities. 27 In general, however, the rivalry between the two types of organizations was not
as keen in Brazil as it was in the United States.
In other instances, German associational activity transcended
ethnicity. For example, the Beethoven Club of Rio de Janeiro,
founded in 1881, was organized solely for the cultivation of German classical music; not all of its six hundred members were German. According to Koseritz, the club's annual concert was a great
social event, held in the most luxurious hall in South America,
and was attended by Emperor Pedro II and his family.2B

German Schools
In most respects, the associational activity (Vereinsleben) of the
German Brazilians was similar to that of their ethnic cousins in the
United States. A major difference, however, pertains to education.
In Brazil, where for both cultural and economic reasons illiteracy was endemic, school societies (Schulvereine) were very common. In the United States, where literacy was standard among
whites and a nearly unIversal public school system had evolved
in the nineteenth century, such school societies were largely
superfluous.
When the Germans first settled in southern Brazil, there were
few tax-supported public schools, and none in the forested mountain area they chose as their new home. Few of the immigrants
were well educated themselves, but they placed a high value on
literacy. In the early years the fathers of families sometimes took
turns teaching the children in the colony. Later, as the number of
Evangelical pastors increased, the educational function was frequently shifted to the church, notably in Rio Grande do SuI. But
in Santa Catarina, Parana, and Sao Paulo, the schools were more
often maintained by Schulvereine, especially among Protestants. 29
27. Porzelt, Der deutsche Bauer, 102-103.
28. Koseritz, Bilder aus Brasilien, 294.
29. Dressel, Derdeutschbrasilianische Kolonist, 19-20; Oberacker, "Die Deutschen
in Brasilien," 233-35; Fouquet, Der deutsche Einwanderer, 174; Karl Fouquet, "Die
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The parents would procure a building of some kind for use as a
school and seek the services of a teacher, often a recent immigrant. His pay was paltry and his tenure short because he was
likely to be looking for other, better-paying employment. Most of
the schools consisted of only one classroom, and instruction was
commonly limited to basic reading, writing, arithmetic, and religion. Ordinarily, children would attend classes for no more than
two or three years. Later in the nineteenth century, the curriculum
in many schools was expanded to include the geography and history of Germany and Brazil. All instruction was in the German
language, at least partly because few of the teachers, as recent immigrants, understood Portuguese. 30 Wretched though they were,
these schools helped to raise the literacy rate in the German colonies high above the national average.
In Luso-Brazilian society, formal education was largely limited
to the upper or wealthier classes. In districts where there were
few German or Italian immigrants, as in the cattle-grazing campanha, illiteracy ran as high as 85 percent. As recently as 1920,
only 24.5 percent of the Brazilian population was classified as literate. Rio Grande do SuI, with its numerous German and Italian
immigrants, registered the highest rate of any state in the country
with 38.8 percent, but in Sao Leopoldo municipio, the proportion
soared to 62 percent, and among the Germans the figure was
higher still. Gradually, the ruling classes in Brazil began to see
public schools as potentially important agents for the assimilation
of the colonos and that education was the responsibility of the
state. 31
But early efforts at public school education were not adequate.
deutsch-brasilianische Schule, ein Werk der Selbsthilfe," in Gerhard Friesen and
Walter Schatzberg (eds.), The German Contribution to the Building of the Americas
(Hanover, N.H., 1977), 322; Mummelthey, "Santa Catarina," 16; Porzelt, Der
deutsche Bauer, 86; Silva, Historia de Blumenau, 295-326. A particularly insightful
study of the rural school is by Egon Schaden, "Aspectos historicos e sociologicos
da escola rural Teuto-Brasileira," in 1. Coloquio, 65-77.
30. Fouquet, "Die deutsch-brasilianische Schule," 321; Fischer, "Geschichte der
EKLB," 135; Dressel, Der deutschbrasilianische Kolonist, 11.
31. Love, Rio Grande do Sui, 130; Porzelt, Der deutsche Bauer, 88; Artur H. Neiva
and M. Diegues, Jr., "The Cultural Assimilation of Immigrants in Brazil," in W. D.
Borne (ed.), The Cultural Integration of Immigrants (Paris, 1959), 214.
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A director of education in Rio Grande do SuI reported in 1879 that
the German schools he had visited were excellently. organized,
well equipped, and well attended. The government schools, by
contrast, were miserable affairs, entirely lacking in equipment
and left in the hands of incompetent teachers. He recommended
that in the German districts the government schools be closed.
Some years later a German school society sought government assistance in adding to the faculty of its school a Brazilian teacher
who was a specialist in teaching the Portuguese language and
Brazilian history, geography, and literature. When the government failed to respond, the society successfully hired a teacher
from Germany who had the desired competence. He served until
the school was closed during World War I.32
By the turn of the century, the Germans of southern Brazil had
developed an extensive private school system. In Santa Catarina
the governor's office reported in 1916 that 40 percent of the schools
in the state were privately operated. The actual figure may have
been significantly higher. 33 At the same time, in Blumenau municipio, there were 10 state and 113 private schools enrolling 520 and
5,011 children, respectively. In Joinville municipio, the proportion
was much the same: 5 government schools with 303 students; 64
private, with 3,}28 enrolled. 34 Not all the schools classified as private were German; some were Italian and a few were Polish. But
the great majority-at least 80 percent-used the German language exclusively. Some were heavily subsidized by the Prussian
state church, the Gustav-Adolf Verein, the Allgemeine Deutsche
Schulverein, and other similar societies in Germany. Five years
32. Neiva and Diegues, "The Cultural Assimilation of Immigrants," 214; Fouquet, Der deutsche Einwanderer, 180.
33. Deutsche Zeitung (Porto Alegre), September 19, 1917. The data are grouped
in four categories: federal, state, municipal (county), and private schools. In the
tabulation of students in each category, the enrollments in the municipal group
were lumped with the private, suggesting that the municipal schools were Vereinschulen and the private were the parochial schools. Cf. Fischer, "Geschichte der
EKLB," 136.
34. Fouquet, "Die deutsch-brasilianische Schule," 322; Herbert Koch, "Die
staatlichen Schulen in Santa Catharina," Mitteilungen des Deutschen Schulvereins [iir
St. Catharina, XII (August-September, 1917), 29-30. The same data are to be found
in Herbert Koch, Das Deutsche Schulwesen in Brasilien (Langensalza, Germany,
1923), 18-19, and pp. 25-39.
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The school maintained by the Deutsche Hilfsverein of Porto Alegre. Most GerrnanBrazilian schools of the time were much less pretentious in appearance.
Reprinted from Hundert Jahre Deutschturn

later, data from Rio Grande do SuI revealed a total of 698 private
schools in the state, of which 60 percent were Protestant, the remainder Catholic. 35
In some areas where the Teuto-Brazilian population was less
highly concentrated, Vereine were organized to found "interconfessional" schools in which both Protestant and Catholic children
were enrolled but instructed separately in religion. 36 Protestants
were especially fearful that if they failed to maintain their own
schools, their children would either lapse into illiteracy or be proselytized in Catholic schools. Thus the position of the Protestants
resembled that of the Catholics in the United States who worked
mightily during the same decades to build their huge system of
parochial schools.
35. Neiva and Diegues, "The Cultural Assimilation of Immigrants," 214; Hundert Jahre Deutschturn, 236; Brunn, Deutschland und Brasilien, 180-82; Dressel, Der
deutschbrasilianische Kolonist, 11.
36. Fischer, "Geschichte der EKLB," 137; Mummelthey, "Santa Catarina," in
Geissler (ed.), Die Kulturbedeutung, 16; Koch, Das Deutsche Schulwesen, 25.
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The teachers college started by the Evangelical Synod of Rio Grande do Sui in
Santa Cruz in 1913
Reprinted from Uhle's Kalender: 1917

A bureaucratic support system for the German schools began to
emerge in the years before World War I. German Catholics, backed
by the Jesuit order, founded a teachers association in 1898. Two
years later they launched a professional journal for teachers, The
Evangelicals quickly followed suit and, in 1904, went on to create
an organization to coordinate the work of the many Schulvereine in
Santa Catarina. In all instances and in the face of much poverty,
these organizations strove to raise the level of instruction, to hire
better-qualified teachers, to coordinate curricula, and to represent
the interests of the German schools against increasing opposition
from the government. In 1913, after several false starts, the Riograndenser Synod established a small teachers college (really a
secondary school patterned on the German gymnasium) in Santa
Cruz. This venture was strongly encouraged by Provost Martin
Braunschweig, the representative of the Prussian state church,
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and it received substantial monetary support from sources in Germany until war was declared in 1917. Later, in 1926, it was moved
to Sao Leopoldo, where it continues to exist today.37

The German-Language Press
Like the churches, schools, and voluntary associations, the German-language press was also an essential structural element in
the immigrant house of culture. The ftrst attempts to develop
newspapers for the Germans in Brazil occurred in the 1850S, but
these efforts required subsidies from external sources and hence
failed to reflect the needs and interests of the immigrants. It was
not until another decade had passed that the size of the German
immigrant population had increased sufficiently to support a
German-language press. The Deutsche Zeitung of Porto Alegre and
the Kolonie-Zeitung of Joinville were both founded in the early
1860s. At least fifty other newspapers were started in the following half-century. Most were short-lived, but others survived for
many years. The majority appeared once or twice each week. By
1900, there were at least a dozen thriving papers, including dailies
in Porto Alegre and Sao Paulo. 38
The German-language press, like other immigrant institutions,
tended to reflect the same divisions that were evident in religious
life. Dr. Wilhelm Rotermund, the dynamic Evangelical pastor of
Sao Leopoldo, founded the Deutsche Post in 1881; this paper consistently supported the close connection between Protestantism
and the maintenance of German culture in Brazil. In Rotermund's
view, the Deutsches Volksblatt, a rival Catholic paper founded in
1871 in Sao Leopoldo (but moved to Porto Alegre in 1891), was not
a German paper at all, but rather a Jesuit sheet printed in German
type. The Catholics returned the compliment by referring to Rotermund's Post as the Deutsche Pest. 39 Similarly repugnant to the
37. Fischer, "Geschichte der EKLB," 136-40; Brunn, Deutschland und Brasilien,
182-83; Hans Gehse, Die deutsche Presse in Brasilien von 1852 bis zur Gegenwart
(Munster, 1931), 31; Hunderi Jahre Deutschtum, 325; Fouquet, "Die deutschbrasilianische Schule," 325. The Catholics did not found an institution specifically
to train teachers for its German-language schools until 1924, when one was started
in Alt-Hamburg. PorzeIt, Der deutsche Bauer, 87.
38. Gehse, Die deutsche Presse, 23-26, 127.
39. Hugo Metzler, Aus 60 Jahren (Porto Alegre, 1928), 38; interview with Egon
Schaden, January 8, 1982, Sao Paulo.
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Evangelicals and the Catholics alike was the anticlerical, freethinking Koseritz' Deutsche Zeitung, founded in 1882 in Porto Alegre
in direct opposition to the Deutsche Zeitung. Comparable divisions
emerged in Curitiba, the capital of Parana, where the anticlerical
Beobachter (1890) was opposed by the Kompass, which was edited
in a Franciscan cloister. In Sao Paulo, the Germania appealed to
liberal, freethinking persons in the German community. 40
In virtually all cases, the German-language newspapers reflected the personalities, values, and prejudices of their editors
and publishers, who, with few exceptions, were born and educated in Germany. Most of these men actively promoted the maintenance of the German language and culture (because their economic well-being depended upon it), but they were nonetheless
loyal to Brazil and performed an invaluable service in educating
immigrants to Brazilian ways. Most of the immigrant journalists
made a distinction betweem Deutschtum and Deutschliindertum.
The former term meant cherishing their German heritage and
supporting immigrant institutions; the latter implied loyalty to
Germany, its government, and its kaiser. 41
Unlike most German-language newspapers in the United States,
the German-Brazilian papers tended to avoid political involvement and only rarely supported one party or another. Some received subventions from the Brazilian government as part of its
policy of supporting the recruitment of immigrants. Otherwise,
according to one historian of the Germans in Brazil, the Germanlanguage press was free of government interference, except in
time of war. 42
The German Brazilians developed a variety of periodicals in addition to their newspapers. The most influential of these were religious; the Catholics, Evangelicals, and Lutherans each had their
own magazines intended for lay readers.43 Several periodicals for
40. Hundert Jahre Deutschtum, 285; Fouquet, Der deutsche Einwanderer, 202-12;
Gehse, Die deutsche Presse, 65-66, 147-49; Erwin Buchmann, "Die deutschsprachige Presse in Brasilien," Staden-Jahrbuch: Beitrage zur Brasilkunde, IV (1956), 220.
41. Fouquet, Der deutsche Einwanderer, 206.
42. Carl F. Wittke, The German-language Press in America (Lexington, Ky., 1957);
Fouquet, Der deutsche Einwanderer, 205. See also Karl J. R. Arndt and May E. Olson,
The German Language Press of the Americas, 1732-1968, Vol. II, History and Bibliography (Pullach-Miinchen, 1973),91-221.
43. Examples include Der Christenbote (1908), a monthly published in Blumenau
for Evangelicals; St. Paulusblatt (1912), intended for Catholic readers in Rio Grande
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farmers and one for persons in commerce and industry also appeared before World War I. 44 One of the most important products
of the German-Brazilian press was the so-called Kalender, an annual, book-length publication that included a variety of articles
concerning daily life, in addition to an almanac and compilations
of standard information. Often a review of the events of the previous year was included. The calendars were widely read, even
though they, like the periodicals, were usually prepared for specific religious constituencies. 45
Because of its role in the development of ethnic identity, in the
support of immigrant voluntary associations, and as a means of
intragroup communication, the German-language press was a
strong force for the perpetuation of the immigrant culture. Presumably it was also significant in the maintenance of the use of
the German language. Yet it is not entirely clear how important
the press really was for the remote rural German districts. For example, a German-language press never developed in Espirito
Santo, where most of the immigrants were clustered in rural ghettoes and isolated as well from their much more numerous fellows
in the southern states. Despite this lack, the Portuguese language
made few inroads in such districts; immigrant language and customs were retained for generations. Even former slaves and isolated Luso-Brazilians whom chance had placed among the Germans learned to speak the prevailing German dialect, sometimes
even as their first language. 46
The many dialects that the Germans ordinarily spoke in their
daily activities and in their homes tended to become corrupted
and mixed with one another. Only in districts where the dominant majority came from the same area in Germany could the diado SuI; and the Evangelisch-Lutherisches Kirchenblatt (19<J6), published for Missouri
Synod Lutherans. Rotermund's Deutsche Post of Sao Leopoldo published a Sunday
supplement entitled Sontagsblatt fUr die evangelischen Gemeinden in Brasilien (1887).
Fouquet, Der deutsche Einwanderer, 208-209; Gehse, Die deutsche Presse, 27-31.
44. Gehse, Die deutsche Presse, 31-33.
45. An example is Kalender fur die Deutschen in Brasilien fUr das Jahr 1914, published by Rotermund in an edition of 12,750 copies. Gehse, Die deutsche Presse,
35-37; Fouquet, Der deutsche Einwanderer, 210-11.
46. Dressel, Der deutschbrasilianische Kolonist, 20; Jordan, "Aspects of German
Colonization," 350.
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lect be preserved. Dois Irmaos was such a place: The Hunsriicker
dialect (spoken west of the Rhine and south of the Mosel in Germany) prevailed into the 1960s. But even in homogeneous communities, Portuguese words found their way into everyday speech.
Erruno Willems has estimated that approximately five hundred
Portuguese terms were gradually absorbed into the language of
the German Brazilians. Most of these words concerned political
and economic activity for which there was no suitable German vocabulary. Borrowings were especially numerous in aspects of the
horse culture that Germans adopted and adapted from the LusoBrazilians. 47

Linguistic Acculturation
In Brazil as elsewhere, the linguistic acculturation of an immigrant population is closely associated with the number and quality of interpersonal contacts with members of the host or receiving society. Data from the 1940 census show that in Rio Grande do
SuI, where the Germans had relatively few contacts with speakers
of Portuguese, 97.6 percent of the German-Brazilian families habitually spoke German in their homes; in Sao Paulo, where the
Germans were well dispersed within the huge city, the proportion
dropped to 55.1 percent, even though the European-born compared with the Brazilian-born group was much larger there than
in Rio Grande do SuI. 48 However, these data do not reveal the proportion of habitual German-speakers who could also speak Portuguese. Only in the most isolated rural districts did the children
grow up ignorant of Portuguese. Yet generalizations about the failure of German Brazilians to acculturate linguistically are frequently
based on impressions drawn from such atypical environments.
In contrast to the people in isolated rural areas, the craftsmen,
47. Dressel, Der deutschbrasilianische Kolonist, 34-40; Emilio Willems, "Linguistic Changes in German-Brazilian Communities," Acta Americana, I (OctoberDecember, 1943), 455; Willems, "Assimilation of German Immigrants," 127; Emilio
Willems, "Acculturation and the Horse Complex among German-Brazilians,"
American Anthropologist, n.s., XLVI (April-June, 1944), 158-60. See also Carlos H.
Oberacker, Jr., "Transformac;6es da lingua alema no Brasil," in Egon Schaden
(ed.), Homem, cultura e sociedade no Brasil: Sele~6es da Revista de Antropologica (2nd
ed.; Petropolis, 1977), 383-432.
48. Neiva and Diegues, "The Cultural Assimilation of Immigrants," 221.
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industrial workers, and professional persons in the cities and
large towns learned Portuguese, not merely as an economic necessity, but also as a matter of social prestige. For educated urbanites, the inability to speak Portuguese became a source of social
deprivation. Persons with social aspirations naturally perceived
the language of the dominant Luso-Brazilian society as prestigious. Many eagerly shed the identifying marks of German ethnicity; given names, for example, were often modified or changed
to Portuguese equivalents. By the time of World War I, there were
undoubtedly thousands of descendants of German immigrants
who were unable to speak German and who, despite their family
names, were well integrated into Brazilian society. Unfortunately,
there was no way to determine the size of the group.49
In general, it appears that rapid linguistic acculturation was associated with urban residence, employment in the industrial sector,
high level of education, youth, and membership in the Catholic
church. 50 There were, however, certain cross pressures, especially
for the middle and upper classes. Such persons often felt disdain
for Luso-Brazilian culture, believing that their German heritage
was superior. At the same time, they had many contacts with
Luso-Brazilian society because of their education and social status, and this produced a strong tendency toward assimilation.

The Role of the Family
The basic unit in the social structure of the German-Brazilian
population was, of course, the family. Isolation tended to enhance
its importance in the rural areas, where the attainment of material
success was largely dependent on the labor that children contributed to the agricultural enterprise. Thus large families were an
economic asset, and comments about the fecundity of GermanBrazilian families abound. Spectacular examples have been recorded: Hans Adam Schmidt, who immigrated at the age of sixteen to Santa Catarina in 1829, had 829 descendants a century
later, of whom 748 were living; Jacob Goedert, who arrived in the
49. Willems, "Linguistic Changes," 448; Benjamin F. Schapelle, The German Ele-
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50. Willems, "Linguistic Changes," 462.
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same year at age ten, had 461. More meaningful, however, is the
calculation that up to 1914 the average number of children in German immigrant families was 4.7. According to one estimate, the
birth rate among members of the Evangelical church in Rio
Grande do SuI immediately preceding World War I was 4.5 times
the death rate. 51
Large families were customary among both Catholics and Protestants. Impressionistic evidence suggests, however, that exogamy, or marriage outside the ethnic group, was more frequently a
Catholic than a Protestant phenomenon. Following a trip to Brazil
immediately after World War I, the American historian Clarence
Haring reported that German Protestants were strongly race conscious, despised the "dark Brazilians," and rarely married outside
their church. By contrast, according to Willems, German Catholics were more likely to marry non-German Catholics than German Protestants. 52 In the solidly German districts endogamy was
standard, but in the marginal areas a different pattern emerged. A
study of the records of the Catholic parish of Ijui, located in an
ethnically mixed area in the western part of Rio Grande do SuI,
revealed that only 48 percent of the marriages involving German
parishioners from 1899 to 1932 were between German men and
German women. The remainder were to Italian (25 percent), LusoBrazilian (15.6 percent), and Polish (11.4 percent) partners. Most
frequent among the exogamous unions were those between
German women and Italian men (17 percent). Even though LusoBrazilians were apparently numerous in this parish, they were
considered inferior partners because they did not share the German work ethic. At the same time, mixed marriages among Protestants in the Ijui area were reportedly rare. 53
Exogamy was also common among urban residents, especially
51. Reinhard Maack, "The Germans of South Brazil: A German View," Quarterly
Journal of Inter-American Relations, I (July, 1939), 8-10. See also Artur Hehl Neiva,
"Uma familia teuto-brasileira," in I. Col6quio, 85-95. Fausel, Dr. Rotermund, 146.
52. Haring, The Germans in South America, 38; Willems, "Assimilation of German Immigrants," 129. See also Emilio Willems, "A miscigena~iio entre brasileiros
de ascendencia germanica," Revista Sociologia, XV (1953), 95-108. Willems' data
are from a later period, chiefly the 1940s.
53. Porzelt, Der deutsche Bauer, 95; Maack, "The Germans of South Brazil,"
11-12.
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A typicaIJy large German family living in the Taquanl munidpio of Rio Grande do Sui
Reprinted from Kalender fUr die Deutschen in Brasilien: 1918

industrial workers. Conditions in the factory promoted social
uniformity and equality in wages and living standards. Similarly,
there was a greater inclination to marry outside the group among
the well educated. Koseritz himself provides the most distinguished example of a German intellectual who married a LusoBrazilian. 54

Conclusion
The social structure that evolved among the Teuto-Brazilians during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was thus the
product of the adaptation of the German immigrant culture within
the social environment of Brazil. Just as geographical conditions
in that vast, tropical land imposed certain limits on German immigrant settlement and forced adaptation in economic behavior, so
54. Willems, "Assimilation of German Immigrants," 129; Willems, "A miscigenac;ao entre brasileiros," 108; Maack, "The Germans of South Brazil," 12.
Maack, a German geographer and an apologist for Nazism, considered Koseritz's
marriage "tragic" because, as a consequence, his descendants were lost to the
German-Brazilian population.
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the social environment of Luso-Catholic Brazil acted on the immigrants in their new world. Immigrant churches quickly became
the most important institutions among the German Brazilians.
Differences in religious belief in relation to Brazilian culture in
turn not only influenced the character of synodical organizations,
schools, voluntary associations, and the immigrant press but also
led to differences in linguistic acculturation and marital assimilation between Catholics and Protestants. Diversity within the
Teuto-Brazilian subsociety is further revealed by differences in the
assimilational experiences of urban immigrants and those who remained in isolated rural ghettoes, where the quantity and quality
of interpersonal contacts were different. Yet, despite these intragroup variations, the Germans were commonly and stereotypically perceived by persons outside the group as having uniform
characteristics and behavior.

3
The German Ethnic Group
in Brazilian Society, 1890-1917

B

y THE LAST DECADE of the nineteenth century, the Ger-

man ethnic group in Brazil had become a society within a
society-a large, diverse, and structured community with
institutions, language, values, and folkways that differed significantly from those of the host society. Because of the accidents of
time and place, the Germans had been allowed to develop their
own society without much interference, and in general they were
well received and respected during the last years of the empire.
European ideas were valued for the contributions they could
make to Brazilian culture; German culture, science, and education
were often considered among the best in the world. 1
With the advent of the republic, however, attitudes toward the
German Brazilians began to change. The difference was partly a
matter of confidence: The republic had to demonstrate its authority and its ability to govern, a task made more difficult by the
diffusion of political power among the states and the development
of political parties on a state basis. The abolition of slavery in 1888
had created a labor shortage, chiefly in the central and southern
states, that the government had sought to relieve by recruiting im1. Freyre, Order and Progress, 56-57, 123-24, 188-89. Freyre has noted that, of
all the immigrant groups, the Italians were the most desired, the most imitated,
and the most highly praised by Brazilian leaders who in those years hoped the
influx of European immigrants would "whiten" the population. Since Italians were
closer than Germans to Luso-Brazilians on a sociocultural distance scale, they
were less separatistic and thus more capable of producing the desired genetic
effect (see pp. 256-57). Cf. Skidmore, Black into White.
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migrants from Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Germany. At the same
time, the modernization of the economic structure of Brazil was
under way, especially in the south. With the expansion of industry in relation to the production of agricultural commodities came
economic and social dislocations that were new to Brazilians. As
the world has witnessed so often in the twentieth century, modernization produced new social problems and tensions, especially in the cities. Some Brazilians, doubting the capacity of their
society to absorb the flood of immigrants, demanded that the
newcomers learn to conform to Brazilian ways. Others urged the
revitalization of Latin Catholic culture, which in their view had
been weakened by the infusion of foreign ideas and attitudes. 2

Nativism
Nativist sentiments fomented heated disputes, some within the
German community itself, others among Germans, Italians, and
Luso-Brazilians. It was a period of much strife, unrest, outrage,
and even murder. 3 The unstable conditions of the early republican
era as they affected ethnic groups are revealed in an incident that
occurred in Porto Alegre in 1895. A radical, freethinking German
lawyer, Germano Hasslocher, attacked individual Jesuit priests in
the Portuguese-language press (Gazeta da Tarde) in a manner the
Catholics deemed despicable. Hugo Metzler, the publisher of the
Catholic paper Deutsches Volksblatt, thereupon reviled Hasslocher
as a political apostate. Further insults were followed by threats of
violence. Meanwhile Metzler, loyal Catholic that he was, had also
criticized Italians on the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary
of Italian unification (which had been achieved at the expense of
the papacy). Hasslocher's response was to use Metzler's editorial
to incite a mob of celebrating Italians, and on September 29, 1895,
they destroyed Metzler's printshop.4
Nativism was consonant with the doctrines of Comtean Positivism that infused the thought of many of the new republican lead2. Freyre, Order and Progress, 123, 197; E. Bradford Bums, A History of Brazil
(New York, 1970), 250-54. For a general discussion, see Brunn, Deutschland und
Brasilien, 201-17.
3. Gehse, Die deutsche Presse, 148-55; Haring, The Germans in South America, 40.
4. Metzler, Aus 60 Jahren, 38; Gehse, Die deutsche Presse, 155.
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ers. The commitment of the Brazilian Positivists was not merely to
progress but also to order, which they understood to include a
harmony among the classes, races, ethnic groups, and sexes.
They could applaud the diverse origins of Brazilian society and
culture and yet insist that a new unity-a distinctively Brazilian
unity-had to be achieved, by force of dictatorship if necessary.
Thus, the Constitution of 1891 generously granted citizenship to
all immigrants who wanted it; at the same time, they felt strongly
that the newcomers should make a conscious effort to assimilate.
According to this view, Luso-Brazilian society needed to resist the
tendency of such ethnic groups as the Germans to remain separate. To speak a different language, to attend different schools, to
eat different foods, to wear different clothing, to worship different
gods-all these actions were undesirable because they implied
being not merely different but superior. 5
Nativism also thrived on envy. While there is no record of persistent cultural conflict based on ethnic differences, one mayassume that some Brazilians of the less privileged classes regarded
the Germans with resentment and jealously. Like any other large
social grouping, the Germans encompassed a wide variation in
education, skills, health, and working habits. In fact, large numbers experienced a deterioration in socioeconomic status as they
struggled to survive in the Brazilian environment. But the strong
image among some Brazilians was that the Germans were better
housed and fed; that their system of private and parochial schools
was often superior to what passed for public education in Brazil at
that time; and that their homes and persons were cleaner and
healthier. The Germans also seemed willing to work very hard, at
least in contrast to the impoverished caboclos, among whom labor
was intermittent and subject to long and frequent interruptions.
Moreover, the Germans were savers. In order to counter the effects of inheritance laws that tended to break up farm properties
into unprofitable units, the German colonos often saved diligently
in order to provide their sons with agricultural land. Value conflicts were apparent in many other aspects of life as well. Willems
5. Freyre, Order and Progress, 14; Joao Cruz Costa, A History of Ideas in Brazil,
trans. Suzette Macedo (Berkeley, 191'4),82-175; Fernando de Azevedo, Brazilian
Culture (New York, 1950), 159-60,414-18; Freyre, New World in the Tropics, 154;
Jose Hon6rio Rodrigues, The Brazilians: Their Character and Aspirations (Austin,
191'7), C)6.
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has pointed out, for example, that whereas Luso-Brazilians were
tolerant of prostitution but intolerant of sexual intercourse for unmarried women, Teuto-Brazilians were opposed to prostitution
but permitted premarital intercourse under controlled conditions
that normally led to marriage. 6
.
Nativism displays itself most naturally in the field of politics.
Even though the Teuto-Brazilians had experienced a great deal of
success economically, their participation in the political process
was quite another matter. Government at all levels remained firmly
in the hands of the Luso-Brazilian landowners and in Rio Grande
do SuI their power was virtually complete. They usually dominated the local leader of the established party. A rural political
boss delivered the votes required of him, prevented the opposition from voting, controlled patronage, and dispensed favors.
When enticement failed, he might resort to fraud and violence. 7 It
was difficult for the Germans to find a place in such a system.
Most of the time they were happy enough to be left alone without
harassment.
Political apathy has, in fact, been frequently noted as a characteristic of German immigrants everywhere and should be understood sociologically as an aspect of marginality.8 In southern Brazil, where the cultural isolation of Germans was especially strong,
social pressure often worked against political participation. For
6. Although Emilio Willems is in no way responsible for my interpretation
here, I have relied in part on his numerous works and have modified my views in
consequence of private correspondence with him. See Willems, A aculturar;iio dos
alemiies no Brasil. Among his English-language articles, see "Assimilation of German Immigrants," 125-32, and "Some Aspects of Cultural Conflict and Acculturation," 375-84.
7. Love, Rio Grande do Sui, 118-20; Roche, La colonisation allemande, 554-55;
Max Dedekind, Brasilien, das Ziel deutscher Auswanderer und die Deutsche Evangelische Kirche in Brasilien (Elberfeld, Germany, 1924), 9. Cf. Victor Nunes Leal, Coronelismo: The Municipality and Representative Government in Brazil, trans. from the
Portuguese edition (1949) by June Henfrey (Cambridge, 1977), 1-25.
8. Egon Schaden, "Der Deutschbrasilianer-Ein Problem," Staden-Jahrbuch:
Beitrage zur Brasilkunde, II (1954), 193; Niemeyer, Die Deutschen in Brasilien, 89;
Arpad Szilvassy, "Participa<;ao dos alemaes e seus descendentes na vida politica
Brasileira," in I. Col6quio, 247-61; Schutz, "Imigra<;ao alerna," 307-308. Cf. Frederick C. Luebke, "Politics and Missouri Synod Lutherans: A Historiographical Review," Concordia Historical Institute Quarterly, XLV (May, 1972), 141-58; and Norman A. Graebner, "Lutherans and Politics," in John E. Groh and Robert H. Smith
(eds.), The Lutheran Church in North American Life (St. Louis, 1979), 12-30.
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example, one German teacher in Rio Grande do SuI felt constrained to apologize for having become a Brazilian citizen. He explained that such a step was prerequisite to becoming an instructor in a government school, a position to which he aspired. 9 As
the descendants of northern Europeans in a land marked strongly
by southern European culture, the German Brazilians were an obviously different sort of people. In their separate and isolated
world, participation in the political process was usually not considered very important. Mostly they were ignored by the ruling
classes, and if they attempted to become involved in politics, they
were easily dominated.
Throughout the empire period, the majority of German colonos-perhaps 75 percent-never bothered to acquire citizenship.
For example, in 1852, there were only 165 voters of German stock
in the entire Sao Leopoldo municipio. The majority were of peasant stock and few had traditions of political participation in Germany. Most were unaware of the rights that were at least technically theirs. 10
It was the redoubtable Karl von Koseritz who led the fight for
political rights and greater political participation among the TeutoBrazilians. He was among the first of the Germans, and the first
non-Catholic, to be elected to the provincial assembly of Rio
Grande do SuI. In his speeches and publications, he repeatedly
urged the Germans to become naturalized and to vote. Like many
of his counterparts in the United States at that time, Koseritz also
urged his fellow immigrants to organize themselves into a political bloc or, as circumstances might demand, a political party, arguing that this was the only way the Germans could enjoy the political power that was commensurate with their numbers. In 1883
he confidently but prematurely declared that the Germans had
been drawn into public life; as he pointed out, they had been
elected to the councils of several cities and held important positions in the national guard. By the end of the 188os, four Germans
had served in the provincial assembly of Rio Grande do SuI. 11

9. "Anteil des Deutschtums an der Politik," in Hundert Jahre Deutschtum, 179.
10. Hundert 'Jahre Deutschtum, 179; Szilvassy, "Participa~ao dos alemaes," 249.
11. Koseritz, Bi/der aus Brasilien, 14°,360; Oberacker, Carlos von Koseritz, 51-69;
Gehse, Die deutsche Presse, 147; Hundert Jahre Deutschtum, 179; Roche, La colonisa-
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Neutralizing Teuto-Brazilian Power
Shortly after the establishment of the republic in 1889, all immigrants were granted the option of becoming citizens with the
right to vote, provided that they could meet a literacy requirement. Promising though this enfranchisement was, it did not lead
to political acculturation. Since the literacy rate of German Brazilians soared above that of the nation as a whole, they represented a
potential threat to the political dominance of the estancieiros-the
established landowner class-in districts where German settlements were concentrated. In Rio Grande do SuI, the regime of
Julio do Castilhos and Antonio Borges de Medeiros (with its Positivist emphasis on order and commitment to social progress
through republican dictatorship) solved the problem by negotiating a sort of gentleman's agreement: Teuto-Brazilians' electoral
support for the ruling party was exchanged for cultural liberty,
that is, freedom from any coercive program designed to integrate
them into the political life of the local communities, the state, or
the nation. 12
Electoral docility on the part of the Germans was guaranteed in
Rio Grande do SuI by a second step-the gerrymandering of electoral districts in 1897. Even though the Germans constituted 24.7
percent of the registered voters in the state, they were distributed
among three districts so that the chance of their electing one of
their number was seriously reduced. A subsequent reapportionment in 1914 preserved the minority status of Germans in all electoral districts. So effective was this arrangement that throughout
the republican era from 1889 to World War I, rarely more than
tion allemande, 534, 555; Szilvassy, "Participa<;ao dos alemaes," 250. Actually,
Koseritz might have been more successful if he had not been so impatient and
intolerant of the church people, whom he inevitably alienated with his barrage of
criticism aimed at Jesuits and the Protestant clergy.
12. Kohlhepp, "Die deutschstammigen Siedlungsgebiete im siidbrasilianischen Staate Santa Catarina," 220; Szilvassy, "Participa<;ao dos alemaes," 250;
Freyre, Order and Progress, 270. Freyre did not approve of the arrangement. He
wrote that "descendants of Germans were allowed liberties or privileges entirely
incompatible with Brazilian cultural basic unity (such as the right to have schools
where Portuguese was not taught) by politicians who needed German votes in
order to dominate or control their particular state" (Freyre, New World in the Tropics, 102).
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three deputies in the state assembly bore German names-approximately a third of the seats their numbers warranted. 13
Such steps to neutralize the political potential of the TeutoBrazilians did not go far enough to satisfy the concerns of some
Rio Grande do SuI politicians. They believed that measures had to
be taken to break up the existing colonies and to guarantee that
new settlements would consist of a mixture of ethnic groups.
Some nativists wanted to accomplish these goals through a commission that was established in 1897 to investigate the validity of
the land titles held by the immigrants-Italians as well as Germans: It was a fact that many immigrants had acquired their land
from swindlers; they could base their landownership only on
documents that had been falsified earlier by public officials. Naturally, such titles were thrown out, to the great consternation and
bitterness of the immigrants, who perceived the work of the verification commission as a poorly disguised effort to force them off
their land and break up their colonies. 14
A decade later, another method was devised to restrict the
growth of immigrant colonies, this time at the national level. In
1909, Congress passed a law specifying that at least 10 percent of
the land in an area of small-farmer settlement had to be owned by
native-born Brazilians. The effect of this legislation was minimal
because by that time the great majority of the German colonos were
Brazilian-born. 15
In some respects, the Teuto-Brazilians fared better in Santa Catarina than they did in Rio Grande do SuI. The political power of
the small landowners (as distinguished from the estancieiros) was
greater in this smaller and poorer state, and the Germans benefited accordingly. Several German colonos attained a political prominence in Santa Catarina that was denied them in Rio Grande do
Sul. The most distinguished was Lauro Muller. Born in Itajaf of
immigrant parents, Muller received a military education and became a follower of a well-known Positivist~ Benjamim Constant
I}. Roche, La colonisation allemande, 552-54, 568; Love, Rio Grande do Sui,
1}1-}}.
14. Monckmeier, Die deutsche uberseeische Auswanderung, 214; Gehse, Die deutsche
Presse, 160.
15. Karl Heinrich Oberacker, Jr., "Die sozialgeschichtliche Bedeutung der
deutschen Einwanderung," Staden-Jahrbuch: Beitrage zur Brasilkunde, II (1954), 179.
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Magalhaes. He served as an aide to Marshal Deodoro da Fonseca,
a founder of the republic, and after the coup of 1889, Deodoro appointed Muller, then twenty-six years of age, as governor of Santa
Catarina. Muller was subsequently elected to the same office
three times and also served the federal government as minister of
commerce in the Rodrigues Alves administration and as foreign
minister from 1912 to 1917 under presidents Hermes da Fonseca
and Wenceslau Braz. Other second-generation Germans were active in Santa Catarina politics, including Muller's first cousin,
General Felippe Schmidt, who served as governor from 1914 to
1918, and the four Konder brothers, who were active in state and
federal politics in the 1920S and 1930S.16
Along with these personal successes was a counterpoint of hostility. Positivism was less of a political force in Santa Catarina than
it was in Rio Grande do Sui, and the immigrants were more highly
concentrated in communities such as Blumenau, Joinville, and
Brusque. Because the threat posed by the colonos to the ruling
Luso-Brazilians had not been neutralized as in Rio Grande do SuI,
tensions mounted in Santa Catarina and programs of assimilation
were ardently espoused.
Several prominent Luso-Brazilian politicians in Santa Catarina
spoke out against further growth of the German colonies. One of
the governors in this period, Hermio Luz, condemned the Germans severely for their separatism. He was especially troubled by
the German Protestants because, in his view, they wanted only to
remain German. Everything they did seemed to reflect their attachment to Germany; they wanted no other fatherland. Luz was
particularly galled by the Evangelical clergy's opposition to marriages of Germans and Luso-Brazilians and by the refusal of Germans in general to adopt Brazilian customs. 17
16. Marcus Konder, Lauro Maller (Itajai, 1944); Rodrigo Octavio, "Lauro
Mueller," Revista do Instituto Hist6rico e Geografico Brasileiro, CCLXV (1964), 172-88;
Oberacker, Der deutsche Beitrag, 401-405; Martin Fischer, "0 problema da conservac;ao da cultura alema," in I. Col6quio, 344; Entres (ed.), Gedenkbuch; "A morte do
Senador Felippe Schmidt," unidentified newspaper clipping, May 10, 1930, in Instituto Hans Staden, sao Paulo.
17. Luz quoted in Martin Braunschweig, "Die rechtliche Stellung des deutschen
Schulwesens in Siidbrasilien," in Geissler (ed.), Die Kulturbedeutung, 51. See also
Brunn, Deutschland und Brasilien, 217.
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In Santa Catarina, as in the United States, the nativist attack on
immigrant institutions focused on private schools. Whereas in the
United States, Catholic parochial schools were targeted for control
if not elimination, in Brazil it was the Protestant schools that were
found objectionable. Another important difference is that in the
United States the public schools were well developed and numerically preponderant, while in Santa Catarina they were an inadequate minority. Given this circumstance, any effort to expand and
improve the public school system was perceived by Teuto-Brazilian leaders as an attack on the schools. At least two laws, passed
in 1904 and 1907 by the Santa Catarina legislature, was intended
to assist in the development of government schools and the regulation of private schools. But it was not until 1911 when Orestes
Guimaraes was appointed inspector of schools that effective control was initiated. IS
Evidently, private school teachers and administrators were less
than cooperative with state officials. In 1913, Santa Catarina enacted legislation requiring them to supply all information concerning curriculum and attendance statistics requested by state
officials and to permit inspection of their schools. The law further
specified that private schools were to observe national holidays
and to comply with hygiene regulations. It expressly recognized
the freedom of schools that received no government support to
develop their own curricula, but any institution that accepted
subventions from either the state or the municipio was required to
use Portuguese as the language of instruction. Remarkably mild
by present-day standards, this law was sharply condemned, especially by the Protestant clergy, who saw it as a sinister effort to
strangle their schools. 19

The German Peril
Among Luso-Brazilian leaders of the educated and governing
classes, there was a growing concern that the Germans in the
18. Braunschweig, "Die rechtliche StelIung," 51; Entres (ed.), Gedenkbuch, 223;
Schroder, Brasilien und Wittenberg, 356; Brunn, Deutschland und Brasilien, 184.
19. Braunschweig, "Die rechtliche StelIung," 51; Schroder, Brasilien und Wittenberg, 356; Dedekind, Brasilien, 24. Many Brazilians admitted that if the Germans
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southern states were becoming so numerous and so powerful that
they could never be assimilated. Early in the twentieth century,
their fears were heightened by much discussion of the "German
peril" -a belief that Germany had set itself upon a course of worldwide imperialism, based in part on the presence of German immigrants in various underdeveloped countries, including Brazil. Before and after the turn of the century, German aggressiveness was
observed in the South Pacific, China, the Philippines, and the
Caribbean. When in 1904 the Germans threatened the integrity of
Venezuela, Brazil's neighbor to the north, in a debt-collection controversy, alarmists in Europe, the United States, and certainly Brazil feared that Germany was taking the first steps in a plan designed to culminate in the creation of a German protectorate over
southern Brazil and possibly an independent state that would be
German in language and culture. 20
The Brazilians' suspicion of German intentions was not unfounded. Already in the 1840s, there were propagandists in Germany who hoped to encourage German emigrants to go not to the
United States but to southern Brazil and the La Plata district of
Argentina and Uruguay. If sufficient numbers could be directed
there, German language and culture would predominate and the
people could establish a state that would become rivals of German
industry rather than consumers of German goods, as they were
likely to be in undeveloped Brazil. Still others maintained that the
typical German emigrant lacked the ability to withstand the assimilative power of Anglo-American culture; he and his descendants would be completely un-Germanized within a few generations. Brazil, by contrast, offered a setting in which Deutschtum
could be rooted permanently. 21
had failed to assimilate, it was not their fault, since the government had failed to
provide Portuguese-language schools. For example, see Truda, A colonisa(;iio allemii,
141 - 66.
20. For a general discussion of the "German peril," see Brunn, Deutschland und
Brasilien, 201-18.
21. F. Schmidt, Grundzuge einer geregelten Auswanderung der Deutschen, mit besonderer Rucksicht aUf Sudbrasilien (Hamburg, 1842); F. Schmidt, Die geregelte Auswanderung nach Brasilien und ihr erster gliinzder Erfolg (Rudolstadt, Germany, 1852);
Wilhelm Georg Roscher, Kolonien, Kolonialpolitik und Auswanderung (Leipzig and
Heidelberg, 1856), 358. Cf. Sudhaus, Deutschland und die Auswanderung, 48-50.
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German cultural chauvinists continued to beat the same drum
until, early in the twentieth century, resistance to acculturation
became a common theme. Teuto-Brazilians could read, for example, about Hermann Leyfer, a German journalist who argued
that cultural characteristics were inborn, inherited, and inalienable and that a person retained them to death, regardless of residence or other circumstance. "A German remains a German," he
wrote. "To deny one's nationality is to deny one's self." Others carried the argument farther, asserting that maintaining the German
language and culture was the duty of Teuto-Brazilians because
they would thereby enhance and strengthen national culture,
even as they contributed to Brazil's prosperity by their industry.
Some writers recommended resistance to assimilation on the
grounds that Brazilian culture was worthless. Brazil, wrote Walther Kundt, "is a country that has produced nothing memorable
in any field, including economics and culture." Furthermore, he
continued, Brazilians are unable "to establish a properly functioning means of transportation and communication, regulate
their fmancial affairs, guarantee justice, build a fleet, or maintain
an army other than one that is really nothing more than a privileged band of robbers." 22
In Sao Leopoldo, Dr. Wilhelm Rotermund insisted on German
racial superiority, arguing that Teuto-Brazilians must remain exclusive and racially pure because miscegenation could only introduce
decadence. "We Germans are an elite," he wrote in his Deutsche
Post in 1897, "and can fulfill our cultural mission only when we do
not mix with Latinate people [romanische Rassen]."23
Meanwhile in Germany the noisy, chauvinistic Pan-German
League had, by 1900, united twenty thousand supernationalists
from the urban middle classes and fueled new fears of German
imperialism. In its widely distributed publications, this organization emphasized the cultural kinship of Germans all over the
world and agitated vociferously for a colonial empire, for an enlarged navy, for war as an instrument of national policy, and for
22. Leyfer quoted in Joinville Zeitung, October 21, 1896; Deutsche Zeitung (Porto
Alegre), February 24, 1900; Walther Kundt, Brasilien und seine Bedeutung fUr
Deutschlands Handel und Industrie (Berlin, H)03), 18. In 1905, A Federa~iio of Porto
Alegre published an article summarizing such Pan-Germanist comments. See
Brunn, Deutschland und Brasilien, 206.
23. Fausel, Dr. Rotermund, 186.
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the preservation of the German language and culture in German
settlements overseas. A symptom rather than a cause of the rampant nationalism of the time, the Pan-German League was identified by English and French propagandists as the coordinating
agency of German imperialism. Although the league's importance
was grossly exaggerated, a flood of articles exposing the alleged
Pan-Germanist conspiracy soon appeared in ne~spapers and periodicals in Europe, America, and elsewhere, climaxing with the
publication in 1913 of Pan-Germanism by an American historian, Roland G. Usher. Typically filled with misinformation and
overstatement, these materials repeatedly drew upon the same
sources-either German chauvinists or French and English counterpropagandists-and as a result they succeeded in stirring up
much anti-German sentiment. 24
Literature of this kind also appeared in Brazil. By far the most
significant example is a short book by a noted Brazilian literary
critic, Sylvio Romero, which was published in 1906. In 0 allemanismo no sui do Brasil, Romero, who is distinguished for his recognition of the African contribution to Brazilian culture, warned his
countrymen of the "German peril," outlined possible steps to
combat the threat, and urged that measures be taken to assimilate
the German colonos into Brazilian society. Undoubtedly Romero's
book contributed to the efforts of the government during the preWorld War I decade to limit the potential political power of the
Teuto-Brazilians, to break up the exclusive character of the German settlements, and to improve the quality of the public schools
so that they could indeed function as agents of assimilation.25
24. Mildred S. Wertheimer, The Pan-German League, 1890-1914, Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law, CXII (New York, 1924); Roland G. Usher, PanGermanism (Boston, 1913). For samples of such material, see Frederick W. Wile,
"German Colonization in Brazil," Fortnightly Review, LXXIX (January, H)06),
129-38; and Alfred F. Sears, "Gennan Influence in Latin America," Popular Science
Monthly, LXXII (February, H)08), 140-52. More moderate or balanced are Stephen
BonsaI, "Greater Germany in South America," North American Review, CLXXVI
(January, 1903), 58-67; and George A. Chamberlain, "Gennany in Southern Brazil," Independent, LVI (May 5, 1904), 1016-22. A later review of this material is provided by Loretta Baum, "Gennan Political Designs with Reference to Brazil," Hispanic American Historical Review, II (November, 1919), 589-99.
25. Sylvio Romero, 0 allemanismo no sui do Brasil: Seus perigos e os meios de os
conjurar (Rio de Janeiro, 1906). For a general treatment of the Brazilian literature
attacking Pan-Germanism, see Brunn, Deutschland und Brasilien, 207-16. Edgardo
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The Portuguese-language press also warned against the "German peril." In August, 1904, for example, the Correia do Povo of
Porto Alegre published extracts from several nationalistic newspapers in Germany to illustrate that Pan-Germanists considered
the three southern states to be within Germany's sphere of influence. 26 Brazilians were especially offended by a remark of Gustav
Schmoller, a German professor, regarding the options available to
the three southernmost states: remaining a part of Brazil, becoming an independent country, or coming "into closer relation" with
the German Empire. 27 Concern was frequently expressed about
the opening of German consulates in southern cities and about the
subsidies the Prussian state church (always described as the German goverment) was providing for German Evangelical schools in
Brazil.
German-language newspapers in Brazil were by no means
united in support of Pan-Germanism. The movement had its partisans, of course, but most Teuto-Brazilian journalists were more
moderate. They believed that it was possible, even desirable, to
maintain the German language and culture in Brazil, but within
the framework of loyal Brazilian citizenship. So keen was the opposition to Pan-Germanism in Porto Alegre, for example, that one
weekly newspaper, the Rio Grandenser Vaterland, was founded on
the proposition that the Teuto-Brazilian fatherland was Rio Grande
do SuI and Brazil, not Germany. This paper expressly declared its
intention to do battle with Pan-Germanism and its advocates;
having the support of prominent and powerful Riograndenser
politicians, it thrived and continued to publish for many years. 2B
To the German imperial government, the Pan-Germanists were
de Magalhiies wrote a piece for English readers, but it merely repeated typical
anti-German propaganda. See his "Germany and South America: A Brazilian
View," Nineteenth Century and After, LXXXI (January, 1917),67-80. See also Theodor
Alemann, Die Zukunft des Deutschtums in Amerika (Buenos Aires and Stuttgart,
1923), 68-74·
26. Ernest Tonnelat, L'expansion allemande hors d'Europe (Paris, 1908), 144-45.
27. Chamberlain, "Germany in Southern Brazil," 1020; Fritz Biihler, Dona
Francisca: 70 Jahre deutscher Kulturarbeit in Brasilien im Staate Santa Catharina (BerlinWilmersdorf, [1919]), 76-78. See also Gaston Gaillard, Amerique latine et Europe occidentale: L'Amerique latine et la guerre (Paris, 1918), 20-21.
28. Tonnelat, L'expansion allemande, 137; Gehse, Die deutsche Presse, 24, 159;
Fausel, Dr. Rotermund, 196-97.
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a nuisance. Count Bernhard von Biilow, the German chancellor,
explicitly repudiated the league. In a speech before the German
Reichstag on March 19, 1904, he denied unequivocally any intention to annex territory anywhere in South America. "In Brazil,"
commented von Billow in an interview with a Brazilian journalist,
"we wish to form no state within a state, and hope that the Germans there will become useful members of their country." The
same message was brought to the Teuto-Brazilians by Prince Henry
of Prussia, the brother of the kaiser, when he stopped in Brazil on
a world tour a short time earlier.29 Such spokesmen for the German government readily admitted that while their country had no
political aspirations in the Western world, it had a strong economic interest and that Germany, like France and England, was
eager to develop its trade relations with South American countries.
Had the German government wanted to assume a political role
in Brazil, the opportunity came in connection with the visit of the
German cruiser Panther to the port of Itajai, Santa Catarina, in
1905. When a sailor failed to return to the ship at a designated
time, the ship's commander, Count von Saurma-Jeltsch, ordered
several officers and a dozen marines to go ashore and apprehend
the deserter, which they did, but not without resistance. The action was a clear violation of Brazilian sovereignty, and Baron Rio
Branco, the Brazilian foreigner minister, quickly demanded an
apology. Meanwhile the Brazilian press became highly agitated
over the affair. The German minister in Rio de Janeiro at first tried
to defend Saurma's action, but Chancellor von Billow successfully
insisted, despite Kaiser Wilhelm's reluctance to discipline the
commander, that the German government comply and that he be
recalled. 30
Thus, during the decade before the outbreak of World War I,
Brazilians at all levels of society, from the ruling classes to the despised caboclos, had begun to perceive the Germans, both TeutoBrazilians and Reichsdeutsche, as a problem-an element that
threatened the equilibrium of Brazilian society.31 The Germans
. 29. Chamberlain, "Germany in Southern Brazil," 1021-22.
30. Brunn, Deutschland und Brasilien, 88-99; Alfred Vagts, Deutschland und die
Vereinigten Staaten in der Weltpolitik (2 vols; New York, 1935), II, 1/'68-70; Tonnelat,
L'expansion allemande, 145-56. Rio Branco's letter is quoted in Otto Prazeres, 0
Brasil na guerra: (Algumas notas para a historia) (Rio de Janeiro, 1918), 23-24.
31. Fischer, "0 problema da conserva~o"; Schaden, "Der Deutschbrasilianer."
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seemed rich and powerful, socially exclusive, and unwilling to be
assimilated. To the more suspicious, they were eager accomplices
in a Pan-Germanist plot to extend German power and the German
language and culture to all parts of the world.

Ethnic Images and Perceptions
The Brazilians' image of the Germans, like most stereotypes,
rested on insufficient and distorted information, rhetorical exaggerations, and myths. 32 There was little comprehension of the diversity within the group, such as the differences that divided
Catholics from Protestants or the disparate values and behaviors
that separated farmers from urban workers and businessmen. Perceptions were drawn primarily from the behavior of a part of the
ethnic elite-the articulate, educated clergy, journalists, and businessmen who perpetuated the immigrant culture because it served
their economic interest and satisfied their psychological needs.
Meanwhile the ordinary German-Brazilian people went about
their daily business, gradually adapting to their surroundings and
rarely giving the problem any thought. If their assimilation was
unusually slow, it was because they had farther to go, culturally
speaking, than did the Italians, for example, to whom they were
frequently and negatively compared. Partly because of this cultural distance they tended to gather in separate communities, especially in the rural districts. Since the Germans were so numerous, it was relatively easy for them to create the institutions that
maintained their distinctive cultural forms. Luso-Brazilians, no
less than the Germans themselves, failed to understand how the
physical environment in conjunction with the accidents of Brazilian history had promoted German isolationism. They had little
appreciation for the diversity of German immigrant society and
the sharp differences that often divided its members.
Luso-Brazilians were often mystified by the apparent separatism
of the Germans. They could not understand why the Germans
would even want to perpetuate their own language and culture indefmitely. In their view, Luso-Brazilian culture was especially attractive-it was open, tolerant, hospitable, adaptable, nonideo32. Schaden, "Der Deutschbrasilianer," 184.
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logical, humane, and free of rigid social stratification. Brazilians
were motivated by a spirit of conciliation that sought compromise
and rejected extremist measures; above all, they considered themselves a nonviolent people. 33 Jose Hon6rio Rodrigues, a modern
authority on Brazilian national characteristics, observes:
The basic Luso-Brazilian personality has a horror of violence and always seeks a way of smoothing things over, a path of moderation that
avoids definite breaks. Cleverness, prudence in shunning extremes, an
ability to forget, a rich sense of humor, a cool head, and a warm heart
get the Brazilians through difficult moments .... Conciliation rather
than revolution has dominated Brazilian history. In part this is because
the people, with their spirit of concord, prefer to gain less than to have
recourse to violence, in part because the dominant oligarchic groups
prefer yielding a little to risking much, and finally because the armed
forces-democratic, liberal, and progressive in their tendencieswield a balance of power that is exercised to moderate minorities
rather than subjugate majorities. 34

Rodrigues also supplies a lengthy list of negative characteristics,
among them a tendency to procrastinate, belief in luck and gambling, psychosocial instability, and susceptibility to the temptations of nepotism and to the cult of personality.35 The typical German colono would have agreed, but would have added a few other
traits to the list.
The vaunted tradition of nonviolence did not conform to the
German Brazilians' experience. They recalled that many of the
original German settlers were soldiers recruited by the Brazilian
government to fight its wars on the southern frontier. The colonos
remembered bloody slaughter and destruction in the wars with
Argentina and Paraguay; they experienced devastation in the civil
conflicts in the nineteenth century; and from 1912 to 1915, state
33. Rodrigues, The Brazilians, 60-61; Neiva and Diegues, "The Cultural Assimilation of Immigrants," 185.
34. Rodrigues, The Brazilians, 59. Apparently Rodrigues wrote these words before the Brazilian army assumed control of the government in 1964. Non-Brazilian
historians have disputed the claim of a nonviolent tradition. See Burns, A History
of Brazil, 254; and Henry H. Keith, "The Non-Violent Tradition in Brazilian History: A Myth in Need of Explosion?" in Henry H. Keith and S. F. Edwards (eds.),
Conflict and Continuity in Brazilian Society (Columbia, S.c., 1969), 231-40, and commentary by Joseph L. Love, ibid., 241-47.
35. Rodrigues, The Brazilians, 62-65.
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and federal forces numbering thousands of men were required to
put down a revolt led by a religious mystic in the western territory
contested by both Santa Catarina and Parana. Beyond that, banditry seemed endemic in the interior.36 Many Teuto-Brazilians
were bitter about the government-national, state, and local-because it seemed oppressive, unfair, corrupt, and unwilling to respond to their needs. They felt excluded from the political process; they, either had to fight for their rights or accept whatever
was served up to them by the Luso-Brazilians. 37 They were criticized for not knowing Portuguese, yet the government gave them
no schools-and they were criticized for that, too.
Why should the Germans want to assimilate into such a society? asked the most ethnocentric among them. It seemed obvious to them that Luso-Brazilian culture was inferior to their
own; they found little that might be worthy of adoption or imitation. Unlike the Anglo-American Protestant culture in the United
States, where German immigrants were virtually unable to withstand powerful assimilative forces, Brazilian culture was thought
to be weak. The Luso-Brazilians themselves seemed to combine
indolence and ignorance with ridiculous conceit. As for their Portuguese language, it was useful to know but unimportant in terms
of world cultures. Compared with German, it offered few literary treasures. The distinguished Brazilian anthropologist Egon
Schaden, reflecting upon his youth as a pupil in a German school
in Santa Catarina before World War I, recalled that each child had
a notebook with a firm admonition printed upon the cover: "Remember that you are a German!"38
It was precisely because Luso-Brazilian culture was so ineffectual, the German chauvinists argued, that Teuto-Brazilians should
feel obligated to preserve their own culture. By infusing Brazilian
society with their superior values and behaviors, they would per36. Tonnelat, L'expansion allemande, 97-98; Bums, A History of Brazil, 253;
Fischer, "0 problema da conservac;ao," 343. For a detailed study of the Muckerkrieg, see Janaina Amado, Conflito social no Brasil: A revolta dos "Mucker," Rio Grande
do SuI, 1868-1898 (Sao Paulo, 1978).
37· Dedekind, Brasilien, 9.
38. Deutsche Zeitung (Porto Alegre), October 20, 1917; Canstatt, Brasilien, 251,
416; Tonnelat, L'expansion allemande, 125, 141; Haring, The Germans in South America, 43; interview with Egon Schaden, January 8, 1982, Sao Paulo.
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form their best service as loyal Brazilian citizens. Some Germans.
held that each ethnic group should be allowed to develop its own
potentialities, Teuto-Brazilian as well as Luso-Brazilian; each was
to have the same right to survive. According to this doctrine, cultural pluralism would bring strength to the state; assimilation, by
contrast, was threatening to the state because it meant the gradual
disappearance of ethnic vitality. 39
The preservation of the German language was equally essential,
in the chauvinist view, because if it were to fade from use, so
would valuable German customs, along with the German sense of
duty and commitment to the work ethic. At the same time, they
agreed that it was important for the Germans to master the Portuguese language. Only by speaking it fluently could the Germans ever hope to find the place they deserved in Brazilian society and to influence Brazilian culture properly.4O Proponents of
this brand of ethnocentrism never questioned the loyalty of the
immigrants and their children to Brazil. Brazil was their home and
they were totally committed to it. Most had been born there and
had never lived anywhere else. Their bonds were with German culture, not with the German state or the kaiser and his ambitions.
Immigrant perceptions of the host society may be discerned in
a variety of sources, including textbooks. For example, a geography published in 1916 specifically for German schools by Rotermund's Evangelical publishing house offers a generally positive
portrait of the Luso-Brazilians but also reveals German attitudes:
The greater number of the inhabitants of our state [Rio Grande do SuI]
are Luso-Brazilians, descended from,immigrant Portuguese.... But
these Portuguese did not keep their race pure. For the most part they
mingled with Indians and negroes so that with time the mixed race of .
the Brazilians has arisen.
The Luso-Brazilian country dweller has many attractive qualities.
He is generally modest and hospitable, much more polite and sociable
than the German, and he is not so addicted to the abuse of alcohol. He
has no class prejudice. Rich or poor, ignorant and cultured meet together in the pleasantest way. But these good qualities are not so well
developed in the Luso-Brazilian dwellers in cities. Among them are
39. Schaden, "Der Deutschbrasilianer," 183-84; Willems, "Immigrants and
Their Assimilation in Brazil," 209.
40. Oberacker, Die volkspolitische LAge, 76; Dedekind, Brasilien, 9, 45·
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noticed rather some less agreeable Brazilian qualities, little sense of
duty, unpunctuality, carelessness, and ingratitude.
The Brazilian is a zealous patriot and loves his country above everything.

The textbook writer then assesses his fellow Teuto-Brazilians.
Protestant opposition to alcoholic drink is again apparent:
The German colonists are simple, industrious, worthy, and honorable
men of good reliable character. All the more is it to be lamented that
here and there one of them has hurt the name of the local Germans by
quarrelsomeness or drunkenness. The significance of German things
for Rio Grande is very great. A hundred years ago Rio Grande do SuI
was a land on whose uplands the Luso-Brazilians grazed a few cattle
and in whose primeval forest dwelt Indians and wild beasts. Then
came the Germans and with them came agriculture, commerce, and
industrial arts into the land. When we visit our thriving German colonies, when we see the German wholesale houses and factories in our
cities, our hearts are proud of the things German industry and German capacity have accomplished.
What would Rio Grande do SuI be without the Germans? The future
of the state depends on the further development of the GermanBrazilian population. 41

This passage exposes the conflict Germans felt as members of Brazilian society. Like any other ethnocultural group, the Germans
felt the need to emphasize their desirable characteristics (and by
implication the ways in which they thought themselves superior
to the Luso-Brazilians). At the same time, however, they sought
acceptance and recognition. They were eager to be considered an
essential element in their country's history, and they wanted Brazilians to understand and appreciate how extensive their contributions had been to Brazil's development.
The literature of Teuto-Brazilian filiopietism therefore describes
how individual Germans had participated in the exploration of
the land, the independence movement, and the preservation of
Brazilian territorial integrity through the wars with Argentina
and Paraguay. If applauds Koseritz and Rotermund, different as
they were from each other, for their liberalism. In the Teuto-Brazil41. Theodor Radletz, Heimat and Naturkunde fur Deutsche Schulen (Sao Leopoldo,
1916), quoted in Jefferson, "Pictures from Southern Brazil," 546.
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ian view, the liberty of conscience that these and other Germans
defended helped to initiate the renewal of national intellectual
life. Filiopietists also stressed the role of the Germans in giving
work new value and dignity and in condemning slavery as morally and socially obnoxious. The Germans, they felt, had contributed significantly to the elevation of moral, cultural, and material
standards in Brazil. Proud of the role the Germans had played in
the history of Brazil, they were eager for Teuto-Brazilians to be '
recognized for their contributions.42 The filiopietists were also
convinced that the Germans should take credit, at least in part, for
the emergence of the middle class in Brazil. Similarly, the fact that
Sao Leopoldo, Joinville, Blumenau, and other strongly German
cities were so well planned and administered could be attributed
to the Germans' communal spirit and their sense of personal responsibility for the public welfare. 43
For a substantial but not fully definable portion of the German
subsociety in Brazil, this kind of ethnocentric talk was pointless.
Like any other immigrant group, the Germans included persons
who were favorably disposed toward the language and culture of
the host society and who wanted to become a part of it as quickly
and painlessly as possible. 44 Unlike the cultural idealists who
claimed that it was their right (if not their responsibility) to maintain their immigrant speech and folkways and who denied the
right of the government to demand that they learn the language of
the country, the rapid assimilators were eager to abandon the
marks of immigrant status that presumably had caused them social and economic deprivation.
Between these two extremes-the cultural chauvinists and the
rapid assimilators-were the majority, who saw no particular
problem at all. They went about their daily activities without
thinking much about the status of immigrant culture in Brazil or
the problems of assimilation. Through daily contacts at work, at
42. The classic example of Teuto-Brazilian filiopietistic literature is Der deutsche
Beitrag zum Aufbau der brasilianischen Nation, by Karl H. Oberacker, Jr. Originally
published in 1955, it was revised and expanded in 1978. A second, revised edition
appeared in Portuguese: A contribufao teuta a forma¢o da na¢o Brasileira (Rio de Janeiro, 1968).
43. Szilvassy, "Participa.,ao dos alemaes," 248-53.
44. Fischer, "0 problema da conserva!;iio," 344.
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the store, at church, in school, or even at home, they learned Portuguese more or less automatically. Whether they learned quickly or
slowly depended upon the individual circumstance and whether it
provided good or poor opportunities for interaction with speakers of Portuguese. In any case, however, for them the ability to
speak Portuguese became the symbol of higher social status; it
was the avenue to social and economic progress, especially for the
young. 4S
When governmental personnel began to identify as problems
the exclusiveness of the rural German colonies and the slowness
of the Germans to assimilate, as they did in the 1890S and later,
they thought first of the extreme cases-the highly isolated districts where there were no Portuguese-language schools and
where hundreds of second and third-generation children could be
found whose knowledge of Portuguese was rudimentary at best.
Similarly, when they tried to identify typical German attitudes,
they naturally paid attention to the most conspicuous personsthe noisy idealists who made speeches and wrote editorials, essays, and letters demanding the right to maintain their cultural
separatism.
Thus the Luso-Brazilian majority acquired a distorted image of
the Teuto-Brazilians. Some elements of the composite picture
were correct, others were out of proportion, and a few, one might
suppose, were simply wrong. For decades in the nineteenth century, the Luso-Brazilian majority had ignored the question of German assimilation, probably because it had not seemed important
enough to demand action. Then, when the Germans' failure to
assimilate began to be perceived as a problem, some Brazilians
tended to overreact and to press for extreme or far-reaching measures that would enforce greater conformity. Such was the situation when World War I began.
45. Schaden, "Der Deutschbrasilianer," 189-93.
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Brazil and
the Distant War, 1914-1917

W

ORLD WAR I, central though it is to modem world history, was not a major event in Brazilian development.
Unlike the United States and most European countries,
which can trace the origins of numerous contemporary conditions and problems to the Great War, Brazil was involved only peripherally. Ultimately, Brazil was the only South American nation
to declare war. On August 4, 1914, when diplomacy failed and hostilities began, the Brazilian government quickly decreed its "complete neutrality." Nevertheless, the international conflict had an
immediate and severe effect on the Brazilian economy, which was
already in a nearly chaotic condition because of the extravagance
and corruption of the Hermes da Fonseca regime (1910-1914).1
Brazil had been experiencing difficulties in its international
trade relationships even before war was declared in Europe. There
had been a substantial decline in Brazilian exports, which in tum
meant a shortage of European capital for investment purposes.
Prices dropped accordingly. The Brazilian treasury was directly
affected by this tum of events because import taxes furnished the
major source of income; state governments were similarly influ1. [Brazil, Ministerio das Rela~6es Exterioresj, The Brazilian Green Book, Consisting of Diplomatic Documents Relating to Brazil's Attitude with Regard to the European
War, 1914-1917 (London and New York, 1918), 11-13; Percy A. Martin, "Introduction by the Translator and Editor," A History of Brazil, by ]oao Pandhi Calogeras
(Chapel Hill, 1939), xiii; Percy Alvin Martin, "Brazil," in A'. Curtis Wilgus (ed.),
Argentina, Brazil and Chile since Independence (1935; rpr. New Yor!<, 1(63), 166-68.
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enced because they were financed chiefly by export taxes levied
on coffee, rubber, sugar, and other agricultural commodities. As
deficits grew in 1914 and 1915, the Brazilian government resorted
to the inflationary expedient of issuing unsecured paper currency,
so that by 1917 the quantity of fiat money in circulation had
doubled. Overproduction was also a problem. In order to control
devastating fluctuations in the price of coffee, Brazil had developed a program in which the government secured foreign loans to
purchase coffee from the planters. Surpluses were then stockpiled
in warehouses overseas and released to the international market
in years of bad harvests. 2
War upset these arrangements. For several decades Great Britain had been the largest investor in Brazilian development, but
going to war meant the diversion of capital into arms and munitions. Purchases of Brazilian commodities, especially coffee,
dropped sharply. War also meant the imposition of a British naval
blockade on the Central Powers, and very quickly the German,
Austrian, and Belgian markets for Brazilian coffee also vanished.
In 1914 the value of Brazilian exports dropped 30 percent from
what they had been the preceding year. The loss of German markets and investments inevitably increased Brazil's dependency
upon the Allied Powers and upon the United States, which, like
Brazil, retained its neutrality at that time. Later, Brazil's relations
with the Central Powers deteriorated drastically when Germany
seized huge quantities of Brazilian coffee warehoused in Hamburg and Antwerp. The net effect of these developments was that
Brazil was forced to declare a moratorium on foreign debt payments until March, 1915.3
Except for the German and Italian colonos, most Brazilians
tended to sympathize with the Allies, especially France. The cultural bond with France that had grown strong in Brazil during the
empire period had continued into the twentieth century. Brazil's
educational system in particular was founded on French models,
2. Herman G. James, Brazil after a Century of Independence (New York, 1925),
168-69; Love, Sao Paulo in the Brazilian Federation, 44-47. For a general treatment of
the role of Germany in Brazil's foreign trade, see Brunn, Deutschland und Brasilien,
232-73.
3. Percy Alvin Martin, Latin America and the War (Baltimore, 1925), 36-39, 51;
Bums, A History of Brazil, 255.
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and knowledge of the French language was common among the
elite. Although admiration for French culture was an upper-class
phenomenon, it had a significant effect on official policy. The Brazilian government, especially in its foreign policy, was strongly influenced by sentiments expressed in the leading newspapers and
in the Congress; but in a country where the majority was illiterate,
these were inevitably the opinions of the educated classes. 4
For most ordinary people in Brazil, the war in Europe was a distant affair of no particular consequence. They understood little
about it; it seemed to affect their daily lives in no direct or discernible fashion. 5 Still, the war tended to evoke sympathies for one
side or the other, even though at first there was no expectation
that Brazil should join in. Immigrants and their descendants, no
matter how many generations removed, felt an emotional bond
with their ancestral homeland and were convinced of the justice of its cause. This had the effect of ranging the few English,
French, and Belgian immigrants with the majority of the LusoBrazilians against the Germans and the Italians, since in 1914,
Italy was still in alliance with Germany. Later, after Italy joined
the Allies against Germany, the attitudes of the Italian Brazilians
changed dramatically.

The German-Language Press Interprets the War
When the news arrived in Brazil that a state of war existed between France and Germany, the Deutsche Zeitung of Porto Alegre
got out an extra edition, as it had the day before when Kaiser
Wilhelm II ordered the mobilization of the army after Germany declared war on Russia. The paper revealed that all Reichsdeutsche
subject to military service were ordered to report to the nearest
consular office and prepare to return to Germany. Reservists in
4. Mario de Lima-Barbosa, Les Franrais dans l'histoire du Bresil (Rio de Janeiro
and Paris, 1923); Freyre, Order and Progress; Martin, Latin America and the War, 5,
30,32; Bums, A History of Brazil, 172,201,228.
5. "Attitude of Brazilians toward the War" and "Situation at Sao Paulo," anonymous reports sent to the Department of State by Capt. S. McCauley, Assistant Director of Naval Intelligence, April 25 and 26, 1918, in Record Group 59, General
Records of the Department of State, Entry 540, Box 1, Brazil folder, National
Archives.
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the Austrian army received a similar call to service. In the succeeding weeks a few reservists managed to return to Europe, but
because of the British blockade most got no farther than the consulates, if they reported at all. No doubt there were some, as in the
United States, who rushed to obtain citizenship in their adopted
country.in order to escape a pointless death on a European battlefield. On the other hand, a few Brazilians of German birth or descent actually volunteered and subsequently served in the German army; some of them were killed. 6
Within a week after the news of the war reached Brazil, the Germans there had begun to organize committees for the support of
the German Red Cross and for the sale of German war bonds. In
Porto Alegre, the Verband deutscher Vereine (Union of German
Societies) met with the German and Austrian consuls to discuss
ways in which they could help families of reservists. Similar activities occurred in most of the German settlements, especially in the
cities. Before many weeks had passed, numerous communities
organized rallies and bazaars in support of the German war effort.
Collections for war widows, orphans, and other needy persons
continued thorughout the fall of 1914. By the end of the year, Germans in Rio Grande do SuI had collected more than $77,000 for
the assistance of war widows, orphans, and other persons in
need. Arno Philipp of the Deutsche Zeitung (Porto Alegre) captured the spirit when he wrote that even though they could not
sacrifice their blood for their old homeland, it was self-evident
that they would at least give of their possessions. 7
6. Deutsche Zeitung (Porto Alegre), August 3,4,5, 1914, February 17, 1915; Germania (Sao Paulo), August 19, September 28, 1915; Georg Konigk, Die Politik
Brasiliens wiihrend des Weltkrieges und die Stellung des brasilianischen Deutschtums
(Hamburg, 1935), 18; Rudolf Becker, Deutsche Siedler in Rio Grande do Sui: Eine
Geschichte der deutschen Einwanderung (1938), 76; Hinden, Deutsche und deutscher
Handel, 475. For a classic account of a chauvinistic Teuto-Brazilian response to the
news of the outbreak of World War I, see Oberacker, 1m Sonnenland Brasilien,
258-68. Cf. Luebke, Bonds of Loyalty, 86-89·
7. Deutsche Zeitung (Porto Alegre), August 10, 21, 1914; Brunn, Deutschland und
Brasilien, 276; Hinden, Deutsche und deutscher Handel, 475; Becker, Deutsche Siedler,
77. Details of the collections in 1915 and 1916 are given in Uhle's Kalender: 1917.
Jahrbuch fUr das Deutschtum in Brasilien (Curitiba, [1916]), 82. Philipp quoted in
Gehse, Die deutsche Presse, 163.
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A notice placed in the Deutsche Zeitung (Porto Alegre), August 3, 1914, by the German consul in Sao Paulo. It announces the mobilization of reservists in the German army and navy and orders such persons in Brazil to return immediately to
Germany and report to their district commanders.
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Emotions ran high during the first weeks of the war. One German national who happened to be on a trip to South America in
1914 reported that in Porto Alegre, hatred of the Germans was so
strong that the personal safety of some of the best-known leaders
of the German community was endangered and that officers of
German societies were regularly insulted on the streets. He also
described how an excited mob consisting 'chiefly of young people
tried to storm the German consulate in Porto Alegre but were restrained by the Brazilian Army. In his view, the trouble was attributable to the pro-Ally propaganda in the Brazilian press. 8
It is true that most Portuguese-language newspapers favored
the Allies, though some were more outspoken than others. The
German explanation of events and their causes was largely ignored. In Bahia, for example, only the Ditirio de Noticias seemed
willing to accord any space to the German point of view. By contrast, another Bahian paper called for the expulsion of all German
citizens from Brazil. 9 The same pattern prevailed in all the major
cities.
If the Portuguese-language newspapers displayed strong partisanship for France and England, the German press was no less
the defender of the Central Powers. There were about two dozen
German-language newspapers in Brazil in that time, and all of
them, from the anticlerical, freethinking Germania of Sao Paulo to
the Protestant church-oriented Deutsche Post of Sao Leopoldo,
deemed it their duty to defend Germany. Even when AustriaHungary declared war on Serbia at the end of July, 1914, the
Deutsche Zeitung of Porto Alegre ventured the opinion that Austria
naturally would have the sympathy of Germans everywhere, not
merely because of ethnic solidarity and shared culture, but because its cause rested on justice. As the Teuto-Brazilian journalists
saw it, their biggest problem was to refute biased news coverage
and vicious propaganda. The Portuguese-language press seemed
filled with caricatures of Germany, its spirit and culture, and its
purposes in the war. For the most part, educated Germans in Bra8. Paul von Kapff (ed.), Erlebnisse Auslanddeutsche im Weltkrieg (Stuttgart,
1921 ),1+

9. Funfzig Jahre Deutscher Verein Germania und Deutschtum in Bahia (Berlin, 1923),
136-37. Cf. Brunn, Deutschland und Brasilien, 275.

The Distant War

89

zil refused to believe any news of the war that had been cleansed
by British and French censors. 10
Teuto-Brazilians were especially troubled by the atrocity propaganda that began to appear in the world press before the end of
the first month of the war. Suddenly they were confronted with
lurid tales of German brutality in Belgium and France-rape, pillage, massacres of defenseless civilians, and the destruction of
cultural treasures. According to these mostly fictional accounts,
fiends in German uniforms had amputated the breasts of Belgian
women with the stroke of a sword, children had been bayoneted,
and babies' hands had been chopped off. Unknown numbers of
people in Brazil as elsewhere accepted these reports at face value,
and inevitably their attitudes toward all things German were modified accordingly. Some of the stories were subsequently proven to
be utterly false; others were distorted and embellished. l l
Teuto-Brazilians naturally applauded any venture designed to
counter British and French propaganda. For example, when the
Uniao Teuto-Brasileiro was founded in Rio de Janeiro, the distant
Deutsche Zeitung of Porto Alegre declared that it lay in the best interest, both material and spiritual, of Teuto-Brazilians to support
all such efforts to develop a true understanding of what it meant
to be German. The fact that Luso-Brazilians were prominent in
the leadership and membership of the organization was especially
gratifying. In Rio de Janeiro hundreds of Germans gathered to
protest the pro-Ally propaganda and unanimously supported a
defiant and defensive resolution that was later distributed widely
in Brazil. 12
The task of countering the propaganda of the Allies was difficult because there was no accessible German news service. The
10. Deutsche Zeitung (Porto Alegre), July 31, August 12, 1914; Gehse, Die
deutsche Presse, 162ff.; Martin Fischer, "Die deutsche Presse in Rio Grande do Sui:
Ihr Werden und Wesen, eine Kulturgeschichte des riograndenser Deutschtums,"
n.d. [ca. 19291 (Typescript in Institut fur Auslandsbeziehungen, Stuttgart), 56;
Buchmann, "Die deutschsprachige Presse in Brasilien," 220.
11. Oberacker, 1m Sonnenland Brasilien, 271; James M. Read, Atrocity Propaganda, 1914-1919 (New Haven, 1941), 29-34. I have treated this topic in greater
detail in Bonds of Loyalty, 85-87.
12. Deutsche Zeitung (Porto Alegre), September 5, 1914; Hinden, Deutsche und
deutscher Handel, 476; Kapff (ed.), Erlebnisse, 14.
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transatlantic cable from Emden in Germany to Pernambuco in
Brazil had been cut during the first week of the war, and communication by ship was blocked by the British navy. News from nonAlly sources arrived piecemeal through neutral countries, but it
was hardly adequate. Several German-language newspapers in
Porto Alegre and Sao Paulo, in cooperation with certain German
commercial houses, tried to set up a news service in Petropolis,
Pedro II's old summer capital in the mountains near Rio de Janeiro. Their idea was to make use of the official reports received
by the German consul general, but the effort was futile because of
the lack of means and experience. The Deutsche Post of Sao Leopoldo set up an elaborate telegram service through Uruguay to
Buenos Aires in Argentina in order to tap Spanish sources of
news. Two stations erected by the Germans in the United States at
Sayville on Long Island and at Tuckerton, New Jersey, made sporadic connections with Brazil by shortwave radio, but this effort at
long-distance communication lasted only through the month of
August, 1914, when it was silenced by technical difficulties. 13
Suspicious as they were of propaganda from French and British sources, the German Brazilians tended to believe the many
rumors, distortions, and lies that were circulated among them
through the efforts of German propagandists. So firm was their
faith in the invincibility of German arms that when a Germanlanguage paper in Rio Grande do SuI published a false report that
Paris had fallen, some colonos responded with a great celebration,
complete with fireworks. 14
In Brazil as in the United States, many of the editors and publishers of the German-language press were people born in Germany who were rather more eager than the rank-and-file members of the Teuto-Brazilian community to defend the fatherland.
Extravagant partisanship was the result. Not content to address
only readers of German, they began to include columns of copy in
Portuguese-allegedly free of bias-in their papers. Readers were
expected to give such material to Luso-Brazilian acquaintances so
13. Gehse, Die\deutsche Presse, 114; Fischer, "Die deutsche Presse in Rio Grande
do Sul," 56; Fouquet, per deutsche Einwanderer, 207; Konigk, Die Politik Brasiliens,
lW Hinden, Deutsche'und deutscher Handel, 469; Fiinfzig Jahre Deutscher Verein Germania, 136; Luebke, Bonds of Loyalty, 117.
14. Gehse, Die deutsche Presse, 114.
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that they too could have the benefit of German truth. Germanlanguage papers also reprinted articles in Portuguese from the
Brazilian press that allegedly distorted war news, disparaged Germany in some way, or slandered Teuto-Brazilians. The Deutsche
Zeitung of Porto Alegre, for example, provided its readers with a
reprint in which it was charged that a German rally at Taquara had
been opened with the singing of the German national anthem,
rather than the Brazilian. This accusation was then rejected as a
malicious fabrication. 15
The next German countermeasure in the propaganda war was
to try to acquire control of Portuguese-language newspapers. A
comparable effort in the United States was futile, but in Brazil this
tactic seems to have been more fruitful. The Tribuna of Rio de Janeiro, for example, was an established paper with a circulation of
more than ten thousand copies. Then, in 1915, it was purchased
by German interests and subsidized by the German embassy
through collections from local German bankers and businessmen.
In Porto Alegre, the Diario, which had followed a strongly antiGerman line throughout the first year of the war, was bought out
in September, 1915, by a corporation owned by German Brazilians, and an editor named Willy Liideritz was put in charge. 16
In Santa Catarina, 0 Dia of Florianopolis and the Novedades
of Itajai also followed the pro-German line. In both instances
ownership rested with politicians, such as Felippe Schmidt, who
naturally cultivated the votes of Teuto-Brazilians. In other cases
Portuguese-language newspapers were started by Germans after
the war began. 0 Ditirio of Rio de Janeiro was such a creation.
Founded by the publisher of the Deutsche Zeitung of Sao Paulo,
this paper was externally Portuguese but the inside pages were in
German and were entitled Deutsche Tageblatt. Neither this effort
nor several others like it were successful. Offensive to the LusoBrazilian population, they were equally unable to attract subscribers among the Germans. 17
15. Deutsche Zeitung (Porto Alegre), September 30, 1914.
16. Ibid., September 15, 1914. See also Germania (Sao Paulo), July 31, August 5,
1915.
17. Gehse, Die deutsche Presse, 56, 164; Haring, The Germans in South America,
54-55; Hinden, Deutsche und deutscher Handel, 479; Monatsbliitter des Germanischen
Bundes fur Sud-Amerika, I (March, 1916), 2.
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What the German-language press chose to report reveals a great
deal about the psychology of this beleaguered minority. Reliable
news of the war itself was in short supply, but there were numerous attacks on the bias of the Portuguese-language press. Columns were filled with accounts of the fund-raising activities of
Teuto-Brazilian organizations on behalf of the German Red Cross
and with 'chauvinistic speeches made at pro-German rallies, bazaars, and festivals. More significantly, the German papers were
intensely interested in what Luso-Brazilian leaders had to say, pro
or con, about Germany, German culture, or Teuto-Brazilian society. Anything an important politician said or did that could be
construed as favorable to the Germans was reported as a justification of their behavior or point of view. 18 Dunshee de Abranches,
president of the Chamber of Deputies in the Brazilian Congress,
was identified as a special hero. It was his willingness "to break
lances for German honor," according to one German source, that
led to his forced resignation. 19
The German-language press was most sensitive about what it
called Deutschenhetze-German baiting or anti-German agitation.
Dozens of articles on this subject appeared during the first weeks
and months of the war. Indicative of a siege mentality, they revealed a deep concern for what the writers perceived as the debasement of German culture. It was their culture, not Germany
itself or the course of the war in Europe, that was the central concern of the German Brazilians. What the kaiser said or did, what
battles his armies won or lost, or what policies his government
formulated and pursued were important to them because these
things impinged upon their self-image and their self-esteem. For
German soldiers to be called barbarians, Huns, or butchers of
women and children was as unfair as it was untrue; by implication
such charges could be applied to the German Brazilians as well.
They perceived themselves as industrious, moral, honest, educated, loyal citizens of Brazil, but during those early weeks and
months of the war the Portuguese-language papers carried chill18. For example, see Deutsche Zeitung (Porto Alegre), August 31, 1914, report in
Portuguese on the defense of the Germans made by Toaquin Luiz Osorio, a deputy
in the Brazilian Congress from Rio Grande do SuI.
19. Kapff (ed,), Erlebnisse, 14; Fiinfzig Jahre Deutscher Verein Germania, 153;
Brunn, Deutschland und Brasilien, 274.
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ing stories of German brutality, arrogance, and inhumanity. In
contrast, the Allies, they were told, were fighting to preserve civilization, freedom, and justice. It is not surprising that the Germanlanguage press responded vigorously and sometimes unwisely. 20

The Churches Respond to War in Europe
In Sao Leopoldo old Dr. Rotermund lost his patience. Writing in
his Deutsche Post, he asserted that the Luso-Brazilians should
know that the Germans objected to the prejudice and ignorance
that pervaded the Portuguese-language press in its obvious partisanship for France. The irate clergyman went on to encourage a
boycott of all businesses whose owners sympathized with the Allies. One had already begun in Porto Alegre, he reported. Moreover, he advised, papers filled with lies about Germany should
be sent back to the publishers; all economic relations should be
broken off with such people- Deutschenfresser, he called them (literally, one who devours Germans). In the past, Germans had
learned Portuguese in order to trade with them. "We have gone
much too far in our politeness," he grumbled. "Why don't the
Lusos learn German? It's high time that we Germans begin to
speak German-with German words and German action."21
Widely reprinted in the Portuguese-language press, Rotermund's outburst produced a stormy reaction. A huge anti-German
demonstration was staged outside the Post's building in Sao Leopoldo. It is possible that the place would have been destroyed,
had it not been for the intervention of Dr. Antonio Borges de
Medeiros, president of the state of Rio Grande do Sui. Borges subsequently requested an interview with the editor of the Post, who
readily agreed that it was unreasonable to expect Luso-Brazilians
to learn the German language but insisted that Germans should
be allowed to use German in their own social relationships. For
his part, Borges was remarkably restrained. Hoping to calm the
Germans, he expressed his wish that in regions where Germans
had no opportunity to learn Portuguese, government officials
could in fact converse in German and that German could be taught
20. For example, see Deutsche Zeitung (Porto Alegre), February 12, 13, 1915.
21. Deutsche Post (Sao Leopoldo), September 2, 1914, transcribed in Fischer,
"Die deutsche Presse in Rio Grande do SuI," 236.

Dr. Wilhelm Rotermund, patriarch of the German Evangelical Synod of Rio Grande
do SuI and publisher of the Deutsche Post (Sao Leopoldo)
Reprinted from Uhle's Kalender fiir das Jahr 1918
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in the higher schools along with English and French. Moreover,
Borges claimed to understand that the concern for the TeutoBrazilians was primarily for the welfare of their relatives and
friends in Germany. Whatever else Borges might have told the
editor of the Post was not reported. 22
There was no agreement among the German editors on how aggressive they should be in the defense of their ethnic interests.
Some charged that in this case the Post had endangered good relations between Luso- and Teuto-Brazilians; others felt that in the
end the Post had backed off and was too willing to accommodate
itself to Brazilian views. Feelings engendered by the war were so
intense that new German-language publications were brought out
to promulgate one position or the other. In Montenegro, Rio
Grande do SuI, a paper was founded in 1914 to foster the integration of the Germans into Brazilian life; inevitably, Teuto-Brazilian
chauvinists denounced it as a fraud and a deception. Some months
earlier in Pelotas, located at the southern end of Rio Grande do
SuI, several Evangelical clergymen combined to found the Deutsche
Wacht for German-speakers there, whether they were TeutoBrazilians, Reichsdeutsche, Austrians, or Swiss. Its announced
purpose was to watch over German interests and to bridge the political and religious divisions within the group. By scorning political involvement, the founders made the cultivation of ethnicity
the paper's raison d'etre. The earthshaking events in Europe, the
paper observed at the outset of the war, had stimulated consciousness-a development that "fills each good German with pride
and joy."23
Other papers observed the same effect. The Deutsche Zeitung of
Porto Alegre was pleased to note that the war was invigorating
German ethnicity all over the world; the press, churches, schools,
societies of all kinds-all had increased in number, strength, and
scope of activities. Even persons who formerly had felt alienated
from the ethnic group, the Zeitung noted, were captured by the
intense new spirit of unity and togetherness. 24
The German gymnastic societies (Turnvereine) also thrived in
22. Gehse, Die deutsche Presse, 165; Deutsche Post (Sao Leopoldo), September 8,
1914, transcribed in Fischer, "Die deutsche Presse in Rio Grande do Sui," 237.
23. Deutsche Zeitung (Porto Alegre), September 12, 1914; Deutsche Wacht (Pelotas), n.d., transcribed in Fischer, "Die deutscher Presse in Rio Grande do Sui," 322.
24. Deutsche Zeitung (Porto Alegre), August 13, 1914, March 16, 1915.

Dr. Antonio Borges de Medeiros, the distinguished, long-term president of the
state of Rio Grande do SuI
Reprinted from Hundert Jahre Deutschturn
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this heady enthusiasm for Deutschtum. In May, 1915, the union
of turners in Porto Alegre started a new monthly publication,
Deutsche Turnbliitter, declaring in the inaugural issue that its purpose was to strengthen the power of German culture ''by nourishing German customs, German gymnastics, and German songs."
Subsequent issues continued this emphasis, but unlike the newspapers, it was silent on the subject of anti-Germanism in Brazil. 25
Among the churches, the German Evangelical synods experienced a surge of excitement because of the war in Europe. Its
leaders had declared repeatedly that its bonds with the German
language and culture were insoluble. In a publication intended for
the officials of the Riograndenser Synod, Wilhelm Rotermund
prophesied that Germany's destiny would determine the status of
"her children" overseas. He made the link between cultural maintenance and religious commitment explicit: "We Germans must
not educate our children in Luso-Brazilian institutions," he wrote.
"Offerings of life blood will not be required of us, as of our ethnic
brethren over there, but it is our duty to hold fast to our ethnic
customs and to our Evangelical faith, even as we must participate
eagerly in the work of the church and contribute our money to
Evangelical churches and schools." Above all, Rotermund hoped
that the war would generate enthusiasm for the German language
and Brazilian customs, thereby strengthening his church. 26
Local congregations participated actively in the campaign to
raise funds for the German Red Cross, buy German war bonds,
and sponsor bazaars and rallies to aid German victims of war.
Special prayer services were held for the success of German arms.
At Taquanl, located north of Porto Alegre, the German and Austrian consuls, dressed in full uniform, joined an overflow crowd
in a service at an Evangelical church. Even though the great majority of the people in attendance were Brazilian citizens, the preacher
used "we" and "us" in references to Germany and spoke of the
German army as "our" army. He admonished the congregation
that it was their "holy duty to defend their ethnic culture, which
was threatened with annihilation." 27
25. Deutsche Turnbliitter, I (May, 1915).
26. Rundschreiben No. 414 des Vorstandes des Riograndenser Synode, quoted
in Dressel, Der deutschbrasilianische Kolonist, 21; Fausel, Dr. Rotermund, 146-47.
27. Deutsche Zeitung (Porto Alegre), August 7, 10, 11, 13, 14, 1914.
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The professional journal published for the teachers of Evangelical schools in Rio Grande do SuI was similarly indiscreet. The
editor, who also served as the director of the tiny Evangelical
teachers college of Santa Cruz, spoke of Germany as "we" and of
its army as "our magnificent soldiers." Virtually every issue of
this monthly during 1914 and 1915 reveals the Evangelical church's
exceptional commitment to German ethnocultural values and to
its psychological investment in the outcome of the war. The idea
that the Evangelical schools had the responsibility of instructing
young Teuto-Brazilians in the Portuguese language is entirely
absent. 28
The dedication of the Evangelical church to German culture is
further manifested in the curriculum of the college. In 1916 all
course work in this three-year institution was offered in the German language, except for the history of Brazil. Although the college offered instruction in Portuguese, its annual report repeatedly identifies German-language classes as the most important
part of the curriculum. Religion was also regularly taught. The
course of study for the third year included German history since
1888; the description of this course emphasizes Kaiser Wilhelm II
and the war. The annual report indicates that in 1916, twelve
major events in the war, mostly German victories, were singled
out for special attention and some were celebrated with a free
day.29 Here, indeed, was a "nursery of Kaiserism."
In the United States such an epithet was usually reserved for
the schools of the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod. In Brazil,
however, the Missouri Synod was seen in a very different light.
This church never offered a word of defense for Germany or for
the preservation of Deutschtum in its official Brazilian publication;
rather, the war was considered the "worst of evils." Missouri Synod
leaders saw the European conflict as a judgment of God upon a
sinful people-punishment for wickedness, unbelief, failure to
pray, contempt for God's Word, atheism, and the idolatry of human wisdom as revealed especially in modern science and theological liberalism. 3O The contrast between this position and the
28. Allgemeine Lehrer-Zeitung fiir Rio Grande do Sui, 1914-1915.
29· 7· Jahresbericht des Deutschen Ev. Lehrerseminar fiir Rio Grande do Sui zu Santa
Cruz, 1916.

30. Luebke, Bonds of Loyalty, 253-54; "Was will uns der Liebe Gott sagen durch
die gegenwartige schwere Kriegsnot?" Evangelisch-Lutherisches Kirchenblatt fiir Siid-
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Evangelical view was stark and, to the Evangelicals, unforgivable.
For a variety of reasons the German Catholics in Brazil were
much less chauvinistic than were the Evangelicals. They did not
perceive themselves as being threatened in the same way; because
of its universal, multi-ethnic character, the Catholic church tended
to unite its German adherents with Luso-Brazilians rather than to
separate or isolate them from the rest of society. This tendency is
reflected in the annual German Catholic Kalender. Compared to
those put out by Protestant or secular publishers, the Catholic
publications projected at most a muted pro-Germanism. 31 The
Catholic church was not a ready agency for the organization of bazaars, rallies, or other activities to raise either money or enthusiasm for Germany's cause in the war. Moreover, the numerous
Catholic clergymen of German antecedents generally kept silent
on the subject, especially in Rio Grande do SuI, where Joao Becker
was the archibishop of Porto Alegre. Born in Germany and raised
in Brazil, Becker often displayed the characteristics of secondgeneration immigrants who for psychological or situational reasons reject their ethnic heritage. He was exceedingly sensitive to
criticism that he was a German partisan and he was determined to
align his administration with the dominant attitudes and behaviors of Luso-Brazilian society.
The inclusive or universal character of the Catholic church was
hardly enough, however, to raise it above suspicion. Even though
the church as a whole did not allow itself to become embroiled in
the propaganda war, there were individual German Catholics, acting independently or on behalf of independent Catholic institutions, who supported the Central Powers as vigorously as did any
Evangelical or freethinker. This was especially true within the
Franciscan order, whose members and leaders were mostly German. Father Petrus Sinzig of Petropolis is a notable example of an
active pro-German among the Franciscans. A man of many talents, Sinzig defended the German point of view in his Vozes de
Petropolis, a Portuguese-language paper published under Franciscan auspices. It was Sinzig who tried to organize a substitute
Amerika, XIV (August 15, 1914); "Was sagt die Bibel vom Weltkrieg?" ibid. (November 15, 1915).
31. For example, see Der Familienfreund: Katholischer Hauskalender und Wegweiser
fur das Jahr 1917 (Porto Alegre, [1916]).

Dom Joao Becker, the German-born archbishop of Porto Alegre
Reprinted from Hundert Jahre Deutschturn

The Distant War

101

press service at the beginning of the war; he was the author of
such patriotic hymns as "Siegeslied" and "Heil, Wilhelm, Heil!"
According to the editor of Deutsche Zeitung of Sao Paulo, Sinzig
was the guiding light in the fight against English and French propaganda. 32 The Franciscan influence was apparent in the Curitiba
Kompass, widely recognized as a voice of German Catholicism,
which was published by lay persons under Franciscan sponsorship. It, too, was a vigorous defender of Germany's interests in
thewar.33
Like the Evangelicals, many German Catholic institutions and
parishes became the objects of Luso-Brazilian fears and were subjected to threats and intimidation of various kinds. Early in 1915,
for example, there was a widespread rumor that the Franciscan
cloister in Blumenau, Santa Catarina, was a secret arsenal of arms,
including small cannons, still packed in crates. These weapons
were allegedly intended for distribution among the Blumenau
Germans if the monastery were attacked. Officials of the order denounced the allegations as malicious slander, but such rumors
were not easily dispelled. Indeed, they cropped up again in April,
1917, following the break in diplomatic relations between Brazil
and Germany. 34

Tension Increases
Throughout 1914 and 1915 the German-language press continued
to report how organizations in this or that community had raised
32. Petrus Sinzig, Nach dreiszig Jahren: Vierte Chronik (1915-1921) der Sudbrasilianischen Franziskanerprovinz von der Unbefleckten Empfiingnis (Curitiba and
Freiburg, [1922], 140; see also Venantius Willeke, "Deutsche Kulturpioniere in Brasilien," Staden-Jahrbuch: Beitrage zur Brasilkunde, XIX (1971), 91-103. Sinzig also
tried to influence non-German-Brazilian opinion by publishing a two-volume collection of essays written by German scholars and translated into Portuguese.
These writings were in response to a French book (1916) that charged that Germany
was theoretically and practically inimical to Catholicism. See Jorge Pfeilschrifter
(ed.), Cu/tura alleman catholicismo e a guerra munditil: Replica de defeza contra 0 livro
"La guerra allemande et Ie Catholicisme" (2 vols.; Petropolis, 1916, 1917).
33. For an example of its gushy, intense chauvinism, see the article by Otto von
Slid [pseud.] in Curitiba Kompass, April 20, 1916, reprinted in Sinzig, Nach dreiszig
Jahren, 138-40.
34. Sinzig, Nach dreiszig Jahren, 62; Rio de Janeiro Jornal do Commercio, April 23,
1917.
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money for war-relief purposes, purchased German war bonds, or
conducted a rally or bazaar of some kind-all intended to help the
German war effort. It was unquestionably their right as citizens of
a neutral country to engage in such activities, just as supporters
of the Allies could and did do similar things for England and
France. The behavior of many Teuto-Brazilians was nevertheless
indiscreet and led to a further deterioration in their relations with
the rest of society.
Sometimes the behavior on both sides was simply petty or petulant. In Pelotas, for example, a Portuguese-language newspaper
(Ditirio Popular) delighted in attacking Deutschtum. Germans were
incensed to read that Beethoven was not a German after all, but a
Belgian; and that the invention of printing with movable type
should be attributed not to Gutenberg, but to some obscure French
shoemaker. One German response was a spiteful play on words,
suggesting that the proper German translation of Liga pelos AIliados (League for the Allies) was Luge der Allugierten (lies of pathological liars), a coined term that sounds much like the correct German translation, Liga der Alliierten. 35
In other instances, the behavior of the Teuto-Brazilians was
insensitive or simply stupid. Some celebrated German victories
ostentatiously; opened or closed meetings with the singing of
"Deutschland iiber Alles," the German national anthem; and
displayed German and Austrian flags everywhere. The last was
especially offensive to Luso-Brazilians and sometimes led to
trouble. One Sunday afternoon in August, 1915, a couple of
Teuto-Brazilian merchants in Montenegro (near Porto Alegre)
raised the German flag at a private gathering in a courtyard behind their place of business. A mob of non-Germans ("yellows
and blacks," according to the German-language newspaper) collected outside in protest. Fortunately, police arrived in time to
neutralize the crowd. Four days later, Brazil received the news
that Warsaw had fallen to the German army. This time the merchants in Montenegro and their friends celebrated with fireworks.
Again a mob of forty or fIfty men appeared, armed with clubs and
led by a well-known Luso-Brazilian of the community, and once
more violence was narrowly averted by the police. Several days
35. Deutsche Zeitung (Porto Alegre), April 22, 1915.
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A postcard advertising a special collection for Gennan war victims that was to be
held on January 27, 1917. The message reads: "Let no one say, 'I have already
given'; our troops also do not say, 'We have already fought! '"
Author's private collection

later a pro-German rally was held at the clubhouse of a local Verein
in Montenegro. A Luso-Brazilian, Dr. Abreu de Souza, belabored
the Allies as he praised the local Germans for the way in which
their work, sweat, and blood had helped to build Brazil into a
great nation. Still another anti-German mob tried to disrupt the
meeting, and this time a detachment of military police was required to maintain order.36
The aggressiveness of the German-Brazilian cultural chauvinists in their defense of Imperial Germany inevitably provoked a
response in kind. Some of the most distinguished of Brazilian political culture leaders, led by the brilliant orator and statesman
Ruy Barbosa of Bahia and including the novelists Jose Gra~a Aranha and Jose Verissimo, decided that the time had come for coun36. Ibid., August 11, 16, 1915; Haring, The Germans in South America, 45.
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termeasures. In March, 1915, they founded the Liga pelos Alliados (League for the Allies) with Barbosa as president. Its declared
purpose was to defend the Allies, protest alleged German atrocities and violations of international law, and raise money for the
French and British Red Cross. Its strongly pro-French orientation
made it especially attractive to the Positivists. The league also
sought to hasten the assimilation of immigrants in the Portuguese
language, and the promotion of Brazilian patriotism. An elitist,
nativist organization, it soon became involved in domestic politics. For example, in response to Pan-Germanist propaganda, Ruy
Barbosa proclaimed the dangers of German imperialism in the
boundary controversy between the states of Parana and Santa Catarina. The disputed area, a lightly settled region in the west near
the Argentine border, included a substantial concession that had
been granted to a German company, which in turn reportedly
sold its land to German settlers only. 37
Both the Liga pelos Alliados and, later, the Liga de Resistencia
Nacional bore a striking resemblance to the National Security
League and the American Defense Society in the United States,
organizations that saw themselves during the neutrality period
chiefly as propagandizers for preparedness. In both countries
these wartime patriotic societies led the campaign against the
37. Martin, Latin America and the War, 33-35; Martin, "Brazil," 250; Gaillard,
Amerique latine et Europe occidentale, 42; Rodrigues, The Brazilians, 96; Funfzig Jahre
Deutscher Verein Germania, 148.
Grac;a Aranha is often cited as a Brazilian intellectual whose much-praised
novel Canaan (1902), set in a German district of Espirito Santo (where he had
served briefly as a judge), reveals sympathetic understanding of Teuto-Brazilians.
This is to overstate the case. At best, his understanding of the German settlers is
superficial; he reveals no real comprehension of their behaviors, motives, and attitudes, much less of their diversity. Although Grac;a Aranha respects their willingness to work hard and their resultant economic power, he is also suspicious of
their motives and critical of their reluctance to assimilate quickly. He portrays
them as hard, mean-spirited, and unsympathetic, perhaps even cruel, to their own
kind, just as he devastatingly describes minor Brazilian authorities as greedy, lazy,
vindictive, and dishonest. There is no contradiction between Grac;a Aranha as the
author of Canaan and as a militant anti-German in the era of World War I. The
seeds of the latter are clearly in the novel, which also reveals fear of German imperialism, envy of German economic success, and disapproval of Teuto-Brazilian
slowness in learning Portuguese. Jose Grac;a Aranha, Canaan, trans. Mariano
Joaquin Lorente (Boston, 1920). Cf. Skidmore, Black into White, 109-12.
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German language and culture; they repeatedly cited "the German
menace" as their chief international concern; and they all produced profound and enduring resentments among the German
ethnic subsocieties. 38

Germanische Bund fur Sud-Amerika
Unlike the Luso-Brazilians, the Germans in Brazil were unable to
establish a national organization comparable either to the Liga
pelos Alliados or to the National German-American Alliance,
which had been founded in the United States in 1901. The closest
Brazilian equivalent to that aggressive, well-funded organization
was the Germanische Bund fur Sud-Amerika (German Federation
of South America), established early in 1916 through the efforts of
G. W. Zimmerli, a Swiss by birth who appeared briefly in Brazil as
a representative of the German Red Cross.39
Intended as a mighty union of all Germanic peoples in South
America-Germans, Austrians, Swiss, Dutch, and even Scandinavians-the Germanische Bund, according to its constitution,
was to promote broadly Teutonic culture (germanische Volkstum)
within the framework of Brazilian law and in harmony with the
responsibilities of Brazilian citizenship. Although it believed that
envy was the real cause of anti-German agitation, the Bund allegedly wanted to develop friendly relationships between LusoBrazilians and Germanic elements in the population, as well as between the Brazilian government and the several Germanic states
of central Europe. It supported German-language schools in Brazil, but it also claimed to favor the increased use of the Portuguese
language among Germans. It hoped to spread German literature
through a monthly publication and to bring the glories of German
literature to Brazilian readers through Portuguese translations. Finally, the Bund intended to guarantee the protection of law to its
members, especially if they suffered discrimination because of
their membership in an ethnic minority group. Unlike the National German-American Alliance, on which it was patterned to
38. Cf. Luebke, Bonds of Loyalty, 159, 215, 251. Gaillard, Amerique latine et Europa
occidentale, 49; Szilvassy, "Participa<;ao dos alemaes," 251; Love, Siio Paulo in the Brazilian Federation, 237.
39. Deutsche Zeitung (Porto Alegre), February 19, 1916.
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some extent, the Bund was not open to organizations but restricted
its membership to individual persons. By November, 1916, it
claimed to have attracted six thousand members. 40
Such idealistic goals were attractive to many Teuto-Brazilians,
and Zimmerli won much support as he scurried about in southern Brazil and Argentina. Although he concentrated his efforts on
the educated, wealthy Reichsdeutsche in the cities, he did not ignore the isolated German communities in the serra, where his gospel was at first gladly received, especially in Evangelical districts.
Local chapters of the Bund were organized in many communities
during January and February, 1916, and their officers often included pastors and teachers of local Evangelical churches and
schools. Temporary officers of the national organization were chosen in February; A. Krall, an agent of the Hamburg-Amerika shipping firm in Porto Alegre, became the first president. In Santa Catarina the prime mover of the organization was Arthur Koehler,
the publisher of the Blumenau Urwaldsbote. Otto Rohkohl, described as the German consul, served as the local chairman; to
everyone's surprise, the Bund attracted the support of both the
local Evangelical pastor, Walter Mummelthey, and the head of the
Franciscan order, Father Marcellus. A new era of harmony and
cooperation had arrived, it appeared, as the first issue of the
Monatsbliitter des Germanischen Bundes fUr Sud-Amerika was published early in March. 41
Zimmerli, an unusually energetic and aggressive person, moved
so rapidly and successfully that one suspects that his employment
as a Red Cross representative was merely a cover for his real job.
Further research might well reveal that he, like Albert Dernburg
and several other persons ostensibly working for the Red Cross in
the United States, was an agent of the German government assigned to propaganda activity.42 It is obvious that the German40. Ibid., March 7, 1916; Monatsbliitter des Germanischen Bundes far Sad-Amerika, I
(March, 1916), 2, (November, 1916), 286; Oberacker, 1m Sonnenland Brasilien, 269;
Haring, The Germans in South America, 46.
41. Monatsbliitter des Germanischen Bundes fUr Sad-Amerika, I (November, 1916),
312-13; Deutsche Zeitung (Porto Alegre), January 21, February 16,1916; Fugmann,
Die Deutschen in Parana, 130.
42. Cf. Luebke, Bonds of Loyalty, 127. In a communication dated June 13, 1916,
Count Johann von Bemstorff, the German ambassador to the United States, referred to Zimmerli as a "Red Cross delegate" who had arrived in the United States
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ische Bund was expected to counter the success of the Liga pelos
Alliados; the inaugural issue of the Monatsbliitter explicitly cited
the league as an enemy of Germany and declared its intention to
combat the league's propaganda. Zimmerli enjoyed the immediate
and full support of the German consular corps; the Reichsdeutsche also responded eagerly. It is clear that Zimmerli's primary purpose was to mobilize German-Brazilian opinion, wealth,
and influence under the kaiser's banner.43 All the fine talk about
Germanic culture and the improvement of relations with LusoBrazilian society was a clumsy effort to screen the real purpose of
the organization. Even more heavy-handed was Zimmerli's harsh
condemnation of Teuto-Brazilian leaders who opposed his work.
As a stranger to Brazil, Zimmerli was unfamiliar with the leadership structure of the existing German-Brazilian subculture and
he carelessly offended many influential persons. 44 Like his counterparts in the United States, he had no real understanding of the
degree of assimilation that had actually taken place among TeutoBrazilians, despite their continued maintenance of the German
language and customs. Nor did he comprehend the ways in which
his organization-an ephemeral expediency serving the immediate interests of Germany-might undermine the established
leadership structure of the ethnic subsociety or how his success
threatened to cause a further deterioration of its relationships
with Luso-Brazilian society.
Opposition to Zimmerli and his Bund developed most quickly
among the Evangelical clergy of Rio Grande do SuI and spread to
the influential Verband deutscher Vereine in Porto Alegre. The
Reverend Kolfhaus of Sao Leopoldo and Dr. Martin Braunschweig,
the resident provost of the Prussian state church, led the attack
through the pages of the Deutsche Post, a Sao Leopoldo newspaper that catered to Protestant readers. Widely reprinted in other
from Brazil "without means" and "compromised financially." Bernstorff reported
that he had obtained from private sources the means to finance a two-month lecture tour for Zimmerli in the United States. He assumed that he would subsequently receive reimbursement from Berlin. RG 59, Entry 540, Box 1, Brazil folder.
43. Monatsbliitter des Germanischen Bundes [iir Sud-Amerika, I (March, 1916), 2,
(April, 1916), 55; Fischer, "Die deutsche Presse in Rio Grande do Sui, 20-21;
Deutsche Zeitung (Porto Alegre), March 7, 1916.
44. Konigk, Die Politik Brasiliens, 21.
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German-language publications, including many that flatly rejected its arguments, the Post's articles crystallized opposition to
the Bund by mid-March, 1916. By then the debate had degenerated into a mud-slinging contest, thereby dissolving any real possibility that the Bund might achieve its clandestine goals. 45
By the end of February the German-language newspapers were
filled with charges, explanations, and countercharges about the
Germanische Bund. The first criticisms were mild enough: If the
real purpose of the Bund was to fight pro-Ally propaganda, why
exclude non-Germans (Turks, Bulgarians, Hungarians, and nonGerman Austrians, as well as friendly Luso-Brazilians) from the
organization? The argument of the Porto Alegre Verband deutscher
Vereine was more to the point. Sensitive to the Bund's challenge to
its status within the German ethnic community, the Verband observed that since the goals of the Bund were so similar to its own,
it made little sense to fracture the force of Teuto-Brazilian opinion
by establishing a rival to its leadership.46 Meanwhile, the Sao
Leopoldo Post charged that Zimmerli was exploiting German patriotism for his own personal benefit and predicted that money
collected by the Bund would never go to the German Red Cross.
Such attacks on Zimmerli's integrity continued for a month. Highly
sensitive to these personal charges, Zimmerli, a former Protestant
pastor, blamed them on the Evangelical clergy, especially Provost
Braunschweig. He was especially puzzled by Braunschweig's opposition because the latter was, after all, an official representative
of the German government. 47 Finally, when Zimmerli was denounced as a danger to the Brazilian state by the president of the
Verband deutscher Vereine, Aloys Friedrich, the Bund retorted
that such a charge was like "throwing a firebrand into the lordly
house of our Deutschtum."48
By the end of March, news of the imbroglio had become standard fare even in the Portuguese-language press. Pro-Ally news45. Deutsche Zeitung (Porto Alegre), March 18, 1916; Fischer, "Die deutsche
Presse in Rio Grande do SuJ," 21-22; Deutsche Zeitung (Porto Alegre), February 26,
1916.
46. Deutsche Zeitung (Porto Alegre), February 19, 21, March 2, 8, 31, 1916;
Fischer, "Die deutsche Presse in Rio Grande do SuJ," 21.
47. Deutsche Zeitung (Porto Alegre), February 26, March 15, 16, April 3, 1916;
Monatsbliitterdes Germanischen Bundes fur Sud-Amerika, II (March, 1917), 100, 120-23.
48. Deutsche Zeitung (Porto Alegre), March 31, 1916.
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papers such as the Jornal do Commercio and A Noite charged that
Zimmerli was at the center of a plot to destroy public order in
Rio Grande do SuI. The Porto Alegre Ditirio (controlled by TeutoBrazilians) echoed the Deutsche Post of Sao Leopoldo in denouncing Zimmerli as a thief and a swindler. The pro-German Ditirio of
Rio de Janeiro reported the circulation of rumors that connected
Zimmerli with an intended mobilization of the Germans in the
southern states and that in Santa Catarina alone, Germans had a
military force of eighty thousand armed men, including cavalry. 49
It was obvious that Zimmerli's usefulness to the German cause
had vanished. Early in April, 1916, he left for Rio de Janeiro to
receive the commendations of the German ambassador before returning to Europe via the United States. Little more was heard of
him, but his organization and its periodical survived until October, 1917, when Brazil entered the war and put an end to such
activity. During its year and a half of publication, the Monatsbliitter
turned out page after page of the crassest sort of ethnocentrism
and column after column of polemics aimed either at the Allied
powers or at Teuto-Brazilians who disagreed with its purposes
and methods. Unable to unite the Germans, it succeeded only in
dividing them more deeply. Some local chapters of the Bund remained active well into 1917, but others were neutralized by Evangelical pastors who used their prestige to take over the leadership
and then, having gained office, allowed the organization to wither.
Bitterness, dissension, and anxiety remained as the heritage of
Zimmerli's brief sojourn in Brazil. In effect he managed to intensify the Teuto-Brazilian sense of alienation and insecurity on one
hand and of bellicose superiority on the other. At the same time,
Zimmerli's organization offended the Luso-Brazilians and stimulated their determination to put an end to such divisive behavior
as soon as possible. 50
Luso-Brazilians, especially those who strongly favored the
cause of the Allies, tended to see the Germans as a united group,
despite the disagreements and divisions that were so apparent to
49. Rio de Janeiro Jornal do Commercia, March 26, 1916; Deutsche Zeitung (Porto
Alegre), March 29, 31, 1916.
50. Deutsche Zeitung (Porto Alegre), March 31, April 3, September 22, 1916;
Fischer, "Die deutsche Presse in Rio Grande do SuI," 25.
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persons within the ethnic community itself. This tendency was
enhanced by the Portuguese-language press, which reported as
newsworthy the most extravagant opinions of German Brazilians,
their most outrageous behavior, and the most exceptional events
related to the problem. Rapid assimilators and others within the
German community who disagreed with the chauvinists and
were embarrassed by their behavior usually remained silent. Because they said or did nothing to attract the attention of the press,
they were unable to modify the prevailing image of the TeutoBrazilian subsociety. Thus Luso-Brazilians assumed that the Germans spoke with one voice and that officers of ethnic voluntary
associations, particularly those of unions such as the Verband
deutscher Vereine, were representative of the entire GermanBrazilian population. Such an illusion of unity was precisely what
these officials hoped for, because they believed that it would
invest their defense of Deutschtum with greater authority and
strength. Indeed, the Porto Alegre Verband deliberately cultivated
this misapprehension when it characterized itself as an umbrella
organization that spoke for all Germans in the city-Catholics,
Evangelicals, Lutherans, merchants, professional people, craftsmen, factory workers, and unskilled laborers. 51

A Teuto-Brazilian Foreign Minister
Pro-Ally Brazilians were also concerned about the few persons of
German origin who held high political office in the national or
state governments. They assumed that such persons would automatically pursue policies that would favor Germany. It is a curious
irony that the one Teuto-Brazilian who had attained genuine eminence in the Brazilian government, Lauro Muller, held the office
of foreign minister at that time. A politician of major importance,
he was, according to Ruy Barbosa, one of a small group of five or
six leaders who virtually selected Hermes da Fonseca over Barbosa as the president of Brazil in 1909. Muller had been appointed
to his office by Hermes in 1912 as the successor to the celebrated
Baron Rio Branco. In general, he conducted the affairs of the For51.

Cf. Deutsche Zeitung (Porto Alegre), March 13, 1915.
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Lauro Muller, foreign minister of Brazil from 1912 to 1917, born in Santa Catarina
of German immigrant parents
Reprinted from Entres (ed.), Gedenkbuch

eign Ministry with distinction, especially in strengthening relations with Argentina and Chile. 52
With the advent of war in 1914, Muller sought to keep Brazil on
a course of strict neutrality, believing that such a policy would be
advantageous for Brazil. His position was analogous to that of his
American counterpart, William Jennings Bryan, whose strong
neutralism eventually led him to deep disagreements with President Woodrow Wilson and ultimately to his resignation as secretary of state in the wake of the Lusitania crisis in 1915.53 The LusoBrazilian elite, who clearly favored the Allies for economic as well
as cultural reasons, interpreted Muller's policies as pro-German.
From their point of view, the best interests of the country called
for an outspoken pro-Ally policy. Because Muller's brand of neu52. Jose Maria Bello, A Histcrry of Modern Brazil, 1889-1964 (4th ed., trans.
James L. Taylor with a concluding chapter by Rollie E. Poppino; Stanford, Calif.,
1(6), 206. Rodrigo Ochivio offers a brief, scholarly summary of Muller's life but
ignores his role as foreign minister. See his "Lauro Mueller," 172-88.
53. Luebke, Bonds of Loyalty, 129, 136. Cf. Paolo Coletta, "A Question of Alternatives: Wilson, Bryan, Lansing, and America's Intervention in World War 1,"
Nebraska Histcrry, LXIII (Spring, 1982),33-57.
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tralism also worked to the advantage of Germany, it seemed to
give ample evidence of his deepest sympathies.
Muller's detractors could not forget his German ancestry, despite his record of patriotic service, nor would they let others forget it. For his part, Muller made no effort to hide or deny his antecedents, even though he was keenly aware of the liability his
ethnicity imposed upon his conduct of the nation's foreign affairs.
A small incident suggests how deeply the problem affected him
psychologically. Upon his return from a trip to the United States,
Muller was the guest of honor at a reception held by a Brazilian
politician. The host's son innocently asked Muller what he was,
expecting an answer such as lawyer, engineer, teacher, or businessman. Caught off guard, Muller just as innocently replied, "I
am a German." Needless to say, his enemies seized upon this slip
and used it to discredit his alleged neutralism. It would be a mistake, however, to class Muller with the pro-German cultural chauvinists. He was thoroughly assimilated, and except for his final
two or three years as foreign minister, the fact that he was the son
of German-born parents was inconsequential. Another story that
circulated about him was that on one occasion he slyly observed,
"The only time I feel like a German is when I see a bottle of
beer." 54

The British Black List
For a time it appeared to many Brazilians that Muller's policies
were right after all and that the country's destiny was not in fact
tied to the Allies. Early in 1916 the British Parliament approved
the Trading-with-the-Enemy Act, a central element in its economic warfare with Germany. This law called for the development
and regular revision of a register of persons and firms with whom
British persons and firms were forbidden to trade. This Black List
was intended to include any company anywhere that traded with
the Central Powers. In fact, however, many companies were listed
only because they were personally or corporately owned, con54. Funfzig Jahre Deutscher Verein Germania. 143; Oberacker. Der deutsche Beitrag.
330-33; Konigk. Die Politik Brasiliens. 38; interview with Egon Schaden. January 8.
1982. Sao Paulo.
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trolled, or managed by Germans or persons with German names. 55
British consuls in Brazilian cities were especially influential in
gathering information for the Black List. In Sao Paulo, for example, George Falconer Atlee was unusually aggressive, doing
everything he could to coordinate a Black List committee in the
city and to drive German merchants and bankers out of business. 56 In Sao Paulo as elsewhere in Brazil, the immediacy of war
precluded the possibility of basing the Black List on substantial
evidence or proof rather than on allegation or suspicion; hence injustices were as frequent as the many ingenious efforts to disguise
trade with Germany through the use of intermediaries, false
names of consignees, and the like.
Before the war, Germany had ranked third behind the United
States and Britain in the value of Brazil's foreign commerce. After
direct trade with Germany had been eliminated by the British
naval blockade, commerce increased markedly with the stillneutral United States and the neutral countries of Europe, such as
the Netherlands, Sweden, and Denmark. But since British trade
continued undiminished, it remained a powerful weapon to club
neutral nations into line. The many bitter complaints that were
registered about the injustices of the Black List were regarded by
the British merely as unsolicited testimony to its efficacy. 57
The Black List was widely perceived in Brazil and elsewhere as
an unwarranted violation of neutral rights, and many Brazilians
were appalled by the zeal with which British consular agents in
Brazil tried to enforce it. Some Brazilian companies were devastated by the shock waves that raced through the economy. In the
three southern states, for example, coal was withheld from river
steamers operated by firms with German connections, with the
result that vital water transportation there was seriously disrupted.
A substantial portion of Brazil's foreign trade was in the hands of
firms with German names; the Black List included them as well as
some corporations whose apparent German connections were
55. The Brazilian finns on the Black List by city are given in Uhle's Kalender:
191 7,

p. 78·

56. "Situation at Sao Paulo," 11.
57. Martin, Latin America and the War, 41-42; Frederick A. Kirkpatrick, South
America and the War (Cambridge, 1918), 37; Fiinfzig Jahre Deutscher Verein Germania,169·

The Distant War

115

limited to the names of certain stockholders. Although TeutoBrazilian firms in Rio de Janeiro and elsewhere were dismayed by
the Black List and the raw economic power it represented, they
were not alone; many Luso-Brazilian businessmen swelled the
chorus of opposition. Brazil formally protested in a diplomatic
note to the British government that the nationality of a firm is determined by its place of registration, not the citizenship of its
stockholders, and that therefore such enforcement of the list infringed upon Brazilian sovereignty. Like its counterpart in the
United States, the normally pro-Ally Brazilian press sharply criticized the Black List and its administration. 58
The Bra2!ilian economy was similarly damaged in 1917 when
Britain prohibited the importation of coffee, Brazil's chief export.
Britain itself had an ample warehouse supply. By restricting coffee imports, it freed much-needed vessels for the shipment of
more vital commodities. At the same time, the British navy tightly
controlled the quantity of coffee going to the Netherlands and the
Scandinavian countries, thereby preventing the resale of surpluses to Germany. Brazil was left holding the coffee bag as its exports of this commodity dropped in 1917 to 70 percent of what
they had been in 1915. Again the Brazilian press condemned Britain for its restrictive policies, which continued even after Brazil
broke off diplomatic relations with Germany in April, 1917.59
As the war in Europe dragged on through the summer and fall
of 1916 the German-language newspapers gradually seemed to
weary of the subject. The evils of the Black List commanded the
most attention in their columns, and defensive responses to slander, real or imagined, against German culture continued as before. The papers printed many reports about the Germanische
Bund and its activities, as German Brazilians continued to quibble
over the usage of the terms germanisch as opposed to deutsch. But
58. Martin, Latin America and the War, 42; Funfzig Jahre Deutscher Verein Germania, 169; Hinden, Deutsche und deutscher Handel, 486-90; Uhle's Kalender: 1917,
pp. 76, 78; "Situation at Sao Paulo," 12. For the impact of the Black List on the huge
German coffee-importing firm .of Theodor Wille, see Siegfried Zimmermann,
Theodor Wille, 1844-1969 (Hamburg, 1969), 134-35·
59. U.S. Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1917, Supplement 1, The World War (1931), 294, 397, hereinafter cited as
FRUS, 1917, Supp. 1, The World War; Martin, Latin America and the War, 38; James,
Brazil after a Century of Independence, 413-20.
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the heady excitement and enthusiasm of the first year of the war
had abated.
At least one Teuto-Brazilian, a resident of Lajes in the interior of
Santa Catarina, was determined to have a little fun at British expense. Describing himself as a fanatical Deutschenfresser in a letter
to the British consul in Porto Alegre, he reported that the "wicked
German Franciscans" in Lajes had constructed what appeared to
be a wireless radio station in order to receive communications
from Germany. Nearly two months later, in October, 1916, an.Englishman attached to the British embassy arrived in Lajes to investigate. Ineptly disguised as a cattleman, he was accompanied by a
black servant and a local boy as translator. At this point, everyone
decided to join in the gag. A couple of wires were hastily strung
from the top of a dilapidated windmill to an old printshop on the
grounds of the Franciscan cloister. When the Englishman arrived,
he was treated with all gravity. Unaware that he was playing the
fool, he examined this evidence and then hurried back to Porto
Alegre to file his report on the evil Franciscans' subversive activities. Meanwhile, the Germans hugely enjoyed their practical joke,
which was subsequently reported in the German-language press.
They could hardly believe that anyone could have taken the originalletter seriously, much less dispatch an embassy official hundreds of miles into primitive country to investigate such a silly
rumor. 60

Some Comparisons
The experiences of the Teuto-Brazilians during the neutrality period were remarkably like those of German Americans. In both
countries the leadership classes tended to be sympathetic to the
Allied powers and in both most common people tended to regard
war in Europe as a distant affair of no imme~iate concern to them.
Still, German immigrants and their descendants naturally tended
to be partisans of the Central Powers.
The German-language press in both Brazil and the United States
defended the kaiser and his troops against atrocity charges leveled by British and French propagandists. Countless Vereine ac60. Sinzig, Nach dreiszig Jahren, 80-81.
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tively supported the Central Powers through demonstrations,
rallies, and bazaars organized to raise contributions for the German Red Cross and to sell German war bonds. Germany sought
to gain editorial control of newspapers in both countries and,
under the protective cover of the German Red Cross, dispatch
agents to organize German immigrant groups in support of the
fatherland. In both countries the effect of the war in Europe was
to energize German immigrant identity with Germany.
The responses of the churches were more varied. In Brazil, the
Evangelical synods, numerically dominant and proportionately
much more important there than in the United States, relied on
Germany for financial support and for a steady supply of pastors.
Evangelical leaders in Catholic Brazil frequently articulated a relationship between German culture and Protestant theology that
had no equivalent in the United States. Hence, partisanship for
Germany tend to be comparatively strong among Teuto-Brazilian
Protestants. At the same time, however, some Brazilian Lutherans
had organizational bonds with American churches and refused to
give any official support to the kaiser's cause.
The hierarchy of the Catholic church in Brazil, which was largely
drawn from Luso-Brazilian sources, naturally tended to support
the pro-Ally stance of the Brazilian elite. Hence, such a Germanborn prelate as Archbishop J030 Becker felt strong pressure to
conform and to oppose those Teuto-Brazilian priests and laypersons who were vocally pro-German. A contrasting relationship prevailed in the United States, where the Catholics were a minority and the hierarchy was dominated by Irish bishops, most of
whom had scant sympathy for Britain. While few were indiscreet
enough to oppose the Allies openly, there is little evidence of differences in the United States comparable to those that divided the
Brazilian church in this respect.
In both countries the Germans were perceived by the host society as a unified group without significant internal differences
and conflicts. Hence, their threat to dominant pro-Ally attitudes
was perceived as being greater than it really was. In Brazil as in
the United States, prominent German ethnic leaders fostered this
misperception because it seemed to grant greater authority to
their defense of German goals and policies.
The economics of both countries were deeply affected as world
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war disrupted patterns of international trade. British efforts to enforce the Black List led to rankling injustices everywhere and
moderated pro-Ally sentiment among business leaders, just as
pro-German spokesmen were stimulated thereby to press their
partisanship with new vigor. Such developments left the German
ethnic groups in both the United States and Brazil ill-prepared for
the dramatic events that transpired in the spring months of 1917.

5
April Riots

B

y THE END OF 1916 the news from the battlefields of Eu-

rope had dissipated any illusions about the nature of modern warfare. The slaughter in the trenches was horrible
beyond imagination; the countless wounded were theatened by
disease; the smell of death penetrated hundreds of villages in all
fighting areas; and many thousands-even millions-of persons
living in otherwise rich and bountiful lands faced starvation. For
the multitudes of war-weary on both sides, victory seemed an almost senseless goal; the attainment of some sort of peace was a
more rational object, a more earnest hope.
The United States, like Brazil, remained officially neutral, even
though national sentiment tended to favor Britain, France, and
their allies over Germany and Austria. Both countries were affected economically in intricate and diverse ways; because of extensive trade relations, both were vitally concerned about submarine warfare and its effect on neutral shipping. Following the
destruction of the American vessel Sussex in March, 1916, the
American government had successfully pressured the Germans to
abandon unrestricted submarine warfare and to return to established rules of visit and search before sinking merchant vessels.
Germany adhered to this "Sussex Pledge" throughout the remainder of 1916 and in December, having attained some military
successes on its eastern front, undertook a peace offensive, suggesting that talks begin without reference to terms. American
President Woodrow Wilson, who clearly perceived that failure to
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attain a negotiated peace at that time would mean a return to unrestricted submarine warfare and then American involvement in
the war, publicly supported a settlement without indemnities and
annexations in which both sides could negotiate as equals. Thus,
as 1917 began, it appeared to many observers that peace was
possible.
Then came a dramatic and ominous change. Within the war
councils of the German government, advocates of military solutions won out over those who favored the diplomatic approach.
Wilson's "Peace without Victory" initiative was answered with an
announcement from the German government that starting on
February 1, 1917, its submarines would sink without warning the
ships of all nations destined for Allied ports. Three days later the
United States broke off diplomatic relations with Germany, an action fully expected by the German warlords, who believed that
disrupting the flow of supplies to the Allies was worth the risk of
American involvement. They confidently expected to deliver a
military knockout before the unprepared United States could field
an effective army on European soil.
Before the month had passed, President Wilson asked Congress for authority to arm American merchantmen and, in effect,
to initiate an undeclared naval war against German submarines.
Congress debated the issue at length but without resolution until
the session came to an end. Wilson, who had begun his second
term as president, thereupon used his executive authority to order
the arming of the vessels. In mid-March, four American ships
were torpedoed in rapid succession. Finding no honorable alternative to full-fledged belligerency, Wilson then called Congress
into special session for the purpose of declaring war on Germany.
After a few days of debate, the war resolution was adopted and
signed by the president on April 6, 1917.

Brazilian Response to German Submarine Warfare
Although Brazil's Foreign Ministry remained in close contact with
the American Department of State during those weeks, its response to the Germans' resumption of unrestricted submarine
warfare was less aggressive. Given the illiteracy rate among Brazil-
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ians generally and their physical distance from the theaters of
war, there could be no genuine popular sentiment in favor of Brazilian involvement. Nevertheless, many influential persons in Brazil were remarkably belligerent. Several leading Rio de Janeiro
newspapers were vociferous in their condemnation of Germany.
The Jornal do Commercio, for example, denounced Germany's policy as "ruthless piracy," and the Correio de Manha declared that
Brazil's place was "at the side of the United States." The Liga pelos
Alliados adopted a resolution urging the president of Brazil to put
an end to its "criminal neutrality, which shames us before the
world and injures us economically and financially, while causing
us to be suspected by the Allies as passive accomplices of the German government."l Many of these same voices were raised in
favor of preparedness; they argued that circumstances demanded
that Brazil expand its armed forces immediately.
No one person was more emphatic or more effective in promoting support for the Allies than was the brilliant rhetorician Ruy
Barbosa. A politician of unusual charisma, Barbosa was famous
for his eloquent criticism of the government, the ruling class or
clique, especially the military, and their policies. As a senator
from Bahia, he had through the years built up a large personal
following-perhaps the largest of any individual politician in Brazil-and was a frequent but never successful candidate for the
presidency. In 1916 he held the relatively unimportant post of ambassador to Argentina, but he used it to popularize his views,
particularly in a widely publicized speech delivered at the law
school in Buenos Aires in which he condemned neutrality in the
Great War as immoral and cowardly. 2 Like the former American
president Theodore Roosevelt, whom he resembled in some ways,
Barbosa perceived the world conflict as a titanic struggle between
the forces of good and evil-democrats versus autocrats, the defenders of liberty versus vicious perpetrators of international
1. FRUS, 1917, Supp. 1, The World War, 251, 255-56; The Brazilian Green Book,
14-17; New York Times, February 5, 6, 7, 1917.
2. Bello, A History of Modern Brazil, 2)). See Magalhaes, "Germany and South
America," 67-80. In his Rui, 0 homem e 0 mito ()rd ed.; Rio de Janeiro, 1979),
Raymundo Magalhaes Junior ignores Barbosa's role as a partisan of the Allies before and during World War I.
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crime. He spoke at numerous patriotic rallies and demonstrations
in 1916 and 1917; his speeches were widely reprinted and translated. One entitled "A grande conflagra<;ao" was published in an
Italian-language edition of thirty thousand copies. 3
The partisans of the Allies focused their attention on the foreign
minister, Lauro Muller, whose ethnic antecedents they could not
forget. Barbosa in particular seems to have been resentful of
Muller and dismayed that the Foreign Ministry was in the hands
of a man whose parents had been born in Germany. According to
o Paiz, one of the most outspoken of Rio newspapers to advocate
a pro-Ally policy, the moment had come for Muller to demonstrate that his German origins would not "prevent him from acting in a positive manner," by which was meant pursuing a policy
matching that of the United States. Muller was also attacked in the
Brazilian Congress, where Medeiros de Albuquerque, a member
of the Chamber of Deputies, asserted that Brazil should have
aligned itself long before with the Allies. He also implied that
Muller, whom he described as a cowardly tool of Germanism, was
humiliating Brazil by his policies and frustrating the "noble aspirations of the Brazilian people."4
In fact, however, MUller pursued a moderate and prudent
course. Neither he nor President Wenceslau Braz believed that intervention would be in Brazil's best interest. Sensitive to the limitations placed on his political actions by the accident of his parentage, Miiller prepared a dispatch to the German government
regarding Germany's declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare. Ostensibly written by President Braz, the note protested the
German policy as a violation of international law and announced
that his government would hold Germany responsible for any
hostile acts against Brazilian merchant vessels. 5
Miiller's note was dismissed by his pro-Ally enemies as weak
and indecisive. Medeiros de Albuquerque attacked it as a "terrible
deception" that did nothing to dissipate the suspicion surrounding the foreign minister. If Miiller could back his empty words
with decisive acts, Medeiros suggested, his aspirations to the
presidency could be taken seriously, for in that event he would
3. Germania (Sao Paulo), April 10, 1917.
4. New York Times, February 5, 1917.
5. Ibid., February 8, 11, 1917; see also The Brazilian Green Book, 18-19.
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"win so great a victory over himself" that no one could dispute his
right to the republic's highest office. 6
Germany refused to attach much importance to the Brazilian
protest. To abandon its submarine blockade, the Germans replied
in a note delivered late in February, would risk national annihilation; although it was indeed likely that Brazil would suffer losses,
any claims could easily be negotiated through diplomatic discourse. 7 The German response seemed to validate the fears of
Muller's enemies, and his position became increasingly untenable
during the weeks and months that followed.

Anti-German Propaganda
Meanwhile, anti-German propaganda intensified. It was repeatedly charged that Germany had been plotting for years to use the
German settlements in southern Brazil as the base for its imperialist designs. Most of these allegations appear to have been drawn
from several widely distributed tracts written by a French journalist and propagandist, Andre Cheradame, whose Pangerman
Plot Unmasked (1917) claimed that Germany had coveted southern
Brazil for years. Brazilians of German origin were "almost absolute masters" in Rio Grande do SuI and Santa Catarina, according
to Cheradame, and by virtue of a German law of 1913 that permitted dual citizenship, they were "liege men of William II." Cheradame claimed that the "German Peril" was all the more real because
the numerous SchiUzenvereine (rifle clubs) were in fact military societies capable of assisting in the establishment of a huge protectorate that the Germans planned to extend over Paraguay, Uruguay, and parts of Argentina and Brazil. 8
Sympathizers of the Allies were only too eager to accept such
propaganda as truth. A Noite of Rio de Janiero was especially ac6. New York Times, February 14, 1917.
7. Ibid., February 26, 1917.
8. Andre Cheradame, The Pangerman Plot Unmasked (New York, 1917), 193-98,
and esp. the map (p. 194). The United States Department of State had heard
rumors of "80,000 shooting club members" as early as June, 1916, and had asked
the American charge d'affaires in Rio de Janeiro to check them out. The State
Department regarded the rumors as propagandistic exaggeration and believed
that the German Brazilians in fact represented no threat. See Leland Harrison to
Alexander Benson, June 8, 1917, in RG 59, Entry 540, Letters Received by Leland
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tive in promoting this brand of propaganda. In February, 1917, for
example, it reported that the agent of German imperialism in the
southern states was the Hamburg Colonization Company, an organization with which Lauro Muller had connections. The company had in fact been settling German immigrants in Brazil since
1900. According to A Noite, only colonists of German nationality
were admitted to settlement on company lands, which were located near the border between Rio Grande do SuI and Santa Catarina. It was also alleged that the colonists would soon demand the
incorporation of southern Brazil with Germany under the name
"Antarctic Germany." Several weeks later, A Noite assigned a reporter to study the "German Danger." According to his findings,
Blumenau was a purely German city with forty Schiitzenvereine
whose members were prepared to spring into action at a moment's
notice. 9
Another Noite article charged that a German pastor in Santa
Cruz in Rio Grande do SuI, speaking from the chancel of his
church, had advised the children of his parish to refrain from
talking Portuguese because it was an inferior language that they
learned on the streets from Negro youngsters. Although it is true
that some Germans were capable of such cultural chauvinism, in
this case the facts were twisted. It was the publisher of the Porto
Alegre Volksblatt (not a clergyman) who had addressed the young
people in a general meeting of German Catholics (not a worship
service). He urged them to learn both the Portuguese and German languages well and to use each as circumstances demanded,
in preference to their German dialects and the dreadful Portuguese laden with vulgar expressions that "Negroes and other
fourth-class persons use." The comment was certainly infused
with a sense of ethnic superiority, but not at the expense of LusoBrazilian culture. 10
Harrison, 1916-1918, Box 1; Alexander Benson to Secretary of State, March 20,
1917, in RG 59, American Embassy Correspondence, Rio de Janeiro, 1917, part 9·
For studies of Allied propaganda in the United States and elsewhere, see Read,
Atrocity Prapaganda; and Horace Peterson, Propaganda for War: The Campaign against
American Neutrality (Norman, 1939).
9. New York Times, February 24, 1917; A Raw (Rio de Janeiro), February 7, 1917;
Deutsche Zeitung (Porto Alegre), May 29, 1917.
10. Uhle's Kalender: 1917, p. 76.
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The German-language newspapers frequently protested against
pro-Ally propaganda and accused French and English agents of
originating the rumors, but their comments rarely found their way
into the Portuguese-language press and thus had little effect. The
Curitiba Kompass, for example, insisted that there was no basis
whatever for the so-called deutsche Gefahr, either in Germany or
among Teuto-Brazilians, the great majority of whom were citizens
who readily identified Brazil as their fatherland. Even Clarence
Haring, who wrote in the immediate postwar period, correctly asserted that there was no evidence that the German government
ever intended to annex any part of Brazil and that any danger of a
military sort from Teuto-Brazilians was remote. The typical German farmer wanted most of all to be left alone. He had come to
Brazil as an impoverished immigrant, had prospered there, and
hence felt no particular loyalty to Germany. There may have been
a few secret agents of the German embassy in the Teuto-Brazilian
districts, but they posed no threat to Brazil, lacking both effective
cohesion and leadership. If any peril to Brazil existed, wrote Haring, it was to be found among some of the German capitalists of
the coastal cities-Reichsdeutsche, supported by German
banks-who believed that a German victory would enhance their
business prospects. 11
Some of these German businessmen were able to exercise considerable influence on the German-language press. Thus it was
that throughout the early months of 1917, some newspapers such
as the Deutsche Zeitung of Porto Alegre and the Germania of Sao
Paulo continued to follow a steadily pro-German line despite the
ominous signs that Luso-Brazilian tolerance for such behavior was
weakening. Even after the United States had declared war on Germany, the Germania criticized German Americans for proclaiming
that money collected for the German Red Cross would now go to
the American Red Cross instead. Their desire as American citizens to support the United States over was understandable, observed the Germania, but it was hardly necessary for them to behave like loud-mouthed Yankees, declaring that their patriotism
11. Curitiba Kompass, April 17, 1917; Haring, The Germans in South America, 66.
See also "Situation at Sao Paulo," anonymous report transmitted to the Department of State by Capt. S. McCauley, Assistant Director of Naval Intelligence,
April 26, 1918, in RG 59, Entry 540, Box 1, Brazil folder.
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was of the highest possible order. Still, the Germania recognized
that the Teuto-Brazilian situation had become extremely sensitive
and stressed the necessity of remaining calm. All eyes were on the
southern states to observe the conduct of Germans, this newspaper warned; unrest there could do extraordinary damage to the
small colonies of Germans in such places as Pernambuco, Bahia,
Rio, and Sao Paulo without helping the German cause a bit. 12

Germans Sink the Parana
Trouble was not long in coming. Although the northern cities did
not escape the violence, the greatest damage was suffered in Porto
Alegre and other centers of Teuto-Brazilian population and economic power in Rio Grande do SuI. The tinderbox was set aflame
by news that on Aprils, 1917, a German submarine off the coast
of northern France had sunk the Parana, a small Brazilian freighter
of 4,461 tons laden with 93,000 sacks of coffee. Official confirmation of the sinking came on the same day that the United States
declared war on Germany. Following his rescue by a French warship, the captain of the Parana cabled the ship's owner, the Commerce and Navigation Company of Rio, that the vessel had been
torpedoed without warning, that it had been shelled five times,
and that three crewmen had been killed. 13
There was little doubt that Brazil would respond with anything
less than a formal break in diplomatic relations. The Liga pelos
Alliados naturally demanded an immediate declaration of war. A
Noite agreed, insisting that a mere break was insufficient. In addition, it demanded reprisals and a declaration of "sympathetic
neutrality," but preferred that Brazil should join the Allies in war.
Other papers took a similar position, but according to the New
York Times, the U.S. Department of State estimated that the German influence in Brazil was "still too strong" for a declaration of
war. This was an oblique reference to Foreign Minister Muller,
who somewhat quixotically fought a delaying action, urging that
Brazil demand satisfaction from Germany in the form of punish12. Germania (Sao Paulo), April 2, 10, 1917.
13- Rio de Janeiro lornal do Commercio, April 6, 1917; New York Times, April 7, 8,
9, 1917.
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ment for the submarine commander and indemnification for the
families of the victims; if Germany then failed to comply, he said,
Brazil should cut off diplomatic relations. While Muller was strong
enough to prevent an immediate declaration of war, he could not
delay a severance of relations. Prompt action was demanded
because at that moment nearly fifty German merchant vessels
berthed in Brazilian ports were subject to seizure if a diplomatic
rupture were declared. In order to head off their escape, the other
cabinet ministers prevailed over MUller, and on April 11 the break
was officially announced. 14
The next day, April 12, the Brazilian Ministry of Marine impounded the German ships in an action tactfully described as a
measure taken to prevent German crews from inflicting damage on the ships. According to one newspaper account, customs
guards in Santos caught disembarking German seamen carrying
important and virtually irreplaceable parts of their vessel's engines. 15 The Brazilian government fully appreciated the potential
value of forty or fifty German ships. They could go a long way
toward indemnifying Brazil for the loss of some of its own vessels
to German torpedoes; more important, they could greatly enlarge
the size of Brazil's merchant marine and expand its capacity to
market coffee, the keystone of the nation's buffeted economy.
While government leaders debated the appropriate course for
Brazil to follow, the superpatriotic press kept stoking the fires of
anti-Germanism. A Noite in particular printed rumors about German spies sending mysterious light signals and radio messages.
In an article on the German rifle clubs (Schiitzenvereine) in southern Brazil, the paper charged that they were military organizations. The Jornal do Commercio suggested that they be mobilized
into the Brazilian army, where they could be properly controlled.
The Liga pela Alliados sent a series of demands to President Braz
that received extensive coverage. Included were the disarming of
the rifle clubs, a rigorous surveillance of all Reichsdeutsche and
a prohibition of correspondence among them, the dismissal of
14. New York Times, April 8, 13, 1917. The Times reprinted numerous news
items in translation from Brazilian newspapers.
15. FRUS, 1917, Supp. 1, The World War, 252; New York Times, April 13, 14, 16,
1917.
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Lauro Muller as foreign minister, and the appointment of Ruy
Barbosa as his successor. Meanwhile, the Correia de Manha called
for a full mobilization of military resources; 0 Paiz insisted on a
declaration of war. In contrast to such jingoism, the governors of
the southern states, Borges de Medeiros of Rio Grande do SuI and
Felippe Schmidt of Santa Catarina (Muller's cousin), declared that
absolute calm reigned in the German districts of their states and
that the Teuto-Brazilians were incapable of hostile attitudes toward their country. 16
Such words of moderation were lost amid the widespread demonstrations and patriotic rallies stimulated by the sinking of the
Parana and the attendant publicity. Obviously orchestrated affairs, the rallies attracted huge crowds in Rio, Sao Paulo, Porto Alegre, and elsewhere. Orators delivered fervent patriotic speeches
elaborating upon the barbarism of the Germans; national hymns
and anthems were sung; Brazilian flags were displayed everywhere along with the national banners of the Allies and their newest recruit, the United States; and great crowds paraded through
the major cities. Such processions typically moved from major
government buildings to the offices of superpatriotic newspapers
and to the consulates of the Allies. More speeches would be heard
as the crowd shouted "Viva Brazil! Death to Germany!" and
streamed forward to the German and Austrian legations, where
police guards were often stationed to maintain order. In many
cases the rallies were transformed into demonstrations against
the Teuto-Brazilians as the crowds surged to prominent German
business establishments, clubhouses of German societies, and
German-language newspapers. Detachments of cavalry frequently
accompanied the processions in order to restrain incendiary enthusiasms. Despite the laudable efforts of local governments to
maintain order, epithets hurled at these symbols of German power
in Brazil were often followed by rocks and stones. Such disturbances were most serious in Rio de Janeiro and in Sao Paulo,
where the offices of the Deutsche Zeitung suffered extensive vandalism. In Sao Paulo, the American consul estimated the crowd at
fifteen thousand persons. The police were determined to main16. Rio de Janeiro Jornal do Commercio, April 12, 1917; New York Times, April 10,
13, 14, 1917; Deutsche Zeitung (Porto Alegre), April 16, 1917.
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tain order and in their effort to control the mob, one person was
killed and many more were injured. 17

Riots in Porto Alegre
On Friday and Saturday, April 13 and 14, Porto Alegre experienced patriotic demonstrations not unlike those that had occurred
in other cities. On Saturday night, however, the spirit of the mob
took over when a huge crowd gathered before the offices of the
DUirio Allemao. Dr. Vieira Pires, head of the state police, tried to
calm the multitude but withdrew after he was injured by a stone.
The police were unable to prevent the mob from entering the
premises, and pitching books, paper, and furniture into a huge
bonfire in the street. IS
Sunday was even more portentous. A relatively small group of
superpatriots, perhaps a hundred, went by streetcar to Sao Joao,
a suburb where many Germans lived, apparently in response to a
deliberately planted rumor that some Germans were planning to
burn a Brazilian flag on the playing field of the Turnerbund (gymnastic society) located there. Finding nothing, they returned to
the city in a particularly agitated and belligerent mood. Their
route took them past the Hotel Schmidt, a German inn of some
renown, whose owner, fearful of the rabble and determined to
protect his property, had erected a barricade in front of his establishment. When the frustrated assemblage of superpatriots passed
by the hotel aboard streetcars, Friedrich Schmidt, supported by
his son, an employee, and a neighbor, fired pistols into the crowd
and lightly wounded two passengers. The hotelkeeper and his
small band were quickly overcome, disarmed, and placed under
arrest. 19
17. Rio de Janeiro Jornal do Commercia, April 12, 1917; New York Times, April 14,
15,1917; Germania (Sao Paulo), April 11, 12,25,1917; Deutsche Post (Sao Leopoldo),
April 26, 1917; Deutsche Zeitung (Porto Alegre), April I}, 1917; Charles Hoover to
Alexander Benson (charge d'affaires in Rio), April 11, 1917, in RG 59, American
Embassy Correspondence, Rio de Janeiro, 1917, part 8.
18. A Federa¢o (Porto Alegre), April 16, 1917; Porto Alegre Correia do Povo,
April 17, 1917.
19. The account offered in this and the following paragraphs is based on the
Deutsche Post of Sao Leopoldo, April 24, 1917. It is supplemented and verified by
other reports in A Federa¢o of Porto Alegre, April 16, 17, 18, 1917; Correia do Povo
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Then it was discovered that Schmidt had hidden additional
weapons and ammunition within his hotel. The few police present were unable to restrain the crowd and a fearful stoning of the
hotel ensued. After smashing every window in the building, the
mob pressed on to other Teuto-Brazilian structures in the neighborhood, gathering recruits as they moved from street to street.
German-language newspapers, bookstores, pharmacies, restaurants, and beer halls, as well as some larger commercial houses,
were vandalized. Destruction continued through the evening.
Not until well after midnight did the rioters disperse and peace
return. But the calm was only temporary.
On Monday morning, April 16, it appeared at first that the intense emotions of the previous day had subsided. But the Porto
Alegre newspapers published reports of the Schmidt incident and
its aftermath, and even though mob violence was uniformly condemned, people were agitated. Those of a superpatriotic bent of
mind were determined to find opportunities to strike back at the
Germans in retaliation for Schmidt's absurd attack. The TeutoBrazilians were fearful. The officers of the Germania Society, for
example, dispatched a letter to the governor in which they sharply
denounced Schmidt and his accomplices.
But it was too late for such well-meant gestures. A group of students had previously planned a demonstration for Monday afternoon. This gathering went out of control almost immediately.
Swollen by new arrivals, it was tranformed into another ugly mob
that streamed into the German district and resumed the systematic bombardment. All buildings in the area that were known to be
occupied by either Teuto-Brazilians or Reichsdeutsche were subjected to an awesome volley of rocks and stones. While looting occurred, press accounts make little of it, thereby indirectly stressing the ethnic animosity that seems to have stimulated the riot. 20
As it had the night before, the riot centered on structures located
on Caminho Novo, Rua dos Andrades, Rua 7 de Setembro, Rua
Dr. Flores, Rua General Camara, and Rua 24 de Maio.
of Porto Alegre, April 17, 1917; Jornal do Commercio of Rio de Janeiro, April 17, 18,
1917; Germania of Sao Paulo, April 25, 1917; and Der Familienfreund: Katholischer
Hauskalender fUr das Jahr 1918 (Porto Alegre, [1917]), 129. Cf. Konigk, Die Politik
Brasiliens, 49-50.
20. Konigk emphasizes that looting was extensive. See Die Politik Brasiliens, 49.
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The ruins of the Hotel Schmidt in Porto Alegre, following its destruction by arsonists on April 16, 1917
Reprinted from Kalender fUr die Deutschen in Brasilien: 1918

By four 0' clock the Hotel Schmidt was in flames. Even though a
police guard had been posted, a mob estimated at a thousand persons had broken into the building and demolished everything in
sight. Then someone poured kerosene all around, ignited it, and
transformed the hotel into a raging inferno.
The arsonists moved on to the home of one Dr. Viktor Fischel,
where a series of events unfolded that illuminate in a limited way
the problems faced by the police. The rioters first bombarded the
Fischel house with stones, then stormed the doorway, gained entrance, smashed its furnishings, and threw the remains into the
street. The vastly outnumbered and ill-equipped police were powerless to halt the havoc. When the rioters took steps to set Fischel's
place ablaze, an officer named Hercilio Limeiro bravely faced up
to the lawless mob and managed to dissuade them. Their attention was diverted temporarily by the discovery of what appeared
to be an operation for the manufacture of counterfeit coins. The
rioters demanded that the police arrest Fischel, who had not escaped. After this they went on to commit other criminal acts of
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their own. Despite the commendable behavior of individual officers such as Limeiro, it is apparent that authorities were unable to
dispatch reinforcements to the scene in sufficient numbers to
maintain order.
From Fischel's residence the rioters returned to the inner city,
where on Rua Sao Rafael they came to the clubhouse of the Porto
Alegre Turnerbund. Everything in it was destroyed-furniture,
pictures, cabinets, gymnastic equipment. Plans to bum the building were frustrated by a Major Rath, an instructor in the police
department whose living quarters were next door. With the help
of just a few officers, Rath was able to force the mob out of the
building, but not before much destruction had been wrought.
The most dramatic events of those terrifying days occurred that
evening (Monday, April 16, 1917). Reinforced by additions of
rabble (so labeled by A Federa¢o, the voice of the Rio Grande do
SuI state government), the mob gathered at 7:00 P.M. in Rua 7 de
Setembro before the headquarters of the Bromberg Company,
perhaps the largest, richest, and most powerful German-owned
firm in Brazil. Again the police were powerless before the crowd.
Equipped with axes and crowbars, the rioters broke down the
doors and rushed into the building. Arsonists began their work
immediately; soon the night sky was illuminated for miles around
as flames shot upward from exploding drums of petroleum. By
10:30 P.M., the fire had spread to neighboring businesses and
warehouses.
The elegant clubhouse of the Germania Society on Rua Dr. Flores was the next victim. Kerosene was spread all around to guarantee the rapid spread of fire. Within a few moments it was adding to
the nighttime illumination of Porto Alegre. 21 Since all buildings
here were located immediately adjacent to one another, it seemed
for a time as though the entire city would go up in flames. It was
quite beyond the capacity of the municipal firefighters to extinguish the gigantic conflagration, but through heroic efforts they
were able to prevent it from spreading. This achievement came at
the expense of one fireman's life and injury to several more.
21. [Sociedade Independencia], Betrachtungen zu Ihrer Geschichte aus Anlass
der Jahrhundert-Feier, 1855-1955 (Porto Alegre, 1955), 31. See also Hundert Jahre
Deutschtum, 300.
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The entrance of the elegant clubhouse of the Germania Society of Porto Alegre
following its destruction on April 16, 1917
Reprinted from Kalender fUr die Deutschen in Brasilien: 1918

Meanwhile, arsonists put the torch to scores of other German
or Teuto-Brazilian residences and businesses. In addition to those
owned by the Bromberg Company, several other large commercial
and industrial buildings were destroyed that night. The list reads
like a directory of major German companies. The printing plant of
the Deutsche Zeitung suffered a surprise attack and much equipment was damaged before it was saved from arsonists by the
timely arrival of the military.22 Curiously, the Deutsches Volksblatt,
which catered to Catholic readers, was spared. Whether the rioters were capable of discriminating under prevailing conditions between the accommodationist Volksblatt and the more haughty,
chauvinistic Zeitung cannot be determined. Later references to the
riots suggest that they were carefully planned and directed, usually by non-Luso-Brazilian persons. One such account, written by
22 . Deutsche Zeitung (Porto Alegre), April 16, 1917. Despite the date given for
this issue, it was actually published near the end of the month.

An interior view of the destroyed Germania clubhouse, Porto Alegre
Reprinted from Kalender fUr die Deutschen in Brasilien: 1918
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an Evangelical clergyman who retired to Germany after the war,
flatly attributed the Porto Alegre riot to the English consul stationed there. He charged that the mob, after having been enlivened with alcoholic drink, destroyed specific structures at the
consul's direction. Although the newspapers make no reference to
such activity by officials of the Allied powers, circumstantial evidence tends to corroborate the charge. Much of the destruction
seems to have been systematic, not random. A report received by
United States naval intelligence from Sao Paulo suggests that Italian Brazilians, jealous of the influence German businessmen
seemed to have with Brazilian politicians, had stirred up the disturbances to get the Germans out and thereby enhance their own
influence. 23
The three days of riots left nearly three hundred buildings in
various stages of ruin. As a protective measure some inhabitants
of the German district displayed Brazilian flags; others prepared
large signs with the inscription, "This house is Brazilian!" By
Monday evening, cavalry formed cordons on streets adjacent to
the conflagration in order to protect German homes that still remained intact. Nonetheless, rioters continued to feed the flames
with combustible materials when they could, and extraordinary
movement continued in the streets all through the night.
The next morning the city of Porto Alegre surveyed the destruction it had inflicted upon itself. The Germans naturally feared a
resumption of the terror and many fled for refuge to relatives and
friends in the serra. The state government of Borges de Medeiros,
known for its firm commitment to "Order and Progress," immediately imposed military law. Vieira Pires, the head of the state police, issued a proclamation censuring "the crimes and acts of hatred and contempt that the mob committed against foreigners as
well as natives." All public meetings or gathering in public places
were forbidden and army units patrolled the streets. With one accord all the major newspapers, but especially the official Federa¢o, denounced the depredations and counseled calm. In Rio de
Janeiro, President Braz took decisive action. He also condemned
23.

Cf.

Brasilien,

Fischer, "Die deutsche Presse in Rio Grande do Sul," 154; Dedekind,
"Situation at Sao Paulo," 4-5.

12.

Germans in Brazil

A row of burned-out buildings in the German district (Rua 7 de Setembro) of Porto
Alegre following the riot of April 16, 1917
Reprinted from Kalender fUr die Deutschen in Brasilien: 1918

the crimes, but more significantly he placed 7,400 federal troops
at Borges de Medeiros' disposal to assist in the maintenance of
order. 24
Of course, the German-language press did not publish for the
next several days. Some could not because of damages sustained;
others voluntarily agreed to suspend publication until peace was
assured. When the rural German districts failed to receive their
usual newspapers, a sense of panic spread among many of the
people in those areas. One response of the colonos was to halt the
shipment of the agricultural products upon which Porto Alegre depended until their confidence in the ability of the government to
maintain order was restored. By April 25, most German-language
newspapers were publishing again. 25
24. Deutsche Post (Sao Leopoldo), April 24, 1917; New York Times, April 20,
25. Kalender [iir die Deutschen in Brasilien: 1918 (Sao Leopoldo, [1917], 192.
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The Unrest Spreads
Although the rural districts in Rio Grande do SuI experienced
nothing compared to the Porto Alegre terror, anti-German demonstrations or riots occurred in Santa Maria, Montenegro, and
several other provincial cities. In Sao Leopoldo, for example, a
mob threatened to destroy the Deutsche Post but was deterred at
the last moment by an effective speech by a local government official, Dr. Gabriel Azambuja de Fortuna. The Post, like the Porto Alegre papers, suspended publication for a week. 26
The numerous Germans in Pelotas were not so lucky. A port
city located at the southernmost tip of Brazil near the entrance to
the huge coastal sound, Lagoa dos Patos, Pelotas was the home of
the Deutsche Wacht, an aggressive, chauvinistic journal started in
1914. The editor at the time of the riots in 1917 was Rudi Schafer,
who later recorded his experiences in those troubled days. On
Monday, April 16, the Portuguese-language newspapers of Pelotas received telegrams throughout the day reporting the tumultuous events in Porto Alegre almost as quickly as they happened.
Thus stimulated, certain partisans of the Allies, unrestrained by
considerations of law or common sense, resolved to try to duplicate the riots in the state capital. According to Schafer, who is not
an unbiased source, careful plans were laid by an English national
(an electrical engineer), several Italians, and a "renegade" Alsatian. Through the generous dispensation of alcoholic beverages,
these conspirators recruited supporters among illiterate black laborers found in waterfront saloons. Their enthusiasm for lawlessness was heightened by the excited rhetoric of student patriots
and, perhaps more efficaciously, by the promise of opportunities
for plunder. Rumors of an impending riot traveled briskly through
the city. By late afternoon, Schafer received offers of sanctuary in
the homes of discerning, respectable Luso-Brazilians, but he resolved to stay in his printshop and protect it with barricades.
By nightfall a thousand or more persons had gathered in the central plaza. Growing from moment to moment, the mob swarmed
into the German district and began its work of destruction. The
26. Fischer, "Die deutsche Presse in Rio Grande do SuI," 238.
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scenes that followed were almost a replication of events in Porto
Alegre. Screaming "Viva Brazil! Death to Germany!" the multitude swept from one building to another-first the clubhouse of
the Concordia-Verein and the German school, and then a wellknown German bar and a German watchmaker's shop, establishments capable of satisfying newly whetted appetites for liquor
and loot. The mob went on to attack the Pelotas branch of the
Bromberg Company, other large commercial establishments, and
the Deutsche Wacht, where the besieged Schafer repeatedly but ineffectually pleaded by phone with the police for help.
After pelting the building with stones and firing revolvers for
nearly half an hour, the mob battered through Schafer's barricade
and poured into the Wacht's editorial offices and printshop. Many
items were stolen, especially books, paper, and smaller pieces of
furniture (some of which later reappeared in second hand stores);
everything else, including boxes of type, was dragged out into the
street, piled in a great heap, doused with kerosene, and burned
like a huge funeral pyre. The vastly outnumbered police were incapable of coping with the rioters. Denounced as collaborators of
the Germans, the police stood up to the mob and somehow managed to prevent a conflagration like the one that was devastating
Porto Alegre at that very hour. According to the Deutsche Post, the
conspirators had planned further depredations for the next day,
but a military detachment of one hundred men arrived the next
afternoon and prevented any additional outrages. Meanwhile,
many German families, including Schafer's, fled to a rural German
district twenty-five miles away. 27
Anti-German demonstrations in other states were less common
and generally less severe. Almost none occurred in Santa Catarina, possibly because Teuto-Brazilians occupied the governor's
chair and many local positions of authority. In Parana, an attack
on the Curitiba Kompass was prevented by the decisive action of
the chief of the state police. In Sao Paulo state, Rio Claro was the
scene of an outbreak on Sunday evening, April 15, when a mob
attacked a German Protestant church and a boarding school associated with it. After the vandals had done their work, the pastor
27. Rio de Janeiro lornal do Commercio, April 18, 1917; Deutsche Post (Sao Leopoldo), April 25, 1917; Germania (Sao Paulo), April 27, 30, 1917; Fischer, "Die
deutsche Presse in Rio Grande do SuI," 322, 326.
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was forced to kiss the Brazilian flag. Here as in Porto Alegre and
Pelotas, the disturbances exceeded the ability of local authorities
to maintain order and troops were sent in.28 Two weeks later, the
indiscretion of a German Protestant pastor provoked another
anti-German incident in Cam pinho de Santa Isabel, a small community in Espirito Santo. When his parish school was closed by
the state director of education until Portuguese was introduced as
the language of instruction, the pastor led a group of his parishioners down the village street shouting "Viva Germany! Death to
Brazil!" Appalled by such insolence, a gang of Luso-Brazilians attacked the Germans until police intervened and forced the latter
to "respect the proper sentiments of the Brazilian people." Farther north, in Pernambuco, a mob burned a small private school
to the ground. 29
Taken as a whole, the violence visited upon Brazil in April,
1917, was surprisingly widespread and severe. It came as a shock
to many people, Luso- and Teuto-Brazilian alike. While few observers would ever have suggested that there were no ethnic differences or frictions, most accepted the stereotype of Brazilian society as pluralist, tolerant, and nonviolent; they saw individual
Brazilians as amiable and easygoing, ready to accept ethnocultural diversity and eager to reconcile differences. While the behavior of the superpatriots, typified by the Liga pelos Alliados
and Ruy Barbosa, was often harsh and inflammatory, the government on all levels-national, state, and local-apparently coped
with problems of civil disorder as efficiently as possible, though
there is some evidence that the protection of the law was withheld
partially or temporarily. 30

Governmental Responses
In the days and weeks following the April riots, the several governments resisted the temptation to succumb to superpatriotic
28. Germania (Sao Paulo), April 25, 1917; Sinzig, Nach dreiszig Jahren, 100; Rio de
Janeiro Jornal do Commercio, April 18, 1917; Uhle's Kalender fUr das Jahr 1918, p. 140.
29. Rio de Janeiro Jornal do Commercio, April 29, 1917; Porto Alegre Correio do
Povo, April 17, 1917; Alfredo Carlos Schmalz, "400 anos de presem;:a gennanica em
Pernambuco," in I. Col6quio, 304.
30. Warren Dean, The Industrialization of Sao Paulo, 1880-1945 (Austin, 1969),
166.
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political pressure. Even though Borges de Medeiros' sympathies
lay with the Allies, he did everything he could to maintain order
and internal peace in Rio Grande do SuI. Shortly after the Porto
Alegre disturbances, he met with the editors of the city's Germanlanguage newspapers. He assured them of his determination to
keep the peace and urged them to resume publication and to use
their influence to calm the Teuto-Brazilians by restoring their confidence in the government. Borges hoped especially to stop the
movement of fearful Teuto-Brazilians out of the cities and, as
some rumors had it, out of the state. 31
It is obvious that Borges understood the Teuto-Brazilian citizens
of his state. On the basis of th~ir past behavior, he knew that with
few exceptions they were entirely loyal to Brazil, despite their cultural ties to Germany. On a practical level, Borges wanted to
counter the panic that had spread from the cities to the rural Germans and to restore the flow of agricultural products to Porto
Alegre. 32
Throughout this period, a number of journalists, both Lusoand Teuto-Brazilian, played a key role in the effort to return to
normal. The official newspaper of the Republican party in Rio
Grande do SuI, A FederaftlO, condemned superpatriotic journals
such as 0 Paiz of Rio, charging that their extreme partisanship
had unintentionally promoted violence in Porto Alegre. It also
sought to improve the public image of the Teuto-Brazilians by reprinting a long, laudatory article that recounted the great contributions of Germans to Brazilian history and culture. Another Portuguese-language newspaper, A Republica, was alert to charges
that Luso-Brazilians had acted brutally and senselessly in the
Porto Alegre riots. Asserting that Brazilian culture dictates that intelligence and respect should govern the determination of action,
this paper argued that attacks on Teuto-Brazilian citizens were
simply unjustified, even if war was declared. 33
31. Deutsche Post (Sao Leopoldo), April 24, 1917; Rio de Janeiro Jornal do Commercio, April 23, 1917; Porto Alegre Correio do Povo, April 21, 1917; Germania (Sao
Paulo), April 23, 1917; Curitiba Kompass, April 24, 1917.
32. For a more critical evaluation of Borges' role, see Konigk, Die Politik Brasiliens, 49-50.
33. A Federapio (Porto Alegre), April 20, 25,1917; A Republica quoted in Curitiba
Kompass, April 19, 1917.
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In Santa Catarina, Governor Felippe Schmidt followed a course
similar to Borges'. Schmidt convened a meeting of Teuto-Brazilian
leaders to discuss the problem and to plan a course of action. The
Germans responded unanimously by swearing their loyalty to
Brazil; Schmidt so assured President Braz in Rio de Janeiro. As in
Rio Grande do SuI, the German-language newspapers were requested to continue publishing and to use their influence to encourage calm and to build confidence in the government. In Parana, the chief of the state police, Dr. Lindolfo Pessoa, said many
of the same things and publicly credited the Germans for much of
the economic progress made by the state. 34
The superpatriotic press, however, continued as it had before the riots. The wildest rumors could find a place in the proAlly newspapers and some had the characteristics of deliberately
planted lies; others, oddly enough, seem to have originated in
Montevideo. 35 The Correio do Povo of Porto Alegre, for example,
published a dispatch from the Uruguayan capital about events in
its own city. When the warehouses of the Bromberg Company
were burned on April 16, the Montevideo dispatch alleged that
they had contained enormous quantities of arms, ammunition,
machine guns, and even artillery. The Jornal do Commercio picked
up the item from the Correio do Povo and added an earlier rumor
about a huge cache of weapons in Santa Catarina, where large
numbers of mutinous Germans were allegedly congregating. The
New York Times soon expanded on all this with a story entitled
"Germans in Brazil Reported in Revolt." According to this and a
subsequent account, heavily armed Germans had already tried to
blow up bridges and an insurrection was imminent. The same ar34. Curitiba Kompass, April 17, 21, 28, 1917; Germania (Sao Paulo), April 28,
1917.
35. The Uruguayan rumors apparently were rooted in the historic fear that Uruguayans had of invasion from Brazil. Early in 1917, Manuel Otero, the Uruguayan
foreign minister, spoke of an impending revolution in southern Brazil due to alleged German activity there. He feared that Germans in Brazil would acquire a
cache of arms and ammunition, legally the property of Paraguay, that was known
in diplomatic circles to be hidden since 1911 in Argentine territory between Paraguay and Brazil. See Secretary of State [Lansing] to American Embassy in Buenos
Aires, April 10, 1917, and [Frederic J.] Stimson to Secretary of State, April 11, 1917,
both in RG 59, Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs
of Germany, 1910-1929 (M336, roll 67).

Germans in Brazil

ticle reported that Jose Nabuco de Gourea, a member of Congress
from Rio Grande do SuI, confirmed reports that the recent riots in
Porto Alegre and elsewhere had been caused by the Germans and
that "the native [sic] population was incensed and determined to
crush the Germans if they did not desist from troublemaking."
Meanwhile, the American consul in Rio Grande do SuI was less
gullible. He reported to his superior in Rio de Janeiro that there
was no probability whatsoever of the Teuto-Brazilians doing anything significant to help Germany. 36
Other rumors claimed that airplanes, presumably German,
were flying in darkest night in the vicinity of Curitiba, where the
office of the Kompass was alleged to house a secret radio station. 37
A Noite reported that German importers in Santa Catarina, working in conjunction with German submarines, had plans to engage
in piracy along the Brazilian coast in the event that war was declared. When several foreigners purchased a plot of land on the
Brazilian coast near Guaratiba, it was reported that Germans were
plotting to construct a naval base there. When a Rio construction
firm with a German name (Riedlinger) began to build a hotel on
Flamengo Beach, the rumor was spread that Germans were constructing a fortress within the nation's capital. 38

Teuto-Brazilian Reaction
The range of reaction among the Teuto-Brazilians in the wake of
the April riots was as wide as among the Luso-Brazilians. Most
were fully prepared to accommodate their behavior to the norms
narrowed by the international crises. Some decided that the best
course would be to make overt gestures of assimilation. This could
be done most obviously in the matter of names. Although the
transformation of family names seems to have been less common
in Brazil than in the United States, many persons altered their first
36. Porto Alegre Correio do Povo, April 20, 1917; Rio de Janeiro Jornal do Commercio, April 23, 1917; New York Times, April 20, 25, 1917; Samuel T. Lee to Edwin V.
Morgan, April 28, 1917, in RG 59, American Embassy Correspondence, Rio de Janeiro, 1917, part 9.
37. Germania (Sao Paulo), April 28, 1917; Rio de Janeiro Jornal do Commercio,
April 20, 1917.
38. Noite quoted in Germania (Sao Paulo), May 1, 1917; Uhle's Kalender: 1917,
P·78.
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names from the German to Portuguese equivalents. Thus Heinrich became Enrique, Karl became Carlos, and so on. Name
changes in commercial firms, already started by the imposition of
the Black List in 1916, were accelerated. For example, Schnakenberg, Buttermilch, and Company reorganized in 1917 as Bernardino and Zacharias-Schnakenberg's name was dropped, Bernhard Buttermilch's name reappeared as Bernardino, and the given
name of a new Luso-Brazilian partner, Zacharias Junqueira, was
added. Many voluntary organizations adopted the same cosmetic
tactic. Thus the Deutsch-Brasilianische Mannergesang Vereine
Frohsinn von Rio Branco reorganized simply as Club Rio Branco.
It also altered its constitution to admit Brazilian-born people to
membership. In other examples of accommodationist behavior,
Teuto-Brazilian organizations and persons with obviously German names wrote public letters to President Wenceslau Braz and
Foreign Minister Miiller, expressing their support for the break in
diplomatic relations with Germany. 39
Despite such efforts to improve the public image of at least some
individual Teuto-Brazilian organizations, the societies as a group
entered a difficult period after the riots. Many persons, especially
German-speaking Swiss and well-assimilated Brazilian-born Germans, dropped their memberships in the Vereine as participation
in such organizations became a source of social embarrassment or
economic loss. Treasury receipts were correspondingly reduced
and some activities had to be curtailed. 40 The Turnvereine also
seemed apprehensive. Whereas in 1916 the pages of their Porto
Alegre publication, Deutsche Turnbliitter, had been glutted with
pro-German chauvinism, the issues following the riots were
greatly toned down and offered neither propaganda nor comments on the current wave of anti-Germanism. The Monatsbliitter
des Germanischen Bundes chose the most prudent course of all-it
simply ceased publication entirely, except for a final issue that ap':
peared in October, 1917.
39. Rio de Janeiro Jornal do Commercio, May 3, April 30, 1917; Porto Alegre
Correio do Povo, April 25, 1917. See also A federa¢o (Porto Alegre), April 18, 1917;
Edwin Morgan to Secretary of State [Lansing], July 10, 1917, in RG 59, American
Embassy Correspondence, Rio de Janeiro, 1917, part 9; and Rio de Janeiro Jornal do
Commercio, April 19, 26, 1917.
40. fiinfzig Jahre Deutscher Verein Germania, 153.

144

Germans in Brazil

The Teuto-Brazilian churches had mixed experiences and responses to the riots. German Catholic parishes had generally
been ignored by the demonstrators. Archbishop Becker in Porto
Alegre dispatched two letters to the priests and parishioners of
his diocese, warning them of the dangers of war and reminding
them of their responsibilities to Brazil, their fatherland. 41 There
were individual priests whose pro-German sentiments remained
unmodified, but as an organization the Catholic church strongly
encouraged the accommodation of its German members to newly
developed norms of patriotic behavior. Such German Catholic
publications as the Marienkalender said little of the war and nothing of the riots.
The Lutherans of the Missouri Synod tended to see the riots as
a vindication of their own assimilationist stance. Their synodical
publication happily pointed out that not a single window had
been broken in any of their churches and that their tiny theological seminary in Porto Alegre had also been spared by the mob.
The editor, Johann Kunstmann, subsequently published a long
series of essays in which he explained how his church's distinction between church and state led to an understanding of Deutschtum as a commitment to the German language and culture, but
never as loyalty to the German government. In his view, the German language and culture were valuable as means to keep members within the church and to retain purity of doctrine; but they
should never be understood as ends in themselves. 42
The several Evangelical bodies were much larger and therefore
more diverse in their experiences. Perhaps their most eloquent
representative was Dr. Wilhelm Rotermund's Deutsche Post of Sao
Leopoldo, which took a firm but moderate stance that was entirely congruent with the position taken by state president Borges
de Medeiros. In its first issue published after the riots, the Post
commented that "we are citizens of this country and as such we
have the primary duty to obey willingly the laws of the national,
state, and local governments. We citizens of German descent are
41. Rio de Janeiro Jornill do Commercio, May 2, 1917; Hugo Metzler, Die St.
Josefsgemeinde der deutschen Katholiken zu Porto Alegre wiihrend des We/tkrieges (Porto
Alegre, 1918), 7.
42. Evange/isch-Lutherisches KirchenbIatf fur Sud-Amerika, XIV (May 1, 1917),
~. See August and September issues for Kunstmann, "Vom Deutschtum der
Missourier. "
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just as good Brazilians as anyone else, no matter what their origin
may be, but we must demonstrate that fact in deeds as well as
words." In return for such unconditional loyalty, the Teuto-Brazilians could expect the government to guarantee public order in
general and the lives and property of Teuto-Brazilians in particular.
Other Evangelical spokesmen also tried to bring their denomination closer to an accommodationist position. Clemens Brandenburger, for example, strongly endorsed the teaching of Portuguese
to children in German schools as early as possible. In short, these
and other exponents of accommodation emphasized that it was
possible to identify completely with Brazil as "our Fatherland"
and, at the same time, retain German culture. 43 They also liked to
point out that the riots were rarely incited by genuine Brazilians,
but rather that they could be traced to instigation by English,
French, or Italian provocateurs. 44
The moderation of the Deutsche Post contrasted significantly
with the more chauvinistic and secular Germania of Sao Paulo.
Both counseled calm and the avoidance of provocation, but the
latter remained more partisan than the Post was. The editor of the
Germania could not resist sardonic slurs against other ethnic
groups. When, on April 12, he warned of further outbreaks of
vandalism, he remarked that in the next few days the Germans
could expect "further manifestations of their [the Brazilians'] high
civilization." When the Germania reported the brutal slaying of a
Luso-Brazilian by an Italian several weeks later, he sarcastically
observed that "this murder again places in proper light the exceptionally high culture of a race that calls us barbarians." At the
same time he stopped printing part of the Germania in Portuguese
and dropped its Portuguese subtitle, Diario Teuto-Brasileiro, commenting that "our genuine Brazilian friends read German and the
others don't believe what we say in the Portuguese part."45
A sharp division emerged among German Brazilians during
those anxious days as to the proper course to follow after the
Porto Alegre riots. While no one espoused a pro-Ally tack, the
43. Deutsche Post (Sao Leopoldo), April 24, 1917; Clemens Brandenburger, "Der
Schreib-Unterricht im ersten Schuljahre der zweisprachigen Schule Brasiliens," in
Kalender fur die Deutschen in Brasilien: 1918, pp. 177-79. Cf. Koseritz' Deutscher
Volkskalender fur Brasilien aUf das Jahr 1918 (Porto Alegre, [1917]),87.
44. Funfzig Jahre Deutscher Verein Germania, 150.
45. Germania (Sao Paulo), April 20, 30, 1917.

Germans in Brazil

moderates were clearly at odds with the die-hard chauvinists,
who were more determined than ever to maintain their ethnicity
and to assert the justice of the German cause as they saw it. 46 The
latter were capable of remarkable self-deception or duplicity. Regarding the sinking of the Parana, they could say that a final investigation might well demonstrate that the vessel was not torpedoed
by a German submarine but that the Allies had done the deed in
order to provoke Brazil into entering the war. Newspaper articles
in German on the Porto Alegre riots could omit entirely the role of
Friedrich Schmidt and his firing into the crowd of superpatriots.
The pro-German chauvinists also tended to criticize the government for its failure to prevent the destruction suffered by the
Germans in the riots, hinting darkly that the police and fire departments were held back from their responsibilities, thereby deliberately causing the destruction of the German district. 47
Despite the pro-German tendencies of the Teuto-Brazilian leaders and the widespread anxiety caused by the riots, the fact remained that the majority of the German-speaking people in Brazil
had been indifferent to the war. Europe was a distant place, Germany an abstraction with no immediate significance for their
daily lives. But in April, 1917, repercussions of war half a world
away reached the German colonies of Brazil and touched them in
frightfully direct and devastating ways. Given the unrestrained
character of the riots and the ethnic hatred they seemed to reflect,
many Teuto-Brazilians wondered what would happen to them if
Brazil actually declared war.
46. Koseritz' Volkskalender, 1918, p. 284.
47. An example of such biased journalism appears, surprisingly enough, in the
moderate Kalender fUr die Deutschen in Brasilien: 1918, pp. 190-93. Cf. Konigk, Die
Politik Brasiliens, 50.
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The Drift Toward War

I

T WAS CLEAR that Lauro Muller's days as the Brazilian foreign
minister were numbered. All through the month of April his
enemies continued their attacks on him and his policy of neutrality. They did everything they could to paint him with a proGerman brush. On April 16, at the same time that rioters were
devastating Porto Alegre, Ruy Barbosa addressed a crowd of fifty
thousand demonstrators at a rally sponsored by the Liga pelos AIliados in Rio De Janeiro. In his most florid and stirring style, Barbosa denounced Muller's unwillingness to go further than a break
in diplomatic relations. Asserting that there was an "absolute
identity of interests between Brazil and the United States," Barbosa demanded an end to neutrality and a Brazilian declaration
of war. 1
Muller remained the chief stumbling block. So long as he directed the Foreign Ministry, it was unlikely that Brazil would drift
any closer to belligerency. The Liga pelos Alliados thereupon
stepped up its campaign to smear Muller. Its purpose was to influence Brazilian public opinion to the extent necessary to transform Muller into a political liability so that President Braz would
be forced to ease him from office.
Muller's detractors rendered him vulnerable by pointing out his
allegedly German economic, social, and personal connections.
Claiming that he had a large personal interest in a variety of Ger1. Washington Post, April 17, 19i7; New York Times, April 17, 1917; Martin,
Latin America and the War, 56.
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man enterprises, they said he was the motive force in the Hamburg Colonization Company and associated him with various
German-owned banks and importing firms, especially the Bromberg Company. They never distinguished between Teuto-Brazilian
enterprises and those owned by investors who lived in Germany.
Muller's critics also insisted that he was active in German social
circles in Rio de Janeiro and that he was a prominent member of
the Germania Society there. They characterized his home in Rio
as a palace; they pointed out that he also kept a beautiful home in
the summer capital, Petropolis, which since the days of the empire had always had a sizable German population. It was virtually
a German resort, they charged, where beer gardens and various
amusements created a foreign ambience in which German music
and German conversation were standard. The implications were
obvious: One could not possibly have such pervasively German
connections and still direct Brazilian foreign policy. 2
The attack was carried to an intensely personal level. Clearly
influenced by the anti-Muller campaign, the American charge
d' affaires in Rio de Janeiro reported to the secretary of state in
Washington that Muller was "selfish, shifty, and utterly unscrupulous," that he had amassed a large fortune while in public
office, and that he had staffed the Brazilian Foreign Office with
incompetents. The popular press reported that Muller regarded
Brazilians with contempt and avoided social contacts with them
whenever possible. It was alleged that he frequently made derogatory remarks to his German friends about Luso-Brazilians, saying, for example, that they could think of nothing but eating and
making love. 3
There was little doubt, however, about Muller's actions as foreign minister. To the partisans of the Allies it appeared that everything he did was intended to work for the benefit of Germany. He
resisted the pressure to ask Congress for a declaration of war; he
insisted on issuing an official statement declaring Brazil's neutrality in the war between the United States and Germany; and he
seemed slow in getting Dr. Adolf von Pauli, the German minister
2. New York Times, May 4, 1917.
3. Alexander Benson to Secretary of State, May 10, 1917, in RG 59, American
Embassy Correspondence, Rio de Janeiro, 1917, part 8; New York Times, May 4,
1917. See Octiivio, "Lauro Mueller," 172-88.
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to Brazil, out of the country after the break in diplomatic relations
on April 11.
Nearly two weeks had passed between the time that Von Pauli
received his passport and his departure from Rio de Janeiro on
April 27. Muller claimed the delay actually arose out of the refusal
of British and French authorities to guarantee safe passage to Von
Pauli unless he returned to Germany aboard a ship that was headed
for a Scandinavian port and that would put into an Allied harbor
for examination. For its part, the German government claimed
that it could not possibly warn all of its naval units in time to assure safe conduct. The decision was finally made that Von Pauli
(and all German consuls in Brazil as well) would travel by train to
Uruguay, a slow mode of transportation on a route that passed
through Sao Paulo and the Teuto-Brazilian districts in the southern states. 4
Muller's last effort to halt the drift toward war was to issue a decree on April 25 in which Brazil announced its neutrality in the
conflict between the United States and Germany. To the superpatriots, this was a retrograde step rendered unnecessary by Brazil's severance of diplomatic ties with Germany; they saw it as one
more example of Muller's pro-Germanism. But Braz seems to have
agreed with Muller that Brazilian law made the step necessary.
They insisted that they were obliged to enjoin aU government authorities to observe neutrality "so long as they are not given orders
to the contrary." The executive branch could do no more than
this, Braz announced, until the Congress, to which the constitution assigned the initiative in such matters, assembled and took
such action as it deemed appropriate. Moreover, they argued, the
declaration of neutrality was a formality required by established
diplomatic practice. 5 It was also a clever move on Muller's parthis last before he was forced out of office-and it had the effect of
delaying action for a month. It meant that if the partisans of the
Allies were to have their way, they would have to get Congress to
revoke the neutrality decree, and in order to accomplish that, a
bill would have to be introduced and steered through the usual
4. Rio de Janeiro Jornal do Commercio, April 30, 1917; New York Times, April 29,
1917.
5. The Brazilian Green Book, 39; New York Times, May 2, 1917; Martin, "Brazil,"
25 2 .
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time-consuming parliamentary procedures. Even more significant, it meant that the coveted German ships sequestered in Brazilian ports could not be seized and put to work for the benefit of
the Allies until the decree was revoked or war declared.
Meanwhile, the Liga pelos Alliados intensified its pressure on
the Braz administration for Muller's resignation. It was joined by
all the major newspapers-the Jornal do Commercio, 0 Pa{z, Correio
da Manful, Epoca, and others, including journals in the Italian,
French, and English languages. All endorsed the league's demands that the arms of the Schiltzenvereine be confiscated, that the
publication of German-language newspapers be halted, and that
some sort of supervision be established over the Reichsdeutsche
in Brazil. 6

The Resignation of Lauro Miiller
Muller continued to defend himself to the end. He insisted that
Brazil's situation in relation to the United States was fundamentally different from that of Cuba and Panama, two Latin American
countries (both informal protectorates of the United States) that
responded quickly to President Wilson's hope that other neutral
countries would follow America's lead in declaring war against
Germany. Muller dismissed as mere intrigue charges that he was
friendly to Germany. "I am a Brazilian and only a Brazilian!" he
cried. At the same time he condemned Ruy Barbosa as an irresponsible demagogue who, like Demosthenes, swayed public
opinion by eloquence rather than by logic or measured judgment.
Muller's frequent assertions of loyalty to Brazil made no difference, even though as early as 1916 he had publicly denounced
Teuto-Brazilians who claimed a dual nationality.7
Muller understood, of course, that he had indeed become a politicalliability to the Braz regime and that he had to resign, but he
held off until Congress convened on May 3, 1917. In his letter of
resignation, Muller explained that he had not wanted to abandon
the president at a time when Congress was not in session; it is
more likely that he had no intention of giving his successor, sure
to be a sympathizer of the Allies, an opportunity to direct policy
6. New York Times, May 4, 1917.
7. Germania (Sao Paulo), May 1, 1917; Konigk, Die Politik Brasiliens, 46.
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without the moderating influence of congressional politics. President Braz, who apparently retained a high regard for Muller's
ability and a genuine admiration for his past accomplishments,
offered Muller a different cabinet post. This may have been a courtesyonly, and Muller wisely declined the honor, declaring that he
preferred to return to private life or resume his army career. According to the Deutsche Zeitung of Porto Alegre, the Santa Catarina
delegation in Congress sought out Muller at his home to ask him to
resume a seat in the Senate. One incumbent, a Luso-Brazilian, offered to resign in order to make room for him. Again, he refused. 8
Once out of office, Muller received many plaudits for his long
years of excellent service as foreign minister. The Jornal do Commercio, which had earlier joined in the anti-Muller chorus, now
claimed that he had been unjustly attacked and that suspicions
regarding his loyalty had never been substantiated. The Jornal
praised him lavishly for his earlier success in drawing the Latin
American republics together. "Even in the most delicate of circumstances," this paper now declared, "he gave proof of his devotion and patriotism."9
The chances of Ruy Barbosa being named as Muller's successor
in the Foreign Ministry were slight-he was much too controversial a politician for that. Instead, President Braz found a substitute in Dr. Nilo Pe~anha, who was satisfactory to Barbosa himself
and to other prowar enthusiasts. Known for his pro-Ally sympathies, Pe~anha was a prominent politician who had served briefly
as acting president in 1909 and 1910. His appointment was well
received; it indicated that in the future the Braz administration
would pursue a clearly anti-German line. Indeed, many newspapers predicted that a declaration of war would soon follow. It
was even suggested in the press that Pe~anha had accepted appointment only on the condition that Braz would support Brazilian intervention. 10
8. New York Times, May 5, 1917; Germania (Sao Paulo), May 4,1917; Rio de Janeiro Jornal do Commercio, May 3, 1917; Deutsche Zeitung (Porto Alegre), May 7,
1917.
9. Rio de Janeiro Jornal do Commercio, May 3, 1917; New York Times, May 5,
1917.
10. According to the New York Times, May 6, 7, 1917, Pec;anha consulted with
both Barbosa and Rodrigues Alves, the latter a former president and leading candidate to succeed Braz, before announcing his acceptance. The Jornal do Commercio
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The Revocation of Neutrality
Shortly after taking office, Pe<;anha revealed his belief that should
Brazil take an active part in the war, the nation would not send
troops, but would help by lending its moral support and by supplying economic aid in the form of its agricultural products. Pe<;anha also expressed the opinion that the first step toward involvement in the war would have to be the revocation of the
neutrality decree of April 28. He obviously was inviting Congress
to take the initiative, which in Braz's view belonged to t~e legislative branch. For whatever reason, Congress did nothing, and it
remained for the executive to take action. The opportunity for
this came on May 23, when the news arrived that the Germans
had sunk another Brazilian vessel. The victim this time was the
Tijuca, an old steamer of 2,)04 tons built in England in 1883. En
route from Pernambuco to Le Havre, the ship had been off the
Brittany coast when the torpedoes struck. 11 By coincidence, the
Brazilian government learned at the same time that a German
prize court in Hamburg had denied a series of pleas to release the
Brazilian steamship Rio Pardo, a vessel that had been confiscated
by the German navy for transporting contraband within the war
zone. 12
Braz immediately sent a message to Congress recommending
the revocation of neutrality in the war between Germany and the
United States. Claiming that such annulment would be in harmony with the sympathies of the great majority of the Brazilian
people, the president emphasized that the neutrality decree had
been intended as a temporary measure and that the time had
come for its withdrawal. He also reminded Congress that revocation was directly related to another matter that was paramount in
many minds-the urgent need to utilize those German vessels
that were being held in Brazilian ports. Once again the pro-Ally
press crowed its approval and predicted that a declaration of war
waS in the offing. The Jornal do Commercio somewhat prematurely
reported that Barbosa advised Pec;anha to make the reorganization of the entire
cabinet the condition of his acceptance.
11. New York Times, May 7, 1917; The Brazilian Green Book, 41.
12. New York Times, May 22, 1917.

The Drift Toward War

153

announced, "0ur neutrality is ended-we are aligned with and
for America. 13
The committee on foreign relations immediately drafted an appropriate bill. A day later the Chamber of Deputies added an
amendment specifically authorizing the government to put the
German ships to work, passed the bill overwhelmingly, and sent it
on to the Senate, all to the tumultuous approval of a gallery packed
with prowar enthusiasts. On June 1, the Senate passed the bill;
the president signed it the same day and undertook its enforcement immediately, directing that the ships be prepared for sea as
soon as possible. 14
Thus began a new chapter in the saga of the German ships.
Forty-six in number and sequestered in ports all along the Brazilian
coast, but chiefly in Rio de Janeiro and Pernambuco, the vessels
had an aggregate displacement of 240,779 tons. The Blucher was the
largest at 12'}50 tons; thirteen displaced less than 4,000 tons each.
The serious shortage of shipping that had developed worldwide
in 1916 was made much worse by Germany's policy of unrestricted submarine warfare, which had begun on January 31,
1917. Brazil was one of the few Latin American countries possessing a merchant marine of significant tonnage; seizure of the impounded German ships would enable it to greatly expand its ability to capitalize on the ship famine. The pro-Ally press, notably
the Jornal do Commercio, had persistently urged this course of action and had linked it to the confiscation by Germany of Brazilian
coffee stored in warehouses in Hamburg and Antwerp.Is So long
as Lauro Muller was foreign minister, the Braz administration had
been unwilling to run the risk; it meant giving Germany a cause
for declaring war on Brazil. But now that Muller was gone and
Congress had authorized the confiscation of the German ships,
the partisans of the Allies would have been pleased if it had indeed provoked a German declaration of war; the blame would
then go to the other side. Germany, of course, didn't bother.
II

13. The Brazilian Green Book, 39-42; New York Times, April 23, 24, 25, 1917.
14. New York Times, April 28, 29, 30, 1917; The Brazilian Green Book, 43-44;
FRUS, 1917, Supp. 1, The World War, 293-94.
15. New York Times, June 3,1917; Martin, Latin America and the War, 51; Martin,
"Brazil," 251.
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A Midyear Interlude
During the next five months, from the beginning of June to the
end of October, the Brazilian Foreign Ministry was preoccupied
with the problem of the German ships and their utilization. Almost all agitation calling for Brazil to enter the war ceased, pending the resolution of this issue. Persons who had been urging Brazil to rally under the Allied banner of justice and righteousness
against Germany now found themselves bargaining with the Allies for arrangements they believed to be just and right for Brazil.
They discovered that their Allied friends could drive hard bargains with great skill; they also found that their enthusiasm for
the Allied cause was modified by their desire to win advantages
for Brazil in international trade and shipping. Brilliant speeches
demanding an end to immoral neutrality were no longer necessary; they could in fact inhibit the ability of the diplomats to extract favorable concessions from the Allies.
Attacks on the Teuto-Brazilian population, their institutionsSchiUzenvereine, private schools, the press-and the continued
use of a foreign tongue also declined in number and intensity. Occasional references to the "German danger" continued to appear,
but they added nothing to the old propaganda that had been
spread by the pro-Ally press for many months. The chauvinistic
Correio da Manha of Porto Alegre repeated and embellished the
rumors that had circulated in the aftermath of the diplomatic break
in April that a Teuto-Brazilian military revolt was developing in
Santa Catarina, centering in Joinville and Blumenau. An investigation followed, personally conducted by General Barbedo of
the Sixth Military District. His report dismissed as fairy tales the
rumors of armed hordes of Germans preparing to attack the Brazilian army and stated that there was no evidence either of radio
stations or of the importation of weapons. 16 There was no hysteria
16. Deutsche Zeitung (Porto Alegre), July 12, 19, 1917. The American ambassador to Brazil, Edwin Vernon Morgan, concurred with Barbedo's assessment. In a
letter to Secretary of State Robert Lansing, Morgan wrote: "That the colonists have
perfected a military organization and that they have imported ammunition and
arms in quantity is more than doubtful. That they have in concealment a large
number of rapid fire guns or that 20 or 30,000 perfectly equipped men can be
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during this period-no riots, not even peaceful anti-German
demonstrations.
As the next step in the pursuit of its new policy of nonbelligerency, the Brazilian Foreign Ministry tried to link the abandonment of neutrality with the disposal of its huge coffee surpluses.
The revocation act of June 1 applied to the United States only; Brazil's several declarations of neutrality in the conflict between the
other Allied powers and Germany, which had been announced in
1914 and 1915, remained in force. Brazil therefore let it be known
that it would revoke its neutrality with respect to Britain if the
latter would remove its prohibition of imports of Brazilian coffee.
Britain replied that it had enough coffee in warehouses to last five
years and that it needed to reserve all available shipping space for
essential food supplies. Brazil then requested the United States to
intervene on its behalf. The result was that Britain expressed its
willingness to buy a quantity of Brazilian coffee equal to 25 percent of the coffee it had imported in 1916 from all sources. Brazil
accepted this promise in good faith and, on June 29, 1917, withdrew its neutrality decrees as they related to Britain, France, Russia, Portugal, Italy, and Japan, only to discover that the British
now insisted that the coffee be transported in the recently seized
German ships. Brazil thereupon declared, somewhat petulantly,
that there were no former German ships-they were now all incorporated into Brazil's government-owned merchant fleet. 17 Inevitably the deal collapsed. Brazil had been outmaneuvered; it had
revoked its neutrality decrees without gaining anything in return.
Although Brazil needed the ships, it soon discovered that
France, Britain, and the United States wanted them even more
desperately. Each government made proposals, none of which satisfied all parties. Brazil's hand was weakened by the common
knowledge that the nation had the resources to put only thirteen
of the forty-six vessels into service. Some had been either damaged or otherwise rendered inoperable by the German crews; the
placed in the field ... is probably untrue" (Morgan to Lansing, July 10, 1917, in
RG 59, American Embassy Correspondence, Rio de Janeiro, 1917, part 9)·
17. The Brazilian Green Book, 74; FRUS, 1917, Supp. 1, The World War, 294, 296,
304-305, 310.
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remainder had deteriorated to such an extent that only a country
with extensive shipbuilding and repair facilities, such as the
United States, could return them to active service. Unsuccessful
negotiations for sales, charters, dummy companies, repair arrangements, operating arrangements, and cargo restrictions, as
well as additional coffee purchases, continued through August,
September, and October.
Unlike the Allies, Brazil was in no great hurry; in the middle of
September, President Braz, who played an active role in the bargaining, decided to take a month-long vacation. Upon his return,
Braz insisted that the Brazilian government would neither alienate
nor charter the ships but would organize them in transatlantic
lines under the Brazilian flag and with Brazilian crews. The American ambassador to Brazil, Edwin Morgan, pointed out that since
Brazil could not in fact supply the latter, the operation of the vessels would inevitably fall to Americans. Thus Braz's insistence on
the maintenance of the Brazilian flag, Morgan observed, would
soon have the effect of bringing Brazil actively into the conflict. 18
Ultimately, however, other events intruded to lead Brazil to a declaration of war.
The first of these events related to the persistent but frequently
repudiated rumors that Germans were gathering in southern Brazil to stage an armed rebellion. Early in September such a rumor
surfaced again, this time embroidered with the allegation that the
governor of Santa Catarina, General Felippe Schmidt, stood at the
head of this mythical army, ready to lead it against Brazilian forces.
Shamelessly calculated to contribute to Schmidt's defeat at the
polls, this fabrication was exposed in loud and angry speeches delivered in the Santa Catarina state legislature. 19 A month later the
rumor appeared again, but this time its source seemed more reliable and its form and content more ominous.

The Luxburg Dispatches
At the center of the new imbroglio was Count Karl von Luxburg,
the German minister to Argentina. For some months (at least
18. FRUS, 1917, Supp. 1, The World War, 315, 318-21, 325, 331-32, 335, 345-46.
19. Deutsche Zeitung (Porto Alegre), September 3, 1917-
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since July 3, 1917), Luxburg had been communicating with the
German Foreign Office in Berlin through the Swedish legation in
Buenos Aires. In an egregious violation of its neutrality, the Swedish government had permitted Luxburg to disguise his cables in
its code as though they were official Swedish dispatches. Virtually
all communications of the German Foreign Office with its agents
in Latin American countries were funneled through Buenos Aires
in this way. Ironically, the Swedish line of communication passed
through England on its way to Stockholm, which was in regular
and direct communication with Berlin.
Late in July an informer connected with the Central and South
American Telephone Company provided the American ambassador in Buenos Aires, Frederic J. Stimson, with copies of nineteen of Luxburg's telegrams, all in the numerical code used by the
Swedes. Some weeks later he received a second and larger group.
All were quickly sent to Washington to be deciphered. Unable to
decode them, the State Department cabled them to London, where
British intelligence had cracked the Swedish code and had been
quietly monitoring Luxburg's messages, the great majority of
which were routine and without much significance. 2o The American embassy in London then selected certain messages and returned them to Washington. 21
On September 8, 1917, Secretary of State Robert Lansing, after
consulting with President Wilson in the matter, released three of
Luxburg's telegrams to the Washington press. He chose messages
that were especially indiscreet. In one, Luxburg referred to the
Argentine foreign minister as "a notorious ass and anglophile."
In another he urged that two Argentine vessels in the war zone
either ''be spared if possible, or else sunk without a trace [spurlos
20. The Luxburg dispatches were subsequently published in the Committee on
Public Information's Official Bulletin, December 21, 1917. The original typed transcriptions are in RG 59, Entry 543, Box 5, File 120.
21. Frederic Jesup Stimson, My United States (New York, 1931), 399, 406-407,
412; Stimson to Secretary of State, July 23, September 15, 1917, both in RG 59,
Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Germany,
1910-1929 (M336, roll 67); Lansing to American Embassy in London, September 6,
1917, in RG 59, Entry 543, Box 5, File 120; see also Ambassador Page to Secretary of
State, September 6, 1917, in the same file. For extensive correspondence regarding
the Luxburg telegrams, see RG 59, Entry 543, Classified Case Files of Edward Bell,
1917- 19.
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versenkt]."22 Lansing's revelations immediately caused a huge uproar in the world press, and for several weeks countless stories
appeared in all the major newspapers as journalists were titillated
by Luxburg's vocabulary and appalled by Sweden's unneutral conduct. 23 Press accounts everywhere credited the American intelligence service with having decoded the telegrams.
Rumors soon began to circulate that the Luxburg dispatches
also contained references to German intrigue in Brazil. On September 10 and 11, the American ambassador in London, Walter
Hines Page, sent three more decoded messages to Washington
with the recommendation that they also be published "for the
sake of the probable effect in the Argentine Republic and Brazil."
Telegram number 63, dated July 7, 1917, read in part: "Our [Germany's] attitude towards Brazil has created the impression here
[Buenos Aires] that our easy-going good nature can be counted
on. This is dangerous in South America, where the people under
thin veneer are Indians. A submarine squadron with full powers
to me might possibly still save the situation." Telegrams numbered
88 and 89 were both dated August 4, 1917. In the latter, Luxburg
wrote: "1 am convinced that we should be able to carry through
our principal political aims in South America: the maintenance of
the open market in Argentina and the re-organization of Brazil." 24
This dispatch seemed to confirm what the propagandists had
been claiming for years-that Germany had political aims in Rio
Grande do SuI and Santa Catarina and that by implication TeutoBrazilian citizens represented some sort of internal threat to the
country.
Instead of releasing these dispatches to the press immediately,
as Page recommended, Lansing gave them on September 19 to the
Argentine and Brazilian ambassadors, who immediately con22. Lansing to American Embassy in Buenos Aires, September 7, 1917, in RG
59, Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Germany,
1910-1929 (M336, roll 67); FRUS, 1917, Supp. I, The World War, 322-23.
23. For example, see Rio de Janeiro Jornal do Commercio, September 10-25, 1917;
see New York Times and Washington Post for the same period. The General
Records of the Department of State, NA, contain many clippings from newspapers
in England and other countries about the dispatches.
24. Page to Secretary of State, September 10,11,1917, both in RG 59, Entry 543,
Box 5, File 120.
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veyed them to their superiors in Buenos Aires and Rio de Janeiro.
Of course Lansing hoped that at least the Brazilians would be sufficiently outraged to declare war, but President Braz and Foreign
Minister Pe<;anha decided to use the dispatches carefully. After
all, the telegrams were vague and their meaning subject to debate.
It was by no means certain that their release to the press would
trigger a popular clamor for war. They could be used more effectively to convince members of Congress that the German threat
was real. Thus, rumors about a German plot continued to circulate for the next month as the Brazilian government waited for the
right occasion to exploit the Luxburg dispatches. 25
It came near the end of October. The news arrived on the twentythird that a German submarine had torpedoed a fourth Brazilian
vessel, the Macao, two hundred miles off the coast of Spain. 26 Formerly the German ship Palatia and now part of the governmentowned Lloyd Brasileiro Line, the vessel was laden with a cargo of
black beans and coffee intended for France. The Germans added
insult to injury by taking the captain of the Macao captive. 27
After conferring with government leaders, President Braz decided that the time had come, as he put it in his message to Congress on October 25, 1917, "to make legal our defensive attitude
... and to develop the organization of national resistance." By
torpedoing the Macao and seizing its commander, Germany had
imposed a state of war upon Brazil, he declared; for that reason he
felt at liberty "to recommend belligerent retaliation ... in order to
maintain the dignity of the nation." Braz further announced that
if Congress would declare war, he would immediately seize the
25. Lansing to the American Ambassador in Rio de Janeiro, September 19,
1917, in RG 59, Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of
Germany, 1910-1929 (M336, roll 67); Martin, Latin America and the War, 246n.124;
New York Times, October 11, 1917.
26. Rio de Janeiro Jamal do Commercia, October 26, 1917. One contemporary
Teuto-Brazilian writer has made the astonishing and unsupported assertion that
present-day Brazilian historians believe that the Macao could have been sunk by
the Americans in order to bring Brazil into the war. See Klaus Geissler, "Deutsche
in Amazonasgebiet," Staden-Jahrbuch: Beitrage zur Brasilkunde, XXIX (1981), 53.
27. 0 Paiz (Rio de Janeiro), October 26, 1917; Deutsche Zeitung (Porto Alegre),
October 26, 1917; New York Times, October 26, 1917; Konigk, Die Politik Brasiliens,
51; Martin, Latin America and the War, 67.
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German gunboat Eber, then in the port of Bahia, and imprison its
crew. 28

The Declaration of War
The next day, October 26, 1917, the Chamber of Deputies by a
vote of 149 to 1 and the Senate unanimously approved a resolution proclaiming a state of war between Brazil and the German
Empire. It also empowered the president "to take such steps for
the national defense and public safety as he shall consider adequate." Only then did Pe<;anha take advantage of the Luxburg dispatches. As though to justify Brazil's entry into the war, he announced grandiloquently that Germany had been caught in a plot
to invade Brazil. It appears that in order to galvanize public opinion in support of the war resolution, Pe<;anha grossly exaggerated
the content and significance of Luxburg's messages. The press, especially in Argentina, then demanded that the Argentine government release the actual text of the incriminating telegrams or else
authorize their publication by a foreign government, i.e., the
United States.29 In response to this pressure, the American secretary of state released the texts of telegrams numbered 63 and 89.
They were published in Rio de Janeiro papers on October 30,
1917. The New York Times, which welcomed Brazil's entry into the
war, reported that the Luxburg dispatches confirmed long-held
suspicions of a German plot, but as for Pe<;anha's hyperbole, the
newspaper merely noted that the texts did "not fully sustain the
statements made by the Brazilian Minister."30
On October 31, President Braz addressed a widely publicized
manifesto to the presidents and governors of the states: "It is nec28. Rio de Janeiro lornal do Commercio, October 26, 27, 1917; 0 Paiz (Rio de Janeiro), October 26, 27, 1917; The Brazilian Green Book, 87-88; FRUS, 1917, Supp. I,
The World War, 351; New York Times, October 26, 27, 1917.
29. Rio de Janeiro lornal do Commercio, October 27, 1917; 0 Paiz (Rio de Janeiro),
October 27,1917; The Brazilian Green Book, 88; FRUS, 1917, Supp. I, The World War,
352; New York Times, October 27,29,31, 1917.
30. Morgan to Secretary of State, October 30, 1917, in RG 59, Records of the
Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Germany, 1910-1929 (M336,
roll 67); Rio de Janeiro lornal do Commercio, November I, 1917; New York Times,
October 31, 1917.
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essary that all internal differences disappear and that the nation
stand forth one and indivisable before the aggressor." He added
that Brazil's "liberal traditions have always taught respect for the
persons and property of the enemy, as far as is compatible with
public safety."31 Superpatriots heeded the former more than the
latter. As in April, enthusiastic public demonstrations were accompanied by attacks on German and Teuto-Brazilian property.
31. Rio de Janeiro Jamal do Commercia, November 1, 1917. The translation is
from Martin, Latin America and the War, 69.
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AR WITH GERMANY did not come as a surprise to the
Teuto-Brazilians, though some tried to ignore its portents throughout September and October, 1917. There
were plenty of signs of changes in attitude. In addition to the publicity attending the Luxburg dispatches and the revival of rumors
about an impending German revolt in southern Brazil, the state
legislature of Santa Catarina enacted a law on October 5, 1917,
that established compulsory school attendance for all children
from six to eleven years of age. It required all foreign-language
schools to include Portuguese-language instruction in their curricula, in addition to Brazilian history and geography. 1 A few days
later, there were reports in the press about the disposition of the
court case filed against Friedrich Schmidt in Porto Alegre for his
having fired upon patriotic demonstrators in April. Thus, just a
few days before the sinking of the Macao, the prosecutor had the
occasion to characterize anew the torpedoing of the Parana as a
barbaric attack by the Germans on the dignity of the Brazilian
people. Memories of the Porto Alegre riots were revived as newspapers reported the prosecutor's review of those unhappy events. 2
Some German-language newspapers made a halfhearted effort
to prepare readers for the possibility of war. Less than a week before the declaration of hostilities, the Deutsche Zeitung of Porto Ale1.

Braunschweig, "Die rechtliche Stellung,"

berg, 356; Koch, Das Deutsche Schulwesen! 21.
2. Germania (Sao Paulo), October 17, 1917.

51;

Schroder, Brasilien und Witten-
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gre defended the Teuto-Brazilian record of citizenship and explicitly stated that all able-bodied Teuto-Brazilians would willingly
bear arms against Germany, if citizenship required it of them.
Still, the Deutsche Zeitung could not resist suggesting the improbability of war because the Brazilian Constitution permits a defensive war only, and Germany would never wage a war of conquest against Brazil. Thus, ethnic chauvinism remained naIve
until the end. 3
When war was finally declared on October 26, the editor of the
Deutsche Zeitung anticipated trouble; an intolerance of all things
German, he wrote, could be expected as a matter of course. He
suggested that scheduled ethnic festivals be canceled in order to
avoid causing offense. He pointed outthat the president's message
recommending war had immediately caused great excitement and
enthusaism among the local youths who congregated in the streets
and coffeehouses. 4 His advice was far too mild. Given their experiences in April following the break in diplomatic relations, the
Germans of Porto Alegre, Sao Paulo, and other cities as well should
have been prepared for another round of violence, perhaps worse
than the first.
Unlike many of the Teuto-Brazilian leaders, some local governments did anticipate the possibility of new riots. This was especially true of Porto Alegre, where the police forbade all public
demonstrations. A few other cities, including Rio de Janeiro, tried
to ban public meetings of any kind, thereby hoping to nip in the
bud any planning sessions for future anti-German depredations.
At the same time, the Ministry of Justice in Rio issued a directive
to all state presidents and governors that prohibited the publication of alarming rumors or routine information about the departures of vessels, the movements of troops, and other events of a
military character. 5
Most major cities, however, permitted (or could not prevent)
patriotic demonstrations in those heady days following the decla3. Deutsche Zeitung (Porto Alegre), October 20, 1917.
4. Ibid., October 26, 1917.

5. Porto Alegre Correia da Manha, October 27, 28, 1917; A Federa¢o (Porto
Alegre), November 5, 1917; Rio de Janeiro Jamal do Commercia, October 31, November 1, 4, 1917.
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ration of war. A few degenerated into scenes of anti-German agitation. No doubt some were the result of several directives issued by
the national government relating to the Germans. The most important was an order issued by the minister of the interior to the state
presidents and governors to end the publication of all Germanlanguage newspapers, periodicals, and books. A second decree
ordered the closing of all schools in which Portuguese was not
taught. Similarly, the director of the Brazilian postal service announced that his agency would no longer handle materials published in the German language. Subsequently, censorship was
instituted, German sailors were interned, alleged "spies" were arrested, identification cards were required of all Reichsdeutsche,
and interstate travel by aliens without special permits was forbidden. 6

New Violence in the Cities
Newspapers and schools then became. prime targets in a new
round of violence that occurred in Curitiba, Pelotas, Petropolis,
Rio de Janeiro, and other cities. In general, these disturbances appeared to have been more random in character, perhaps less well
organized, and less severe than were the April riots. There is some
evidence, however, that like the earlier disorders, these were at
least partIy attributable to Italian immigrants whose anti-German
sentiments were intense. In American intelligence reports, the
riots were simply referred to as "the Italian demonstrations." Especially in Sao Paulo, where Italians constituted half the population, they organized a vigilance committee, "a secret service
force," for the purpose of German surveillance and fomenting
anti-German activity. 7
The first riot struck Curitiba, the capital of Parana, on Sunday
evening, October 28, and continued into the early hours of the
next day. Its origins are unclear. Catholic sources assert that anti6. Rio de Janeiro JOTlUlI do Commercio, October 30, November 1, 4, 1917; A
Federa¢o (Porto Alegre), October 30, 1917; Konigk, Die Politik Brasiliens, 52; "Attitude of Brazilians toward the War," anonymous report transmitted to the Department of State by Capt. S. McCauley, Assistant Director of Naval Intelligence, April
25, 1918, p. 11, in RG 59, Entry 540, Box 1, Brazil folder.
7. "Attitude of Brazilians," 11; in the same me, see the "Situation at Sao Paulo,"
transmitted by McCauley, April 26, 1918, pp. 5, 9, 10, 11.
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clericalism was at the root of the problem. In any case, a demonstration grew more or less spontaneously from a dispute among
people of strong anti-German sentiments, and a large crowd gathered. The assemblage then moved to the residence of the state
president, where there was much patriotic display. A parade then
formed that quickly degenerated into a mob seeking indiscriminate revenge on the Germans for the sinking of the Macao.
At first the mob merely sought symbols of German power that
they could destroy, such as flags, banners, and pictures of the kaiser and other German leaders. Such objects were taken from a
German theater and the clubhouses of several Vereine and burned
in the streets. As midnight approached, the mob moved on to
the offices of the Beobachter, the anticlerical newspaper, and to the
Kompass, the chauvinistic Catholic publication. The offices and the
printshop of the latter were located within a complex of buildings
maintained by the Franciscan order that included a school, apartments for the teachers and editors, as well as the cloister itself. All
were vandalized. Books, school equipment, clothes, and furniture
were piled high in the street and burned. Other items were stolen.
Printing equipment was wrecked, some of it beyond repair; doors
and windows were smashed. Telephone calls were repeatedly
made to the police. Someone had misdirected them to the brewery, possibly intentionally. Finally they arrived, drove the mob
away, and with the help of cloister residents extinguished the fire. 8
Failure to comply completely and immediately with the injunction against publishing in the German language stimulated another major disturbance in Pelotas, where the strongly pro-German Deutsche Wacht, severely damaged in April, was now put to
rest permanently. Its end came on October 30,1917, the same day
that the editor, Rudi Schafer, had been informed officially that he
could no longer publish. Schafer received the news after an issue
had been printed but before it was distributed. He naIvely announced to the police that that day's product would be his last,
implying thereby that the issue would be distributed. This information was quickly spread through the city, and that night a mob
8. 0 Palz (Rio de Janeiro), November 4, 1917; Sinzig, Nach dreiszig Jahren,
100-103; Fugmann, Die Deutschen in Parana, 87, 121, 127, 192; Paul Rohrbach, Bei
den Deutschen in Latein-Amerika (Berlin, 1922), 31; Arndt and Olson, History and Bib-

liography,
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destroyed the Wacht's building and its contents. Next, the rabble
severely vandalized a German-language school and the clubhouse
of the Concordia-Verein. Many other buildings were threatened
with destruction, but the police were able to protect them. For
several nights following, police closely guarded numerous German businesses in order to prevent further depredations. 9
Petropolis, the old summer capital of Brazil, was next. The disturbance there began in the evening of Wednesday, November 1,
1917, on the heels of news about the Curitiba riot. Apparentlyanother spontaneous affair, the Petropolis riot developed from a
noisy argument, possibly prearranged, between two Italians, one
of whom defended the Germans. Attracted by the commotion,
a crowd gathered. Patriotic sympathies were heated by the exchanges, and soon cries of "Viva Brazil! Death to Germany!" kindled enthusiasm for the liquor supplies in a nearby Gasthaus.
After smashing its doors, windows, and furniture and depleting
its liquid stores, the mob stormed a German bakery and a bowling
club. Then, at midnight, they wrecked Father Sinzig's publishing
house, where Vozes de Petr6polis and various German-language
publications were produced. The riot continued until):oo A.M.;
many German businesses and houses were damaged. In his account of the affair, Father Sinzig emphasized that the riot had
been the work of a few agitators and that the respectable LusoBrazilians of the city were warmly generous in assisting their devastated German neighbors. 10
Rio de Janeiro experienced a major anti-German riot on November), 1917. According to the Jornal do Commercio, the disturbances
were directly attributable to popular indignation over the torpedoing of two former German ships, the Acary and the Guahyba.
Superpatriotic students led the demonstrations at first but soon
the crowd mushroomed into an ugly mob, one so large and unruly that the police were unable to control it. The disturbances began in front of the presidential palace but quickly moved to the
9. A Federa¢o (Porto Alegre), October 31, November 1, 9, 1917; Fischer, "Die
deutsche Presse in Rio Grande do SuI," 326. On October 31, 1917, Borges de
Medeiros dispatched a long report on the riot to the minister of the interior in Rio
de Janeiro. It is reprinted in Rio de Janeiro Jornal do Commercio, November 2, 1917.
10. 0 Paiz (Rio de Janeiro), November 3, 1917; Sinzig, Nach dreiszig Jahren,
143-44. Jornal do Commercio ignored the Petr6polis disturbances entirely, despite
the proximity of this city to Rio de Janeiro.
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nearby German district, where a well-known German restaurant
was completely wrecked. Next, the clubhouse of the Germania
Society and a nearby German school were severely damaged, as
the mob moved on to a special target, the buildings of Arp and
Company, which had regularly displayed pro-German materials in
its windows since the beginning of the war in 1914. Next, the offices
and the equipment of the pro-German, Portuguese-language
newspaper Ditirio Allemao were destroyed. Several other wellknown German commercial houses were vandalized, though the
branch office of the Bayer Company was spared because the caretaker had the presence of mind to place a large "For Rent" sign
over the main entranceY
According to one historian of the Rio de Janeiro Germans, the
outrages committed by the rabble that night were done at the direction of paid agitators. The American historian Oarence Haring
reported that lithe police conveniently arrived after the damage
was done." Still, the chief of police took immediate measures to
strengthen security forces to prevent further outbreaks of popular
indignation. Soldiers patrolled the streets in sensitive districts
and guarded German-owned commercial houses and banks from
further depredations as order was quickly restored in Rio de
Janeiro. 12
The great seaport of Santos, located near Sao Paulo, also endured a severe riot in the evening of Saturday, November 3, 1917,
at the same time the Rio disturbance occurred. In this instance,
the American consul, Carl F. Deichman, was in the midst of the
action and he submitted a report to his superior, Ambassador
Edwin Morgan, at his earliest opportunity. In Deichman's view,
the trouble was directly attributable to popular indignation over
the sinking of the two Brazilian vessels, but he added that the
crowds, which had gathered more or less spontaneously, were
subsequently exploited by agitators who deliberately incited the
crowd to acts of vandalism. Signboards in the German language
were removed and destroyed, the German clubhouse was set on
fire, and a variety of German-owned business houses were exten11. Rio de Janeiro Jornal do Commercio, November 4,5, 1917; 0 Pa{z (Rio de Janeiro), November 4, 1917.
12. Hinden, Deutsche und deutscher Handel, 494-95; Haring, The Germans in
South America, 65; Rio de Janeiro Jornal do Commercio, November 5, 1917.
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sively damaged. The police managed to save a German bank and a
department store only by using their carbines and bayonets. Deichman himself narrowly escaped injury by gunfire in the melee. In
the effort to save the offices of A Noticia, which was known as a
pro-German newspaper, one man was killed and others were injured, some seriously. Calm was finally restored when marines on
Brazilian warships anchored in the Santos harbor were ordered to
patrol the streets of the city. 13
Many other Brazilian cities experienced similar disturbances
during the first week of the war. Most were on or near the coast,
such as Sao Paulo and Pernambuco, but some were remote, interior towns such as Cuiaba, the capital of Mato Grosso. This time
the state of Santa Catarina was especially vulnerable to the contagion, and serious disorders broke out in Itajaf, Sao Jose, and the
capital city of Florian6polis. Problems in the solidly German communities, including Blumenau and Joinville, were real enough
though less severe. Most of the rural towns in the serra had no
trouble, but a few were afflicted with endemic anti-Germanism
for months afterward. 14

Causes of the Disturbances
In his report to the U.S. Department of State, Ambassador Morgan observed that the rioters usually had been "students, boys,
and uneducated people." Had the police intervened, Morgan reported, the mobs probably could have been disbanded. In Rio
I}. Carl F. Deichman to Edwin V. Morgan, November 5, 1917, in RG 59, American Embassy Correspondence, Rio de Janeiro, 1917, part 8. See also Edwin V. Morgan to Secretary of State, November 8, 1917, in the same source.
14. Rio de Janeiro Jomal do Commercio, November 5, 1917; 0 Pafz (Rio de Janeiro), November}, 1917; Pfarrer Radlach, "Die Einwirkungen des Weltkrieges auf
die deutsch-evangelischen Gemeinden in Santa Catharina," in Geissler (ed.), Die
Kulturbedeutung, 24; Entres (ed.), Gedenkbuch, 190; Der Familienfreund: Katholischer
Hauskalender und Wegweiser fur das Jahr 1920 (Porto Alegre, [1919]), 124; Ambassador Edwin V. Morgan to Secretary of State, November 8,1917, in RG 59, American Embassy Correspondence, Rio de Janeiro, 1917, part 8. The American consul
in Pernambuco reported that a riot occurred there on November 7. Several Germanowned buildings were destroyed, one policeman killed, and twenty-two persons
injured. A. T. Haeberle to Secretary of State, November 8, 1917, in RG 59, Records
of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Germany, 1910-1929
(microfilm roll 66).
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Grande, Pelotas, and Florianopolis, order was reestablished, not
by the appointed authorities, but by private citizens acting independently. In Morgan's view, "the less guilty suffered the most"
while the German-owned banks, which he regarded as agents of
German propaganda and espionage, suffered insignificant injury.
Morgan emphasized that Teuto-Brazilians generally were lawabiding and loyal, and that the hatred directed against them was
due, not to their own conduct, but to the acts of the German government. He predicted that leniency in the treatment of TeutoBrazilians was likely to develop, rather than the reverse. 15
In most communities, ethnic strife was in fact short-lived. 16 Brazilian behavior often resembled the huge bonfires set by the
rioters. Fed with kerosene, paper, and smashed furniture, the
flames flared up instantly, generated terrific heat, and then
quickly burned out. Similarly, Brazilian intolerance of ethnic differences or of perceived pro-German behavior flashed into violence, but then it subsided quickly, as more typical manifestations
of the Brazilian personality returned, such as easy acceptance and
good humor.
Although the riots were clearly an urban phenomenon, they
seem not to have been closely related to other social or demographic variables, such as density of German population, or even
to indiscreet pro-German behavior in the period before the declaration of war. Instead, the attitudes of local officials, or outstanding personalities, seem to have been most significant. For example, if the editor of a local newspaper had been especially
intemperate in his denunciation of Germany and the pro-German
behavior of Teuto-Brazilians, or if there were in a given community persons who, for whatever political, economic, social, or cultural reasons, took it upon themselves to plan, organize, and lead
a demonstration and transform it into something more destructive, then anti-German riots were more likely to occur. Although
newspaper accounts usually emphasized attacks on the Germanlanguage press and commercial houses, both Catholic and Protestant churches and schools were by no means immune to attack, as
15. Edwin V. Morgan to Secretary of State, November 5,1917, in RG 59, Records
of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Germany, 1910-1929
(microfilm roll 66).
16. Rio de Janeiro Jornal do Commercia, November 5,6, 1917; "Attitude of Brazilians toward the War," 12-13.
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numerous histories of local parishes testify.17 As in the April riots,
property damage was extensive, but physical injury to persons
was relatively rare. IS Many accounts emphasize that the majority
of Luso-Brazilians, especially government officials and respected
leaders of society, did not condone the violence. While it does not
follow that they approved of pro-German behavior, they were
often helpful to individual Teuto-Brazilians whose lives or property were threatened, and they were instrumental in restoring
peace. At the same time, there is evidence, admittedly inconclusive in character, to suggest that the police were sometimes deliberately slow in responding to calls for help and that they arrived to
quell the disturbances only after rioters had a chance to work their
destruction unhindered.
It is impossible to determine the role of the Portuguese-language press in stimulating this new wave of violence. Such quasiofficial newspapers as the Rio de Janeiro Jornal do Commercio and
A Federafiio (Porto Alegre) were not sensationalist sheets that catered to popular tastes. More conscious of their role as journals of
official record and of elite opinion, they were often inadequate as
purveyors of news. They reported what the government wanted
reported. In his widely publicized message to the state presidents
and governors on the declaration of war, President Braz revealed
his government's expectation that "the press, which has never
failed in its patriotism in the hour of danger, will avoid inopportune discussions." 19 It is not surprising therefore that the antiGerman riots in Curitiba, Pelotas, and Petropolis (October 28 to
November 1) were not even mentioned in the Jornal do Commercio;
it was only when Rio de Janeiro itself was afflicted on November 3
that this newspaper provided coverage of the violence.
Still, there is no question that because of its strongly pro-Ally
bias, the Brazilian press contributed to an intense anti-German
feeling that ultimately manifested itself in riots. Both before and
after the declaration of war, the Brazilian public was fed a steady
diet of stories about the internal German menace. Rumors about
the gathering of armed Germans in southern Brazil were fre17. For examples, see accounts in Lutherische Kirche in Brasilien: Festschrift zum
50-jiihrigen Bestehen der lutherischen Synode am 9. Oktober 1955 [1955], passim.
18. For an example of personal injury to an Evangelical pastor, see Radlach,
"Die Einwirkungen des Weltkrieges," 24.
19. Martin, Latin America and the War, 69.
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quently repeated, despite their utter lack of foundation in fact. 20
Other reports claimed that virtually the entire Brazilian army was
being sent to the south to suppress the impending German revolt.
Meanwhile, nervous Brazilian navy men observed what appeared
to be strange nighttime signals along the coast, presumably signifying some sort of enemy communication. Investigation proved
them to be innocent enough, but in his war message to Congress,
President Braz had warned the people to be on guard against enemy spies. It is hardly surprising that excitable persons were soon
discovering them everywhere. There were rumors that Draconian
measures would soon be taken against German (or Teuto-Brazilian) products, but it was also reported that such steps would not
be in harmony with Brazilian interests or with the country's liberal
traditions. Some enthusiasts for the Allied cause were appropriately horrified by the news that Rio de Janeiro police discovered
seventeen cases of ammunition in the warehouse of Bellingrodt
and Meyer, a German importing firm that for years had been marketing such merchandise in Brazil. 21
Patriotic organizations experienced a new surge of activity in
the weeks following the declaration of war. This was especially
true of the League of National Defense (Liga da Defesa Nacional),
a preparedness association founded in 1916 that had urged the organization of paramilitary units (tiro da guerra) in which ablebodied male citizens would be trained in the use of rifles. In general, the League of National Defense was similar in purpose and
organization to the American Defense Society in the United States.
In Porto Alegre, several hundred Brazilians formed the League of
National Resistance (Liga da Resistencia Nacional), an organization especially devoted to eradicating German influence in Brazilian life. It favored nothing less than a war on German culture in
all its manifestations, not the least of which were German names
of streets and towns. 22
Many persons who joined in this anti-German agitation failed
20. New York Times, November 1, 11, 1917.
21. Haring, The Germans in South America, 43; 0 Paiz (Rio de Janeiro), November
4, 6, 7, 1917; Hinden, Deutsche und deutscher Handel, 497; Hundert Jahre Deutscher
Hilfsverein, Sao Paulo (N.p., 1963), 45; New York Times, November 11, 1917.
22. Martin, Latin America and the War, 71-72. See also Rio de Janeiro Jornal do
Commercio, November 1-15, 1917. A Federar;ao (Porto Alegre), January 4, October 14, 1918.
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to distinguish between German aliens resident in Brazil (Reichsdeutsche) and Brazilian citizens of German birth or descent (TeutoBrazilians). Much confusion resulted and not a few miscarriages
of justice. But other persons understood the difference very well.
Oaiming in a speech before Congress to have studied the German
language in order to equip hims.elf better to understand the German problem, one politician named Barbosa Lima excoriated
Teuto-Brazilians who retained a IIdouble identity" and presumably a double loyalty. In his view, a Brazilian could not speak German habitually in public or at home or, for that matter, celebrate
the defeat of the French at Sedan in 1870 or revere the memory of
Bismarck as a great man. Other legislators of similar attitudes introduced resolutions in Congress that would have confiscated all
the property of Reichsdeutsche, as well as the remaining vessels
in the sequestered fleet of German merchant ships.23
Beyond all such superpatriotic behavior, however, it was necessary for the government to impose certain basic precautionary
restrictions on German aliens in Brazil. The most obvious was
obligatory registration with the police. Photographing and fingerprinting became standard procedure in many areas. In Parana,
alien registration even became the basis for a census of Germans in
the state. Censorship of mail was also introduced. In some cities
the newspapers printed lists of German aliens who had registered.
This led 0 PalZ to observe that since the names of certain prostitutes of German nationality appeared on such lists, the loyalty of
any Brazilian citizen who patronized them should be questioned.
Meanwhile, the army suspended furloughs, recalled officers to
their garrisons, and doubled guard detachments on railroads. 24
Anti-German sentiment was greatly intensified on November 3,
when the news of the sinking of two more Brazilian vessels (the
Acary and the Guahyba) was released.25 President Braz decided to
23. 0 Pafz (Rio de Janeiro), November 5, 6, 1917; Rio de Janeiro Tornal do Commercio, November 5, 1917.
24. 0 Pafz (Rio de Janeiro), November 4,8, 1917; Funfzig Tahre Deutscher Verein
Germania, 157; Balhana and Westphalen, "0 Censo dos A1emaes do Parana,"
404-19; New York Times, November 4, 1917; Oberacker, 1m Sonnenland Brasilien,
277-79·
25· Rio de Janeiro Tornal do Commercio, November 4, 1917; New York Times, November 4, 1917; Konigk, Die Politik Brasiliens, 52. The Acary was formerly the Ger-

man ship Ehrenburg.
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cite these losses as evidence to support his request of Congress
for new repressive legislation against German aliens (and their
property and business) in Brazil. The huge anti-German riots in
Rio de Janeiro were touched off by the same news. In his message
to Congress, Braz asked for authority (1) to annul contracts for
public works that had been negotiated with German: firms, (2) to
prohibit any further concessions of new land to German subjects
for settlement by German subjects, (3) to control German-owned
banks in Brazil and eventually to annul their licenses and to extend similar measures to German-owned commercial firms, (4) to
prohibit the sale of German-owned properties, and (5) to intern
German subjects. 26
Congress responded immediately. Afranio de Mello Franco, a
prominent member of the Chamber of Deputies, introduced a bill
that corresponded to Braz's request. It was vigorously debated,
amended in the Senate, and finally sent to the president, who
signed it into law on November 16. Known as the Lei da guerra
(war law), this legislation granted the executive all the extraordinary powers he had asked for. The most significant powers involved economic questions. The president was empowered to
seize the property of enemy aliens and to sell all goods consigned
to them. The money acquired thereby was to be deposited in the
national treasury as security against future losses caused by Germany. Really intended to apply to German-owned businesses
rather than to persons, the law defined a firm as German when
half or more of its ownership was held by subjects of the kaiser.
The location of a company headquarters in Brazil or Germany was
considered to be irrelevant. 27
This legislation affected most directly the great German-owned
banks in Brazil and their numerous branches, as well as the Theodor Wille and Company, one of Brazil's largest coffee-exporting
firms. Most of the provisions were standard or normal procedure
at the onset of war. According to American historian Percy A.
Martin, these parts of the Lei da guerra were moderate. Moreover,
·the subsequent administration of the law was generally sensible
26. The Brazilian Green Book, 97; Prazeres, 0 Brasil na guerra, 81-83; New York
Times, November 4, 1917; A Federa¢o (Porto Alegre), November 5, 1917.
27. Rio de Janeiro Jomal do Commercio, November 6-16, 1917; Prazeres, 0 Brasil
na guerra, 83-85. The full text of the Lei da guerra is given in English translation in
The Brazilian Green Book, 99-102.
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and marked less by a spirit of revenge than by a concern for the
revival of trade in the postwar period. 28
For the most anxious superpatriots, however, Braz's program
did not go far enough. Stimulated by the many rumors of a potential German uprising in the southern states, they demanded and
received a provision that granted the president the power to declare any part of the country to be under a state of siege. The purpose of this section (which was well within Brazilian tradition)
was to enable the executive to suppress any further disorderseither anti-German riots or any possible German revolt. 29 Drafted
in haste at a time when passions were not always held in restraint,
this section of the law (Article I) was ill-defined and soon led to
wide inconsistencies in administration.
In accord with his newly granted authority, President Braz declared a state of siege the next day (November 17,1917). It applied
to the Federal District (the capital city of Rio de Janeiro) and to the
states of Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais, Sao Paulo, Parana, Santa
Catarina, and Rio Grande do SuI. Martial law was imposed in these
areas, and though it was neither possible nor desirable to intern all
enemy aliens resident in Brazil, approximately seven hundred
were arrested, most of them officers in the German naval or military reserves. The army command at Porto Alegre ordered that all
Schutzenvereine be disbanded and their guns and ammunition confiscated. Detachments of the army were billeted in the rural German colonies. In general, the Lei da guerra and the executive orders
that preceded it were the basis for the repression and persecution
experienced by the Teuto-Brazilians during World War I. 30
28. Martin, Latin America and the War, 81; Martin, "Brazil," 256.
29. Prazeres, 0 Brasil na guerra, 15-21, 100-198, provides extensive transcriptions of the congressional debates in both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate
over the question of the state of siege. Other documents are also included.
30. Ibid., 199; Rio de Janeiro Jornal do Commercio, November 16,17,1917; Martin,
"Brazil," 255; A Federafao (Porto Alegre), November 17, 1917; Nuno Pinheiro [de
Andrade j, Problemas da guerra e da paz: (Legislafao de guerra do Brasil) (Rio de Janeiro,
1919), 28; Hundert Jahre Deutschtum, 334; Biihler, Dona Francisca, 76, 79.

8
Impact of War on German Ethnic
Society and Institutions

T

HE ORDER suspending all publications in the German language was the measure that affected the Teuto-Brazilians
most immediately and most directly. The ethnic press was
their basic means of intragroup communication. It also was their
chief contact with the world of Luso-Brazilian society, and their
way of finding out what the government required or expected of
them. Yet the prohibition was total. It applied not only to newspapers but to all periodicals, farm journals, church magazines, almanacs, devotional literature, even German translations of classic
Portuguese and Brazilian literature, and school books of every
kind, including texts for teaching Portuguese to German-speaking
children.
To the Brazilian mind, the Germans had had ample opportunity
to learn the Portuguese language; if they had not done so, the ban
on German would now force them to it. If they had no means by
which to learn Portuguese, that was unfortunate, but it could not
be helped, given the present emergency and the threat of German
insurgency in the southern states. Moreover, the government
lacked the means to monitor or translate all publications in the
German language. It seemed better to prohibit them all.
Such heavy-handed injunctions reveal the ignorance or lack of
understanding the ruling classes of Brazil had of the Teuto-Brazilian social and cultural circumstance. They seemed unable to read
the evidence, pervasive though it was, that the great majority of
the Germans in Brazil-farmers, laborers, small-business men,
and craftsmen-felt no special loyalty to the German kaiser and
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his empire; that they represented no potential threat, military or
otherwise, to the established regime; and that as native Brazilians,
they were naturally loyal to their government. Luso-Brazilians
failed to recognize that the evidence they perceived as pro-German
was mostly cultural in character, not political, and that it was usually based on the behavior of a nonrepresentative, elite segment of
the German-Brazilian population resident in the large cities-the
European-born journalists, clergymen, technicians, and entrepreneurs with strong economic "or psychological bonds with
Germany.

The German-Language Press
The total prohibition against any publication in the German language was far more severe than any wartime restriction the United
States government imposed upon its German-speaking minority
during World War I. German-American newspapers were permitted to publish throughout the war, though under inept surveillance and under limiting circumstances that brought financial disaster to many. 1 But in Brazil, economic survival was possible only if
the German-language publishers switched entirely to Portuguese.
A surprisingly large number of German-language publishers
elected to try the Portuguese option. Thus, in Porto Alegre the
Deutsches Volksblatt became the Gazeta Popular; the Neue Deutsche
Zeitung became the Gazeta Colonial; in the backcountry of Rio
Grande do SuI, the Serra-Post of Ijut appeared as the Correio Serrano; in Santa Catarina, the Urwaldsbote of Blumenau was transformed into the Commercio do Blumenau and the Blumenauer Zeitung became the Gazeta Blumenauense. The publishers of these and
other similar Portuguese-language substitutes considered them to
be temporary expedients to carry subscribers through the war to a
time when they could resume publishing in German. Not all papers survived, but many did, even though they were closely censored. For example, the circulation of the Gazeta Popular dropped
to 2,500, roughly one-third the subscribers it attracted after the
war when it returned to the German language in 1920. It actually
did quite well compared to some others, probably because it was
1.

Cf. Luebke,

Bonds of Layalty, 241-43.
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widely known as the Catholic paper. With the church as its silent
partner, it was reasonably safe. More important, however, was the
fact that as a Catholic paper it would not persist in ethnic chauvinism, unlike the Jomal da Tarde (the transmuted Vaterland of
Porto Alegre), which later in the war period was temporarily silenced by another mob. 2

The German Schools
The decrees of October 29 also ordered that hundreds of German
schools throughout Brazil (267 in Santa Catarina alone) were to be
closed immediately. Nevertheless, many remained open until they
received official notification early in November. The directive was
straightforward enough: Only schools in which Portuguese was
used as the language of instruction could stay open; all others
were to remain closed until they could demonstrate to local school
authorities that they were staffed with teachers competent in Portuguese and that instructional materials in Portuguese were to be
used. In the United States, where school legislation was at that
time exclusively the province of state and local governments, there
was nothing comparable to Brazil's nationwide closure of private
and parochial German-language schools, though many states curtailed or abolished instruction in the German language as a part
of the curriculum in the public schools. Only in Louisiana, where
there were almost no German-language schools, was the prohibition against the ~se of the "enemy language" total,3
In most German districts the news was received with surprising
equanimity, probably because the long summer vacation (which
coincided with the Christmas holiday) was near. But when the
local churches or school societies tried to reopen their schools,
2. Gehse, Die deutsche Presse, 49; Arndt and Olson, History and Bibliography, 112,
116, 153; Fischer, "Die deutsche Presse in Rio Grande do SuI," 57, 133-34, 156,
181; Hundert Jahre Deutschtum, 288.
3. Braunschweig, "Die rechtliche Stellung," 50; Rio de Janeiro Jornal do Commercio, November 9, 1917; A Federapio (Porto Alegre), November 9, 1917; 0 Paiz (Rio de
Janeiro), November 9, 1917; Frederick C. Luebke, "Legal Restrictions on Foreign
Languages in the Great Plains States, 1917-1923," in Paul Schach (ed.), Language in
Conflict: Linguistic Acculturation on the Great Plains (Lincoln, 1980), 1-19; U.S. Army,
Office of the Judge Advocate General, Compilations of War Laws of the Various State
and Insular Possessions (1919), 47; Luebke, Bonds of Loyalty, 252-55.
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they found that they faced formidable problems. Finding teachers
sufficiently competent in Portuguese to meet the new standards
was often impossible; acquiring suitable Portuguese-language instructional materials was very difficult. Even though the enforcement of the decree was lax in some places, many schools remained closed permanently. Because public institutions had never
been established in many areas of German settlement, the regulation meant that thousands of Teuto-Brazilian children had no alternative schools to attend; they were simply deprived of education. This was usually not the case in the cities, but even there
some parents felt so strongly about the matter that they insisted
on the right to educate their children at home. In some cases, arrangements were made for a German teacher to go from house to
house to instruct three or four children at a time. Resentment was
increased by the knowledge that even though the decrees technically applied to all non-Portuguese-Ianguage schools, Italian institutions were ordinarily not forced to comply with the new language restrictions. 4
Enforcement varied considerably from state to state. In Parana,
a state law placed all private schools under government supervision and required that Portuguese be introduced as the language of instruction in all private schools by April, 1918. In Rio
Grande do SuI, where Comtean Positivism continued to infuse
much governmental thought and action, enforcement was often
moderated by the application of common sense to specific circumstances. Reluctant to impose unreasonable restrictions on individual freedoms, local officials in Rio Grande do SuI were allowed to stretch definitions of what constituted competence in
Portuguese. In some remote districts the decree could even be ignored entirely. This did not go unnoticed in Rio de Janeiro, where
President Braz publicly criticized Borges de Medeiros as the only
state president or governor who failed to require that all classes be
conducted in Portuguese. More important, the Rio Grande do SuI
government recognized that it had a responsibility to provide sub4. Das Brasildeutschtum lusobrasilisch gesehen, translated by Irene Schultz from 0
Observador e Financeiro, no. 33, Rio de Janeiro, 1938 (Stuttgart, 1944), 107-39;
Braunschweig, "Die rechtIiche SteIIung," 50; Hundert Jahre Deutschtum, 326; Brepohl
and Fugmann, Die Wolgadeutschen, 71; Entres (ed.), Gedenkbuch, 91; Sinzig, Nach
dreiszig Jahren, 106; Dedekind, Deutschtum und Evangelium, 47.
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stitutes for the closed German-language schools. By taking advantage of a federal decree of May 4, 1918, that provided subsidies for
schools established by state governments in areas inhabited by
"European settlers," the Rio Grande do SuI government opened
167 new public schools at one stroke. Nevertheless, most TeutoBrazilians refused to enroll their children in these substitute institutions. Ironically, it was the German districts that had been
relatively well supplied with schools, albeit private ones, while
other areas with much higher rates of illiteracy continued to go
without them. 5
In Santa Catarina, enforcement was more stringent. Here Positivism was weaker, nativism stronger, and the Catholic church
more influential. The anti-German propaganda of 1917 had frequently identified Santa Catarina as the center of the alleged German insurgency, thereby intensifying the determination of officials to purify the state's reputation. Moreover, Santa Catarina had
a unique history of government concern for and control of education that had climaxed in the enactment on October 5 of the legislation establishing compulsory education and requiring instruction in Portuguese. It was impossible for the schools, public and
private, to accomplish both at once, yet strict enforcement was expected by state authorities. It was difficult to gain permission to
reopen. Schools had to convince local authorities that projected
daily schedules allowed ample time for instruction in Portuguese
and in Brazilian history and geography; too much time assigned
to religious instruction could jeopardize permission to reopen.
Few German schools could meet the requirements, and the never
numerous government schools could not possibly absorb all the
German-speaking youngsters. The result was that as many as six
thousand children in Santa Catarina were out of school during
most of the war. In Joinville, for example, only one small private
school and the Catholic parochial school were able to remain open.
It its effort to cope, the Santa Catarina government introduced
crash courses in Blumenau for German-speaking teachers to learn
Portuguese, and procedures were established to test the ability of
5. Fischer and Jahn (eds.), Es begann am Rio dos Sinos, 150; Braunschweig, "Die
rechtliche Stellung," 49-50; Love, Rio Grande do Sui, 179; Schaden, "Aspectos hist6ricos e sociol6gicos da escola rural teuto-brasileira," 65-78; Oberacker, Die
volkspolitische Lage, 67.
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teachers to instruct in that language. Later, by the middle of 1918,
authorities began to relax standards and to allow more private
schools to resume instruction. But there were many others, especially in the more mountainous areas of the state, that were casualties of the war and never reopened. 6
The problem of the German schools was compounded by the
fact that many of the teachers, unlike the children, were Germanborn immigrants who had never bothered to acquire Brazilian
citizenship. Inevitably, examiners were reluctant or unwilling to
allow enemy aliens the right to teach. The indiscriminate closing
of German-language schools created special hardships for the
teachers, whose income was normally derived from small monthly
fees collected from the parents of the schoolchildren. After their
schools were closed, many Brazilian-born teachers sought employment in the new government schools and, if hired, never returned to their old responsibilities. In other cases, the German
schools-usually tiny, one-room operations-had as teachers the
pastors of the sponsoring churches. One effect of the war-born
regulations in this regard was to separate the teaching function
from the pastorate and to allow the Gemeindeschulen to become
state-supported public schools with no religious or German-language instruction. 7

The German Churches
Like the schools, the German-Brazilian churches were also obvious targets for superpatriots, and there were many minor antiGerman incidents, especially during the first several months
following the declaration of war. Church services in some communities were interrupted, pastors threatened with physical harm,
German-language signboards vandalized, and altar cloths bearing
6. Koch, Das Deutsche Schulwesen, 17-24; Braunschweig, "Die rechtliche
Stellung," 51-53; Fischer and Jahn (ed.), Es begann am Rio dos Sinos, 150; Schroder,
Brasilien und Wittenberg, 356-57; Rohrbach, Bei den Deutschen, 31; Biihler, Dona
Francisca, 83; Radlach, "Die Einwirkungen des Weltkrieges," 25; Entres (ed.),
Gedenkbuch, 91, 222; Edwin V. Morgan to Secretary of State, December 13, 1917, in
RG 59, Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Brazil,
1910-1929 (microfilm reel 21; 832.49/9).
7. Radlach, "Die Einwirkungen des Weltkrieges," 25; Lutherische Kirche in
Brasilien, 60.
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German (or even Latin) inscriptions destroyed. Inevitably the
Protestants suffered more than did the Catholics because of their
intimate bonds with the German language, culture, and institutions. But some German Catholics were persecuted, too, especially the clergy. Sometimes German Catholics were mistreated by
Luso-Brazilian superpatriots who ignorantly assumed that all
Germans in Brazil were Protestants. 8
Shortly after war had been declared, Cardinal Joaquim Arcoverde, the archbishop of Rio de Janeiro, together with several
other bishops, issued a pastoral letter in which he announced that
all further preaching in the German language in Catholic parishes
was to be prohibited, and that the German language could no
longer be used as the language of instruction in any Catholic
schools at any level. Conversely, all Catholic schools were to stress
patriotism, the history and geography of Brazil, and the Portuguese language. Moreover, this prelate announced his intention
to remove German clergy from all positions of a public character.
Other bishops issued similar orders, though one simply limited
himself to a request for a substantial increase in prayers. The result
of these several directives was that many German-born priests
were removed and reassigned to other duties and that some abbots of Franciscan and Benedictine monasteries were replaced. 9
Oppressive though these measures may have seemed at the
time to Teuto-Brazilian Catholics, they were modified by another
pastoral letter issued in November, 1917. In this instance the cardinal and his colleagues defended the "many Catholics and not a
few Protestants of German origin" who were being unjustly attacked and "surrounded by an atmosphere of hate." The letter described the German Brazilians as "true and disciplined members
of the church" who until very recently had been praised for their
contributions to Brazilian progress. Declaring them worthy of
"Christian love and protection," the cardinal courageously denounced the attacks that had been made against them in the press
8. Der Familienfreund: 1920, P.124; Joseph Grones to Mathias Grones, October 12, 1920, in Joseph Scheben Papers, Institut fur geschichtliche Landeskunde
der Rheinlande, Bonn. I am indebted to Walter Kamphoefner for bringing this
letter to my attention.
9. Rio de Janeiro Tarnal do Commercia, November 3, 11, 1917; A Federa¢o (Porto
Alegre), November 9, 1917; Entres (ed.), Gedenkbuch, 237; Sinzig, Nach dreiszig
Tahren, 144, 145, 149·
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and from public rostrums. These hateful accusations, the cardinal
warned, were clothed in the mantle of patriotism in order to disguise anticlerical impulses. If these malicious slanders were not
answered, he predicted, soon all representatives of the faith
would be attacked or impugned. 1O Inevitably the cardinal's stern
words stimulated a wave of anticlerical sentiment among the
superpatriots.
In Porto Alegre, Archbishop Becker was not so brave. Anxious
to dispel a prewar reputation of being partial to the Germans in
his archdiocese, Becker, like the other bishops, issued his own
ban, directing that the German language could no longer be used
in the celebration of the mass, in marriages, burials, or any other
official functions in any of the churches or chapels under his jurisdiction. He also requested that the clergy seek to work out
agreements with local officials and immediately report to the
chancery any difficulties that they might experience in the exercise of their office. Archbishop Becker would then seek to resolve
the problem with state authorities. 11
The government restriction, thus reinforced by an insecure
prelate, intensified the anxiety of the members of St. Joseph's congregation of Porto Alegre, the only Catholic parish in the city that
was exclusively German. The subsequent experiences of this congregation illustrate the tensions and confusion experienced by
many German Catholics in Brazil during the war. By 1917, St.
Joseph's had grown to a large congregation of more than four hundred families. Its membership included many recent arrivalsReichsdeutsche-whose ability to speak Portuguese was limited
or nonexistent. The parish maintained two schools, one for each
sex, and together they enrolled about five hundred children. It
was a vigorous, healthy congregation that counted among its
members some of the wealthiest and most influential members of
the Teuto-Brazilian community in Rio Grande do SuI.
Shortly after Archbishop Becker issued his ban, the Correio do
Povo of Porto Alegre published a remarkably unrestrained and
hateful attack on St. Joseph's, which denounced the congregation
10. Sinzig, Nach dreiszig Jahren, 101-102. Sinzig quotes the entire letter in German translation.
11. Metzler, Die St. Josefsgemeinde, 7. Metzler's book consists almost entirely of
documents.
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as unnecessary, illegal, and disastrous for the unity of the Brazilian nation. 12 In accordance with the archbishop's directive, the
parish pastor, Father Aloys Kades, immediately sought episcopal
guidance, even though he and the lay leaders of the congregation
feared that Becker would dissolve the congregation in order to
avoid trouble. Thus began a series of exchanges that, at least in
the estimation of German Catholics of Porto Alegre, revealed
Becker as fearfully indecisive, devious, and vindictive. J3
The controversy between the archbishop and St. Joseph's continued for months. It attained a new level of acrimony in April,
1918, when the government of Rio Grande do SuI announced that
Protestant churches would be allowed, starting immediately, to
use the German language in all parts of their public worship-liturgy, hymns, prayers, blessings-except the sermon and other
pastoral addresses. Catholic Germans then went to state president
Borges de Medeiros, requesting that the language ban be lifted for
them as well. Borges assumed that the request had the support of
the archbishop and on June 22, 1918, announced that Catholics
were also now included. St. Joseph's congregation then petitioned
their archbishop for permission to resume the use of the German
language. Becker refused to grant formal permission; however,
through a subordinate he informed the congregation that what the
government would allow, he would allow, but that he would accept no responsibility for the consequences. St. Joseph's thereupon conducted German-language services on the following two
Sundays without incident. At the end of July, however, the pastor
of St. Joseph's received a notice from the chancery dated July 5 forbidding the use of German because it would encourage criticism
of the church. Complaints and appeals, charges and countercharges continued until September 16, when Becker finally announced that the diocesan curia had decided to let St. Joseph's
have its way, even though several German parishes in the rural
colonies had been closed by police after the pastors had been arrested for preaching in German. 14 By then the German Catholics
12. Porto Alegre Correio do Povo, November 27, 1917. A full translation in German is provided in Metzler, Die St. Josefsgemeinde, 8-10.
13. Metzler, Die St. Josefsgemeinde, 12-67.
14. A Federapio (Porto Alegre), June 22, 1918; Metzler, Die St. Josefsgemeinde,
45-46, 58-59·
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of Porto Alegre wished that they, like their cousins in Rio de Janeiro, had an archbishop who was Luso-Brazilian.
The situation was radically different and generally more difficult for the Protestants, especially the Evangelicals. For decades
their leaders had stressed the intimate bond between their faith
and the German language. Moreover, they had become dependent on direct support from Germany in the form of financial
subsidies and the supply of trained clergymen, most of whom
were now enemy aliens. Inevitably the Evangelicals were perceived in some superpatriotic circles as minions of the German
kaiser who threatened the country's peace and stability. In some
cases their situation was made worse by their own mannerssome behaved like spit-and-polish junior officers in the Prussian
army. In other instances trouble resulted from simple thoughtlessness or insensitivity. For example, one pastor neglected to
cancel or reschedule various church activities that fell on November 15, 1917, which was the most important national holiday in
Brazil. Not surprisingly, some local superpatriots interpreted this
as evidence of German disdain or disrespect for Brazil. That evening they led a noisy procession of agitated citizens to the church
and brought an abrupt end the choir practice and confirmation
instruction that were under way. 15
Similar disturbances occurred in many Teuto-Brazilian communities during the first months of the war. Some congregations
were virtually frozen with fear as they posted night watches and
guards to protect property and lives. A few pastors suffered physical abuse. Wild rumors raced through some congregations as reports of violence, some of them true, were heard. Agitation was
most common in communities with newspapers that published
vehement, passionate anti-German diatribes. Some Evangelical
pastors were personally attacked in print. Several years later, one
cleric reflected that it is amazing that the persecution was not
worse, given the overheated rhetoric that damned all Germans as
brutal, barbaric, and utterly devoid of culture and civilization. 16
15. Joseph Grones to Mathias Grones, October 12, 1920, in Scheben Papers;
Radiach, "Die Einwirkungen des Weitkrieges," 24.
16. Fausel, Dr. Rotermund, 150; Wolfgang Ammon, Chronik von Sao Bento in
Santa Catharina, 1873-1923 (Joinvilie, 1923), 233; Lutherische Kirche in Brasilien, passim; Radiach, "Die Einwirkungen des Weitkrieges," 24.
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Still, the violence visited upon the Germans was fitful or sporadic; there was no systematic persecution by the Brazilian government. Instead, violence emerged from the inability or unwillingness of local authorities to control certain individuals who
were determined, for whatever reasons of their own, to attack the
Germans in their midst. Hence, the histories of some local Protestant parishes describe the war period as a fearful time, but others
report no problems at all-for them, life went on as always.17
The first week of the war presented a dilemma for many Protestant congregations because October 31, 1917, was the fourhundredth anniversary of the beginning of Martin Luther's Reformation. Many congregations had been planning festivities for
months. Some anxiously canceled everything, fearing that their
celebrations could easily be mistaken for pro-German demonstrations, but others were determined to follow through, which they
did without incident. 18
The prohibition against using the German language in public
services was not uniformly observed across the land. Apparently
some remote parishes ignored it totally; others discovered clever
ways of obeying the letter of the law while violating its spirit. At
the opposite extreme were congregations that anxiously dropped
all services for the duration of the war. In one Lutheran parish in
Joinville, the pastor conducted public worship in German until
Christmas Eve, 1917, when a mob forcibly brought an end to
it. Thereafter the pastor, who escaped his enemies unscathed,
deemed it prudent to observe the ban and no services were conducted in his church for nearly three months. 19 In other communities, pastors made serious efforts to comply with the language
restrictions. A Lutheran clergyman in Ponta Grossa, for example,
tried to introduce a new Portuguese liturgy of his own creation
17. Oberacker, 1m Sonnenland Brasilien, 274-75, 281-86; 75 Jahre Deutschtum:
Santo Angelo-Agudo (1857-1932) (Sao Leopoldo, 1932), 120; Lutherische Kirche in
Brasilien, passim; Radlach, "Die Einwirkungen des Weltkrieges," 26.
18. Evangelisch-Lutherisches Kirchenblatt fUr Sud-Amerika, XIV (October 15, 1917);
Fause!, Dr. Rotermund, 150; Lutherische Kirche in Brasilien, 49.
19. Radlach, "Die Einwirkungen des Weltkrieges," 25; Fischer and Jahn (eds.),

Es begann am Rio dos Sinos, 150; Fritz Wiistner, Kirchengemeinde Joinville: Evangelische
Bekennen in Schwachheit und Kraft, 1851-1951 (Joinville, [1951]), 51. For another
incident involving the celebration of Christmas, see Oberacker, 1m Sonnenland
Brasilien, 273.
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but it proved to be decidedly unpopular with his congregants. But
in so remote an area as Santa Maria Jetiba, located in the mountains of Espirito Santo, the Lutherans built a new impressive
church, which was dedicated, presumably in the German language, in July, 1918. The historian of this parish laconically reported that even though there were several anti-German mob
scenes early in the war, the activities of the congregation were
never seriously hindered. 20 Still, remote location or isolation was
not the only explanation. In Porto Alegre, the ladies' aid society of
one Evangelical congregation noted that its work had not been
disturbed in any way during the war period. Paradoxically, St.
Joseph's Catholic parish in the same city claimed that every organizational activity had been hampered and that there was nothing
that could have been done about it except to wait for the storm to
pass. 21
The problems of the Protestant Germans were intensified greatly
by the fact that almost all of their clergy were Reichsdeutsche.
Even though many were long-term residents of Brazil, few had
taken out citizenship papers because, upon their retirement from
the ministry, they intended to return to the land of their birth. As
enemy aliens, they were limited in their ability to negotiate with
government officials. An exception to this tendency was the
crusty, old Dr. Wilhelm Rotermund, venerated within church
circles and highly respected beyond. A citizen since 1887, Rotermund was still serving the Riograndenser Synod as its president
despite his advanced age of seventy-five years. 22 Like most Evangelical pastors, he passionately believed that the survival of his
church depended upon the retention of the German language and
culture. But he also believed that Teuto-Brazilians had to learn
Portuguese and, as citizens, participate intelligently in Brazilian
life. Thus, Rotermund's personal record and position as the head
of an organization with 100,000 members gave him an authority
Lutherische Kirche in Brasilien, 140, 176, and see p. 151.
jahresberichte der Deutsche Evangelische Gemeinde zu Porto Alegre aber das jahr
1920 und des Vereines Frauenhilfe ... aber die jahre 1917 bis 1920, p. 29; Metzler, Die
St. josefsgemeinde.
22. Radlach, "Die Einwirkungen des Weltkrieges," 26; Fausel, Dr. Rotermund,
203.
20.
21.
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denied most Protestant pastors. He did not hesitate to use it. He
stood up fearlessly and repeatedly for what he believed to be the
constitutional rights of his people.
Immediately following official notification of the ban on the
German language, Rotermund vigorously protested the restriction as a violation of the freedom of religion. In a sharply worded
statement presented to the government, Rotermund pointed out
that Article 72 of the Constitution granted the right of free practice to all religions. He argued that since the use of the German
language was essential to the life of the Evangelical church, any
restriction of this right was tantamount to an infringement of religious freedom and therefore unconstitutional. German, he insisted, had the same relationship to Evangelical worship that Latin
had to the Catholic ritual. Presumably as a result of Rotermund's
plea, the Rio Grande do SuI chief of police subsequently announced that in Protestant churches of that state the liturgy (but
not other parts of the service such as hymns and prayers) could be
conducted in German. 23 This interpretation did not, of course,
apply to states other than Rio Grande do SuI.
Several weeks later, when the administration of the state of
siege had been vested in a military commission, Rotermund again
protested the language restrictions. Writing to the commanding
general, Rotermund repeated his earlier arguments. The military
authority expressed his sympathy for the plight of the German
Protestants and personally deplored the restrictions. Nevertheless, though he understood that the Germans were no threat to
Brazilian security, he required that they continue to refrain from
using German in all public functions in order to avoid provoking
the "lower classes." What language pastors used in private ministrations was of no concern to him. Of course, this response failed
to satisfy Rotermund, especially because the general's clarification
was never publicized among lower officials in government, with
the result that enforcement was left largely to the discretion of
local functionaries. Inevitably it was inconsistent and tension remained high, especially in the large cities. 24
23. Fause!, Dr. Rotermund, 152. Rotermund announced this ruling in his Rundschreiben No. 948 of November 21, 1917.
24. Fause!, Dr. Rotermund, 153·
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After several months the national government in Rio de Janeiro
dispatched a high-ranking army officer to the southern states in
order to sample public opinion in these matters. Rotermund once
again used the opportunity to present the government with a detailed description of the tribulations of the Rio Grande do SuI
Evangelicals. "I cannot believe," he wrote, "that high government
officials sanction the arbitrary character of events that have occurred; I am astonished that clear directives have not been issued
to end abuses. Agitators have moved against our churches and
have perpetrated the grossest excesses on the basis of orders never
published and decrees that no one has seen." Rotermund was especially outraged by a ruling that forbade the use of German-language textbooks for instruction in Portuguese. "I cannot comprehend," he continued, "how a government that makes such a great
effort to encourage the use of the Portuguese language can forbid
the distribution and sale of materials for this purpose." He bitterly accused the government of stripping his people of their "holiest rights" and of denigrating, by its incomprehensible policies,
the qualities of firmness and integrity they displayed in their
struggle for justice. If the Teuto-Brazilians did not fight to preserve their inherited religion and language, Rotermund declared,
they would quickly degenerate to the level of Helots. 25
There is no firm evidence that Rotermund's frequent protests
actually caused a change in government policy. Yet the national
government did in fact relax its regulations early in 1918. When
the original decree establishing the state of siege expired at the
end of 1917, the government extended it only to February 26,
1918, when it was allowed to lapse until March 6. The suspension
was deliberate. It was allowed for political reasons: The days in
question immediately preceded the national election. Various
newspapers in the areas affected by the state of siege had protested the decree as an unnecessary curtailment of personal liberty and of the freedom of the press. After the election, the state
of siege was directly resumed and extended to December 31, 1918.
Still, it was only six weeks later, on April 11, 1918, that the chief of
police of the state of Rio Grande do SuI declared that Protestant
churches would be allowed to use the German language in all
parts of their public worship except the sermons and public an25· Ibid., 154-55·

Impact of War

nouncements. A similar relaxation was announced at the same
time in Santa Catarina. 26
For the German Protestant churches with connections in the
United States, of which the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod
was the most important, the war period was less stressful than it
was for the several synods with strong ties to Germany. Most of
the Missouri Lutheran pastors were American citizens, not German, and thus were not subject to the restrictions imposed upon
enemy aliens. Given their commitment to bilingualism and the
gradual abandonment of the German language, this synod's clergy
and congregations generally complied with the government's language restrictions. There were instances, especially during the
prewar period, in which some Missouri Lutheran pastors were
noisily pro-German, but once war had been declared, discretion
conquered sentiment. War also exacerbated old denominational
rivalries, as, for example, when an Evangelical leader accused the
Missouri Lutherans of gleefully pointing out in their church paper
to officials that the provost of the Prussian state church resident in
Brazil was, in fact, a German bureaucrat. 27
The burdens imposed by war transcended parochial tensions or
local incidents in which German pastors or their congregants suffered some measure of harassment or persecution. The fact was
that normal channels of communication were disrupted. Synodical conventions were canceled because, as public meetings,
they would have had to be conducted in Portuguese, and given
the linguistic inadequacies of many pastors, that was impossible.
The language ban also extended to the printed word and hence all
church periodicals and annuals were suspended. In one case,
four thousand undistributed copies of DeT Familienfreund, a German Catholic annual, were confiscated as dangerous to the state.
The finances of the Evangelical synods were also in deep trouble.
Subsidies from Germany were cut off at a time when organiza26. Edwin V. Morgan to Secretary of State, January 2, 1918, and Morgan to Secretary of State, March 6, 1918, both in RG 59, Records of the Department of State
Relating to the Internal Affairs of Brazil, 1910-1929 (microfilm reel 21; 832.00/45);
A Federa(ao (Porto Alegre), April 17, 1918; Biihler, Dona Francisca, 87.
27. Roche, La colonisation allemande, 515; Haring, The Germans in South America,
48; Braunschweig, "Die rechtliche Stellung," 43. Provost Braunschweig was not interned. He remained in Brazil throughout the war and shortly thereafter retired to
Germany.
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tional needs were increasing. Moreover, there was no longer a
supply of German-trained pastors to fill parish vacancies. The
care of retired clergymen also became a special problem, since
such persons usually depended upon support from Germany.
Translocal problems of this kind had to be solved without recourse to normal modes of communication in church periodicals.
Circumstances thus forced the German Protestants to become
self-reliant in unprecedented ways. They learned to contribute
money as never before; they took the first steps toward establishing their own theological seminaries for the training of Brazilianborn clergy. 28
Generally speaking, the German ethnic churches of Brazil had
to endure a repression that was different in some important respects from what it was in the United States, where there was no
blanket proscription by the federal government against the use of
the "enemy language" in either the churches or the schools. Several states, however, did enact restrictive measures. But most
American state legislatures, which usually convened biennially in
those years, were not in session during the greater part of the war
period. Had this not been the case, it is likely that many anti-German-language laws would have been enacted. Instead, efforts at
language regulation in the United States commonly emanated
from state and county councils of defense, which were special
agencies created to coordinate the domestic war effort at the local
level. Their directives and orders, oppressive though many of
them were, lacked the force of law. As a result, most wartime restrictions on the German language in the United States tended
to be highly local in character and resulted in such ugly phenomena as public ceremonies in which German-language books were
burned to the accompaniment of patriotic speeches and anthems.
In other instances, clergymen were tarred and feathered and their
church buildings splashed with yellow paint. The American oppression thus tended to be extralegal or informal, even though, in
terms of human interrelationships, it was often intense and personal. 29 In Brazil, the legal measures created problems of a differ28. Der FamiIienfreund: 1920, p. 124; Fischer and Jahn (eds.), Es begann am Rio
dos Sinos, 150-52; Fause!, Dr. Rotermund, 149-50; Lutherische Kirche in Brasilien, 2,
60; Becker, Deutsche Siedler, 79.
29· Luebke, Bonds of Loyalty, 14-19, 225-67; Carl F. Wittke, German-Americans
and the World War (Columbus, Ohio, 1936), passim; Donald R. Hickey, "The Prager
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ent character and magnitude, even though there seem to have
been proportionately fewer instances of personal violence and
abuse after the wave of riots that occurred in the ftrst ten days
after the declaration of war.

German Clubs and Societies
In spite of the many difficulties they experienced, most GermanBrazilian churches and their affiliated organizations tried to function as best they could during the year of war. As they saw it, they
were in the business of saving souls from eternal perdition; given
such a transcendent purpose, they were determined to survive.
The numerous German ethnic societies, however, served no such
noble end. Their goals centered on this life, not the next. Their
existence was more temporary, more secular, more vulnerable. Inevitably, they were prime targets of superpatriotic intolerance.
Some Vereine suffered mob violence. Their halls were vandalized,
their banners dragged through the streets and burned, their members subjected to various indignities, such as being forced to kiss
the Brazilian flag amid patriotic ceremonies. 30
Some of the Vereine quickly decided that expediency called for
them simply to disband. Many others suspended all activities for
the duration of the war and did not emerge from their hibernation
until after the Armistice. 3 ! Most of the remainder changed their
Affair: A Study in Wartime Hysteria," Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society,
LXII (Summer, 1¢9), 117-34; Luebke, "Legal Restrictions," 1-19; Frederick C.
Luebke, "Superpatriotism in World War I: The Experience of a Lutheran Pastor,"
Concordia Historical Institute Quarterly, XLI (February, 1968),3-11; Lyle W. Dorsett,
"The Ordeal of Colorado's Germans during World War I," Colorado Magazine, LI
(Fall, 1974),277-93; Darrell R. Sawyer, "Anti-German Sentiment in South Dakota
Ouring World War I," South Dakota Historical Collections, XXXVIII (1976), 439-514;
Clifford H. Scott, "Assimilation in a German-American Community: The Impact of
World War 1," Northwest Ohio Quarterly, LII (Winter, 1980), 153-67; Anna Zellick,
"Patriots on the Rampage: Mob Action in Lewiston, 1917-1918," Montana, XXXI
(January, 1981), 30-43; Sister John Christine Wolkerstorfer, "Persecution in St.
Paul-The Germans in World War I," Ramsay County History, XIII (Fall-Winter,
1976),3-13.
30. Joseph Grones to Mathias Grones, October 12, 1920, in Scheben Papers.
31. Hundert Jahre Deutschtum, 321-32; Fugmann, Die Deutschen in Parana, 114;
Hinden, Deutsche und deutscher Handel, 510; Fiinfzig Jahre Deutscher Verein Germania, 150.
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names to something appropriate in Portuguese, revised their governance documents to modify ethnic exclusiveness, and tried to
carry on as best they could. Since government regulations regarding public meetings usually meant police surveillance, large formal gatherings were normally avoided. Most Vereine experienced
sharp losses in membership; for one's name to appear on the rolls
was a potential source of trouble. 32
Of course, the measure of accommodation necessary to satisfy
superpatriotic demands varied greatly with the character of the
organization. For example, one could hardly expect the singing
societies suddenly to take up Brazilian folk songs with much zeal.
The highly suspect Schiitzenvereine naturally tend to fade almost
entirely from the scene as military authorities ordered their dissolution and confiscated their guns and ammunition. Apparently,
some were converted into tiro da guerra, the paramilitary training
units established by the government. In one community at least,
Teuto-Brazilian young men participated with enthusiasm; energetic recruitment efforts were followed by the construction of barracks, which after the war were converted into a hospital. 33
The large social organizations found in the major cities usually
survived under protective coloration of some kind. 34 Compared to
their equivalents in rural districts, they found it rather more difficult to persist. They were ready objects of superpatriotic envy and
ire because their memberships usually included high proportions
of prominent businessmen and professional persons, many of
whom were Reichsdeutsche. 35 The latter often felt no loyalty for
Brazil; subjects of the German kaiser, they were living in an enemy
32. Rio de Janeiro Jornal do Commercio, November 6, 1917; Hundert Jahre
Deutschtum, 35, 333; Becker, Deutsche Siedler, 78; Roche, La colonisation allemande,
539; Hundert Jahre Deutscher Hilfsverein, 45; Funfzig Jahre Deutscher Verein Germania, 157.
33. Ernst Niemeyer, 50 Jahre Verein deutscher Siingerbund Curitiba, 1884-1934
(Curitiba, [1934]),4°; Hundert Jahre Deutschtum, 321-22, 334; Roche, La colonisation
allemande, 539; Ammon, Chronik von Sao Bento, 230, 233.
34. Hundert Jahre Deutscher Hilfsverein, 45.
35. For example, see the flyer distributed in Joinville, Santa Catarina, in June,
1918, against the Deutsche Verband of that city. It lists the members of the organization by name, occupation, and country of birth (flyer in Instituto Hans Staden,
Sao Paulo). See also Biihler, Dona Francisca; Samuel T. Lee to Secretary of State,
August 15, 1918, in RG 59, Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Germany, 1910-1929 (microfilm reel 66).
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Tiro Brasileiro, No. 227, of Estrela, Rio Grande do SuI. The unit enrolled approximately 140 men, of whom 80 percent were German Brazilian. The structure in the
background is the Catholic rectory of Estrela.
Reprinted from Uhle's Kalender [iir das Jahr 1918

country; and some did what they could to help the German cause,
short of criminal action. For example, members of the German
Society in Bahia continued to collect funds through much of the
war period for the German Red Cross. These they dispatched to Argentina, expecting that their contributions could be forwarded to
Germany from that neutral country. Loyal Teuto-Brazilians often
found such activity offensive and many withdrew from organizations that were dominated by socially prominent and economically powerful Reichsdeutsche. 36

German-Owned Businesses
Virtually all commercial and industrial firms owned by either
Germans or Teuto-Brazilians experienced some difficulties during
the war. Superpatriots often failed to distinguish between the
36. Funfzig Jahre Deutscher Verein Germania, 158; Biihler, Dona Francisca, 79.
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two, though it is clear that branches of companies with headquarters in Germany fared worse. The national government, of course,
was concerned chiefly about the activities of German-owned companies. By means of the Lei da guerra, it had decreed restrictions
not unlike those imposed by most governments in wartime. All
alien property, including money, credits, merchandise, and other
goods, had to be declared and all such items were subject to sequestration. Business relations with enemy subjects living abroad,
through banks or other commercial houses, were prohibited. Exporting any goods or merchandise of enemy ownership was forbidden. Moreover, any enemy alien "who proved to be troublesome or suspect to the Brazilian cause" was subject to internment
in a concentration camp.37 Few Reichsdeutsche were willing to
tempt fate by testing such a loosely worded law, especially during
the first few months following the declaration of war.
The Brazilian government quickly discovered, however, that
strict enforcement of the economic provisions of the Lei da guerra
worked to the detriment of Brazilian interests. If the letter of the
law was to be observed, various German-owned banks, insurance
companies, and other businesses would be unable to meet their
obligations either to Brazilian-owned firms or to their many Brazilian employees. Consequently the government granted the German companies a series of concessions that allowed them to operate freely, short of enterprise that could possibly aid the enemy.
Thus, despite the official limitations, most German-owned companies continued through much of the war in good economic
health. 38
There were a few exceptions. In January, for example, the federal government canceled a contract for the delivery of war materiel that earlier had been negotiated with the Brazilian representative (Haupt and Company) of the famous Krupp Company of
Essen, Germany. In March it rescinded a contract with a German
company for developing a railroad in Santa Catarina. But it was
not until September, 1918, that it terminated the service of a
37. Hinden, Deutsche und deutscher Handel, 495; Fiinfzig Jahre Deutscher Verein
Germania, 157; The Brazilian Green Book, 99-100.
38. PinheirO, Problemas da guerra, 37. Cf. Dean, The Industrialization of sao Paulo,
100-101.
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German-owned transatlantic cable between Pernambuco and Tenerife in the Canary Islands. 39
The most obvious beneficiaries of the government's liberal policy were the large German-owned banks, the Brasilianische Bank
fur Deutschland, the Banco Allemao Transatlantico, and the Banco
Germanico da America do SuI, each of which was deeply involved
in financing the production and trade of coffee. Meanwhile, the
great coffee-exporting firm of Theodor Wille and Company (headquartered in Hamburg) lost its leading position to British- and
American-owned rivals, but it survived in Brazil by turning from
coffee to manufacturing. Similarly, other German-owned companies that depended on internal trade weathered the storm easily.
In Rio de Janeiro, for example, there were no bankruptcies among
German-owned firms. Indeed, it was a period of prosperity for
some, such as Lambert Riedlinger's construction firm, which specialized in reinforced concrete buildings. Luso-Brazilian merchants continued to patronize German wholesale houses because
it was in their private interest to do so. Haring observed that
prominent Brazilians who preferred not to be seen trading in German shops merely placed their orders by telephone or sent their
servants to purchase the desired merchandise. 40
No doubt there were some small-business men of German descent who were ruined by the war, among them many storekeepers and restaurateurs whose places of business were destroyed in the riots of 1917. Others found their volume of business
reduced by informal, local boycotts, but most had to endure nothing worse than superpatriotic suspicion, innuendo, or an occasional harsh word or insult. Nonetheless, it was in their interest to
keep a low profile. Some businessmen avoided the inconvenience
39. Pinheiro, Problemas da guerra, 243; [Brazil, Ministerio das Relac;:oes Exterioresj, Guerra da Europa: Documentos Diplomaticos. Attitude do Brasil. 1918 (Rio de Janeiro, 1918), 100-101, hereinafter cited as Documentos Diplomaticos, 1918.
40. Pinheiro, Problemas da guerra, 32-41; Prazeres, 0 Brasil na guerra, 204-205;
Love, Sao Paulo in the Brazilian Federation, 47, 56, 205; Zimmerman, Theodor Wille,
136; Hinden, Deutsche und deutscher Handel, 497, 506; Haring, The Germans in South
America, 62-64; "Attitude of Brazilians toward the War," typed manuscript dated
March 20, 1918, p. 14, anonymous report sent to the Department of State by Capt.
S. McCauley, Assistant Director of Naval Intelligence, April 25, 1918, in RG 59, Entry 540, Box 1, Brazil folder. Cf. Dean, The,Industrialization of Sao Paulo, 100-101.
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of being German by claiming to be Dutch, Danish, or Norwegian.
Most German-owned firms, both large and small, severely restricted their advertisements in the newspapers. Few displayed
the audacity of the Hasenclever Company, which had the courage
in December, 1917, to sue the Brazilian government for the damages it had suffered during the Rio de Janeiro riots a month earlier. Although a judge threw out the Hasenclever complaint, there
is no evidence that the company experienced a consequent adversity. Gradually, as the war year ran its course, German businessmen began to operate with new boldness, recognizing that the
government was eager to establish and enlarge trade patterns and
to take early advantage of the opportunities that would emerge in
the postwar period. 41

War and the Common People
Common people of German citizenship, unlike the wealthy business and professional elite, sometimes experienced serious difficulties. Some were fired from their jobs by superpatriotic employers. Others were stranded in Brazil by the declaration of war. A
few were hired by German companies, but others were simply
without prospects. In Porto Alegre the Verband deutscher Vereine
tried to relieve the distress by inaugurating its own "public works"
program. It put unemployed enemy aliens to work as temporary
groundskeepers for the German hospital and the Turnerbund's
playing field.42
For most ordinary Teuto-Brazilians, World War I was period of
only mild discomfort, but it depended on where one lived and
how seriously local officials took the war-born restrictions. In
some of the remote, solidly German rural districts, life went on
undisturbed. In small cities like Joinville and Blumenau, where
persons of German origin dominated the community, compliance
with the regulations was often indifferent and enforcement haphazard. The American traveler Mark Jefferson reported that in
Joinville's post office, there was a notice forbidding anyone to
41. Hinden, Deutsche und deutscher Handel, 497; Roche, La colonisation allemande,
539·

42. Hunderi Jahre Deutschtum, 293.
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speak German. Since many of the older residents could speak
nothing but German, the injunction was ignored with typical Brazilian insouciance. Sometimes such signs were simply mutilated
with impunity. But it should be remembered that Joinville was
also a place where almost all German schools were closed, where
German street names were changed to something suitably Portuguese or patriotic, and where a superpatriotic mob interrupted
a German Lutheran service on Christmas Eve in order to stop the
use of the "enemy language." There were other communities in
which trouble was endemic. In Montenegro, for example, proper
patriots staged anti-German demonstrations with some regularity-every two or three months, by one account-to obliterate
German-language signs and to deface German houses with patriotic graffiti. 43
In the large cities where the Germans were a small though
highly visible minority, ethnic relations were often more tense. It
behooved the ordinary Teuto-Brazilian in such places to be circumspect in his behavior. If there was trouble of some kind, they
could expect to be blamed for it. It was widely rumored, for example, that Germans were the cause of much labor unrest that
swept Brazilian inq.ustrial centers at that time, but recent research
has shown that they played no role in the movement. 44 Not surprisingly, large numbers of Teuto-Brazilians in the cities began to
use Portuguese equivalents of their given names in order to minimize suspicion.
Relatively few Teuto-Brazilian young men were affected by military conscription, but those who were drafted received an unprecedented exposure to Brazilian society and culture. Although
universal military training had been enacted a decade earlier, it
had not been enforced. At the beginning of the war, the Brazilian
army numbered no more than thirty thousand men, including
officers. A law of December 27, 1917, established draft boards to
43. Jefferson, "Pictures from Southern Brazil," 521-47; Haring, The Germans in
South America, 46; Rohrbach, Bei den Deutschen, 20; Wiistner, Kirchengemeinde Joinville, 51; Der Familienfreund: 1920, p. 124.
44. Haring, The Germans in South America, 56; Sheldon L. Maram, 'The Immigrant and the Brazilian Labor Movement, 1890-1920," in Alden and Dean (eds.),
Essays Concerning the Socioeconomic History of Brazil and Portuguese India, 184-85;
Dean, The Industrialization of Siio Paulo, 166.
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register all young men between the ages of twenty-one and thirty,
but few were actually conscripted because the government lacked
the means to feed and clothe the draftees, much less equip and
instruct them in the arts of war. 45
There were other young Teuto-Brazilians, mostly from Rio
Grande do SuI and Santa Catarina, who voluntarily enlisted for
service in the army, a fact trumpeted by ethnic leaders who wished
to establish the legitimacy of their claims for patriotism. Government authorities, distressed that many of these young men could
not speak Portuguese, nevertheless recognized that their literacy
rates were much higher than those of other recruits, many of
whom came from the lowest classes of Brazilian society. 46
But whether they were draftees or volunteers, these young men
were not the leaders of the ethnic group, unlike the clergy, teachers, journalists, and businessmen whose stores, factories, or warehouses had been damaged or destroyed by riots. The war and its
attendant restrictions affected the latter in direct and sometimes
drastic ways. To these formulators of ethnic group opinion (persons of high status and power within the subsociety), the war
laws seemed unnecessary and harsh. They saw themselves not as
threats to national security but as loyal, industrious"and valuable
citizens or residents of Brazil. They considered themselves to be
innocent victims of an irrational and undeserved anti-German
hysteria instigated by a small but influential group of Francophile
enthusiasts envious of German accomplishments. In their opinion, the government had succumbed to political influence and
powerful rhetoric and therefore it had decreed the many legal restrictions. But many persons in government, they believed, did
not really share the superpatriotic view.
There is much evidence to support at least parts of this interpretation. The president and Congress clearly were sensitive to
the pressure applied by the Liga pelos Alliados and other superpatriotic organizations and leaders. The declaration of war itself
and the enactment of the Lei da guerra were not responses by a
45. Martin, Latin America and the War, 86.
46. Haring, The Germans in South America, 59-60; Uhle's Kalender fur das Jahr
1918, p. 354. Cf· 0 Paiz (Rio de Janeiro), March 6, 1917, as cited in Martin, Latin
America and the War, 76.
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democratic government to a deeply felt popular sentiment. They
were rather political reactions to the ability of certain ruling-class
persons to manipulate public opinion and to influence decision
making at the highest level. But the popular enthusiasm shown at
the outset of the war could not be sustained indefinitely. While
some persons in the government and the military services undoubtedly believed that the Germans of Brazil were a subversive
and traitorous element, most others did not and enforced the restrictions to no greater extent than local circumstances demanded.

The Role of Brazil in World War I
During the first months of the war the government generally tried
to enforce the war law and to participate in the Allied war effort to
crush Germany. But it really lacked the means, if not the will. The
market for Brazilian coffee was greatly reduced; the disruption of
international trade diminished the revenue normally produced by
tariffs on imports. Still, the war stimulated much business activity
within the country, as it dramatically increased the production of
foodstuff, especially sugar, beef, and beans, for the Allies. A few
aviators and a military mission were sent to Europe and a small
number of Brazilian soldiers actually fought in France. But the
army as a whole remained tiny and never grew to more than sixty
thousand men. The navy was engaged in patrol duty in the South
Atlantic and only at the very end of the war was a squadron assigned to the Mediterranean Sea. 47
On the domestic front, the Brazilian government participated in
a minor way in the propaganda war. In 1918, it published a series
of books documenting through personal accounts and photographs the war crimes of the Germans. as Horrores de Wittenberg,
for example, described brutal treatment Allied prisoners of war
received in a camp in Germany. American propaganda was also
imported. One of the pamphlets written by Earl Sperry and published by the U. S. Committee on Public Information was translated in 1918 and distributed in Brazil as Intrigas e Conspira{:oes:
47. Martin, Latin America and the War, 92-94, 87-90; Martin, "Brazil," 254-56;
Documentos Diplomaticos, 1918, pp. 74-77, 92-97, 152-56; James, Brazil after a Century of Independence, 169-71; FRUS, 1917, Supp. 1, The World War, 379-80.
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Dos Allemaes nos Estados Unidos durante 0 Periodo da Nossa Neutralidade. But gradually, as the first months of Brazilian participation
passed and it became clear that no significant number of Brazilian
soldiers would be sent to the trenches in France, the restrictions
of the war law and others were relaxed.
In the opinion of one American resident of Brazil, popular attitudes by March, 1918, had degenerated to what he called "almost
complete apathy." In his view, Brazilian "passions have not been
inflamed" and "even mercenary motives fail to rouse the people."
In Sao Paulo, he reported, the German Brazilians "look with derision upon the 'play-war' which this country is indulging in." The
Brazilian war effort was a bad joke and the enforcement of the
anti-German measures he described as a "hollow pretense." 48
By mid-1918, Brazilian superpatriots, also alarmed by instances
of government laxity, registered loud complaints. In May, newspapers had reported that the national government itself had no
scruples about patronizing German-owned businesses: It had engaged such a firm to decorate the Guanabara Palace in Rio in
preparation for a reception to welcome a British mission to Brazil.
It was also pointed out that though the Lei da guerra specified that
German-owned banks were to be placed under direct government
supervision, they had been allowed to operate more or less normally. This had worked to the advantage of both the government
and many merchants and consumers. Finally, the government responded to the agitation of the Liga pelos Alliados, and on July
28, 1918, the German-owned banks were ordered to cease operations. But even then, pending transactions were allowed to be
concluded. The government did not formally cancel the right of
the German banks to conduct business in Brazil until October 16,
1918, less than a month before the Armistice. 49
In general, the Brazilian response to the problems posed by its
large German ethnic minority was violent and repressive. The
anti-German riots of 1917 were unprecedented in Teuto-Brazilian
experience; the imposition of martial law was of doubtful necessity; the governmental regulation of German-language usage and
48. "Attitude of Brazilians toward the War," 1, 5,10,14.
49. Ibid., 12-14; Haring, The Germans in South America, 62-66; Pinheiro, Problemas da guerra, 37-38. The decree of October 16, 1918, is reprinted in Pinheiro
(p. 240). See also Documentos Diplomaticos, 1918, pp. 97-101.
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the attendant infringements of the freedoms of press, assembly,
and religious practice were of questionable constitutionality. Even
though these restrictions were inconsistently enforced, they left
strong impressions in many Teuto-Brazilian memories. German
ethnic newspapers switched to Portuguese; others simply ceased
publication. Scores of German schools were closed, many permanently. On the whole, German Catholics suffered less than did the
Protestants, whose institutional ties with Germany were close
and clear. Many clubs and societies disappeared permanently
while others suspended operations for the duration of the war,
but most survived through the adoption of accommodationist
strategies. The discomfort experienced by common' pegple of
German descent varied greatly from place to place, but urban
dwellers were more exposed to superpatriotic excesses than were
the inhabitants of rural German enclaves. Although Brazil's repression of the German ethnic minority is understandable within
the context of its history, it was remarkably harsh in relation to the
negligible threat that the Teuto-Brazilians actually posed to national security.

9
Aftermath and Retrospect

W

HEN THE NEWS ARRIVED in Rio de Janeiro that an armistice had been signed at Compiegne on November 11,
1918, the Brazilian Senate turned to its most distinguished member, Ruy Barbosa, for an oration suitable for the occasion. Although ill and preoccupied with problems of Brazil's
international relations, this champion of weak nations, righteousness, and the Allies extemporaneously addressed his colleagues
in the florid manner they expected of him. Describing the war as a
dramatic struggle in which "cruelty that ex.ceeded the very limits
of the satanic fought ferociously against divine loftiness of sacrifice
and measureless abnegation," Barbosa grandly welcomed Brazil
into the house of victory alongside Britain, France, and the United
States. His speech, we are told, made a profound impression. 1
Far to the south in Santa Augusta in Rio Grande do SuI, certain
Teuto-Brazilians received the news of Germany's defeat with disbelief, and they dismissed it as a shameless lie. That the kaiser
had abdicated, that Germany was experiencing revolutionary turmoil, or that a republic had been created was simply not possible
in the Germany they remembered. Their Evangelical pastor described those days as the blackest of his life, and one ninety-twoyear-old who had avidly followed the news of the war was heartbroken. He died soon thereafter in inconsolable grief for his old
fatherland. 2
Neither Ruy Barbosa nor the die-hard chauvinists of Santa Au1. Ruy Barbosa, "Brazil in the House of Victory," Inter-America, II (1919), 139-44.
2. Oberacker, 1m Sonnenland Brasilien, 288-90.
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gusta were typical of the elite or the masses of Brazilian society.
Of course, government officials were pleased that the war was
over; it meant that they could turn to pressing problems of international trade and a growing national debt. At the same time, few
Brazilians, including those of German birth or descent, were
moved deeply by Germany's defeat. Most people naturally pursued their private affairs in ways untouched by national politics or
international conflict. For most Germans in Brazil, the Armistice
made no immediate or significant difference in their personal
lives, since most of the wartime restrictions (regardless of enforcement, or lack of it, in their own communities) remained on
the books during the next several months, a time when much
public attention shifted to the peace conference at Versailles.
Brazil was a minor participant in these negotiations. Its delegation was headed by Dr. Epitacio Pessoa, a minor political figure
who was elected president of Brazil during the course of the negotiations. The Brazilians concentrated on two issues, the Brazilian
coffee seized by Germany and the German ships seized by Brazil.
The first was settled easily; Germany was in no position to contest
the. issue. But the second ran afoul of the French, who insisted
that all former German ships sequestered or confiscated during
the war be distributed among the Allies in proportion to their
own maritime losses in the war. The Brazilian government, which
had leased to France thirty of the forty-three German vessels it
had requisitioned, argued that the issue was already settled because French acceptance of the leases w~s tantamount to recognizing Brazil's right of ownership. Intransigent in its opposition to
the French plan, Brazil resisted until May, 1920, when France finally conceded. 3 Thus the thorny question of the German ships,
which had so preoccupied Brazil's leadership during much of the
war, was finally resolved.

The Return to Nonnalcy
On January 12, 1920, President Epitacio Pessoa declared the Treaty
of Versailles to be in force. The technical state of war following the
3. Martin, Latin America and the War, 99-106; James, Brazil after a Century of Independence, 174; Bernard M. Baruch, The Making of the Reparation and Economic Sections
of the Treaty (New York, 1920), 37-39, 187.
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Armistice, which had continued for a period slightly longer than
the war itself, was officially at an end. All federal decrees and
orders limiting the freedoms of speech, press, assembly, and
movement were repealed as the national emergency was terminated. It remained for the state governments to remove such wartime measures as they had individually enacted. Six weeks later,
for example, the government of Rio Grande do SuI permitted
schools to resume instruction in any foreign language, including
German. At least one Teuto-Brazilian source attributed this generous action to the Positivist principles of its strong chief executive,
Borges de Medeiros.4
Santa Catarina was much slower to remove its restrictions. In
that state the numerous Vereine continued to be persecuted. Indeed, like many state governments in the United States, Santa
Catarina had enacted additional restrictive legislation after the
Armistice. In September, 1919, a law was passed that defined
"foreign-language schools" as those in which instruction in one
or more subjects was conducted in a language other than Poduguese, irrespective of the citizenship or birthplace of the teacher.
A month later, Santa Catarina once again closed many German
schools because they allegedly had violated the requirement that
teachers provide evidence of competency in the Portuguese language. In January, 1920, a further directive specified that the
schools in the German colonies were to schedule at least twentyfour half-hour periods per week for instruction in Portuguese in
reading, writing, history, geography, music, and civics. Moreover,
all school documents such as lesson plans, curricular statements,
and attendance repods were to be prepared in the Portuguese language. Not until September, 1921, did the Santa Catarina government repeal the regulations it had enacted during the war.S Obviously, in this nationalistic state the campaign to speed up the
assimilation of Teuto-Brazilians by regulating their schools, which
had been under way several years before the war, continued naturally afterwards.
4. Braunschweig, "Die rechtliche Stellung," 50; II. Jahresbericht des Deutschen
Ev. Lehrerseminar fur Rio Grande do Sui zu Santa Cruz, 1920; Kalender fUr die Deutschen
in Brasilien, 1921 (Sao Leopoldo, n.d.), 37.
5. Kalender fUr die Deutschen in Brasilien: 1921, P.37; Germania (Sao Paulo), August 22,1919; SchrOder, Brasilien und Wittenberg, 357; Entres (ed.), Gedenkbuch, 223.
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Of course, such legal measures reflected upper-class concerns
about the slowness of the Germans to be assimilated into Brazilian
life. Most ordiriary folk were unconcerned whether the Germans
were absorbed rapidly, slowly, or not at all. Similarly, the responses
of the German ethnic group to the war and its aftermath are based
on "elitist" evidence culled from editorials, reports, reminiscences, and commemorative materials. Ordinary Teuto-Brazilians,
especially those marginally literate persons who had experienced
downward mobility in the rural enclaves, left no record. But even
among those in the ethnic leadership group who had perceived
the war as a dangerous period in which their persons, property,
and way of life had been threatened, there were many who decided that the less said about the war and its concomitants the
better off they would be. Thus many postwar reports, calendars,
and anniversary booklets published by ethn,ic institutions avoided
mentioning the matter. In effect, they blanked out of the record
those months or years in which the use of the German language
was illegal. For example, the 1919 annual report of the tiny German Evangelical teachers college in Santa Cruz says nothing of the
war's impact, including the fact that reports for 1917 and 1918 had
never been published because of the language proscription. The
1920 report merely prints a translation of a letter received from
the Ministry of the Interior officially lifting the ban on German. 6
The Deutsche Turnbliitter of Porto Alegre was explicit about this
strategy of silence. In its first issue following the war, it declared
its intentions to refrain from comment and to gather strength,
presumably for future contests in which the integrity of the TeutoBrazilian community would be challenged. 7

German-Language Publications
The Teuto-Brazilian newspapers were generally hesitant about resuming publication in German; governmental directives were un. clear and evidently varied from state to state. In Parana the Curitiba
Kompass reappeared in German on July 29, 1919; in Sao Paulo, the
6. 10. Jahresbericht des Deutschen Ev. Lehrerseminar fUr Rio Grande do Sui zu Santa
Cruz, 1919; see also the eleventh report (for 1920). Cf. Luebke, "Legal Restrictions," 1-19.
7. Deutsche Turnbliitter (July, 1920).
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Germania resumed on August 19, 1919; and in Rio Grande do SuI,
where restrictions were lifted on September 12, 1919, both the
Deutsches Volksblatt and the Neue Deutsche Zeitung of Porto Alegre
returned to German on September 16. Four days later, however,
the Porto Alegre police shut down the Volksblatt in the belief that
the Ministry of the Interior intended to withhold permission until
after the peace treaty had been signed. A letter of protest was immediately sent to President Pessoa, who responded with a telegram clarifying the issue and permitting the Volksblatt to resume
publication in German. B
The German-language newspapers responded variously to
their restored freedom to publish. The Kompass was mild: In a
new epoch of social tensions, it reasserted its devotion to Christian culture and to the interests of the German ethnic community
and of the Brazilian nation. The Neue Deutsche Zeitung described
the war years as a troubled dream but declared that the distress
had created a new sense of unity among the Teuto-Brazilians. It
remained for the more chauvinistic Germania to follow a harder,
more defensive line. This paper bewailed the fate of Germany,
which it characterized as the vjctim of an Allied plan of eradication. It described its own recent experience as having been
gagged and bound hand and foot, like everything else that was
German. But now that those horrible times have passed, the Germania asserted, it must return to its duty to raise the consciousness of German identity to new levels and to defend Germany in
an unswerving and nonpartisan way. Its new slogan was to be
"End hatred and agitation!" even as it would fearlessly defend
Deutschtum and oppose unjust attacks on Teuto-Brazilians. Still,
the Germania declared, it recognized the strong bond between the
success of Brazil and the German colony and therefore it intended
to foster good relations with the government and to defend it also
from unfair criticism without reference to partisan interests. 9
Another year passed before the many German-language calendars reappeared, no doubt because, as book-length publications,
8. Fischer, "Die deutsche Presse in Rio Grande do Sul," 154-55.
9· Curitiba Kompass, July 29, 1919; Porto Alegre Neue Deutsche Zeitung, September 16, 1919, as quoted in Fischer, "Die deutsche Presse in Rio Grande do SuI,"
134; Germania (Sao Paulo), August 19, 1919.
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they required months rather than days to be compiled and manufactured. The first postwar calendars were published in 1920 for
use in 1921, and, like many other German-language publications,
most preferred to tread lightly on the sensitive issues of the war
and the distress it had caused. This was not true, however, of the
calendar published by Rotermund, the grand old man of the
Evangelical church in Rio Grande do SuI. It contains a long article
entitled "Das brasilianische Deutschtum nach dem Kriege," which
conveyed remarkable bitterness. Its author, identified only as "Dr.
B.," declared that because of the calculated hatred of the French
and British for everything German everywhere in the world,
Teuto-Brazilians had not been safe in their own homeland. The
pitifully weak president Wenceslau Braz had been unable to prevent the dark machinations of a clique of money-hungry politicians and businessmen to drag Brazil into the war. Teuto-Brazilians, he said, were treated as pariahs in their own country, their
schools closed, newspapers forbidden to publish, and printshops
destroyed. German businesses and clubhouses went up in flames
because officials ignored their constitutional duty to protect lives
and property. Even freedom of conscience was violated, he declared, as Teuto-Brazilians were forbidden to worship their God in
their own language. While the Germans might have taken up
arms against such a weak government, it would have been out of
character for Germans to challenge the authority of the state. The
author carried on in this fashion for several pages, at one point
blaming Jews in the service of both the Allies and the Bolsheviks
for the sorry state of affairs. 10
Such venomous resentment was uncommon, at least in print. A
more moderate response is provided by Koseritz' Deutscher Volkskalender, a secular rather than a church-related publication: "Even
during the war the Germans of our state [Rio Grande do SuI] had
to suffer relatively little, except for individual outrages perpetrated by mobs and for certain minor limitations on freedom of
movement in churches, the press, schools, and associationallife.
Now that peace has been restored, commerce has returned. German instruction, German sermons, and German newspapers are
again unrestricted. German songs resound in our singing so10.

Kalender fur die Deutschen in Brasilien: 1921, pp. 35-40.
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cieties and the gun clubs have gotten theit rifles back. Nevertheless, there still remains a residue of the desire to nationalize (read
de-Germanize) everything." Despite this relatively placid view of
recent Teuto-Brazilian experience, this publication, like many
others, remained thoroughly committed to the maintenance of the
German language and culture. It offered specific suggestions
about what German Brazilians should do for the revival of Deutschtum in Brazil: (1) Help the suffering people in postwar Germany;
(2) restore Brazilian trade with Germany; (3) above all, revitalize
the spiritual bonds with Germany-German books, newspapers,
music, and art must be distributed more widely than ever before
among Teuto-Brazilians; and (4) help newly arrived immigrants
from Germany to make a new start in Brazil. A final exhortation
cautioned against allowing differences of opinion regarding Germany's internal political affairs to divide them, because as Brazilians they are properly without influence in such matters.ll Thus,
Koseritz' Deutscher Volkskalender articulated a cultural pluralist position that was unchanged by the war: unswerving political loyalty
to the new fatherland combined with steadfast devotion to the
cultural forms of the old.
No matter how differently or how generously the publishers of
German-language newspapers and periodicals might have perceived their wartime experiences, the fact remained that a huge
proportion of these publishing ventures failed to survive the war.
The ban on German had been devastating; the substitution of Portuguese was a mere expediency that was both difficult and unsatisfactory. According to data accumulated by a leading student
of German-language publishing in Brazil, there were twenty-one
newspapers in 1917. A few were dailies; others appeared weekly;
most were published two or three times per week. Of these, nine
(43 percent) were casualties of war. Among them was the Deutsche
Zeitung of Porto Alegre, the oldest continuously published German-language newspaper in Brazil (since 1861), whose wellknown and influential editor, Arno Philipp, also had been a deputy in the Rio Grande do Sui legislature. In Parana, the anticlerical
and liberal Beobachter, founded in 1890, failed to reappear in 1919.
But most of the other casualties, such as the notorious Deutsche
11.

Koseritz'Volkskalender,

1921,

pp. 33-34, 102.
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Wacht of Pelotas, were recent in origin and not well established.
Meanwhile, the revived Germania of Sao Paulo, a venerable advocate of social democracy, lasted only until 1921. 12
It appears that publications lacking ties with the churches were
the most vulnerable. Papers that catered to Catholic readers, such
as the Kompass of Curitiba or the Deutsches Volksblatt of Porto Alegre, or Evangelical readers, such as the Deutsche Post of Sao Leopoldo, drew strength from the informal support of organized institutions; anticlerical, liberal, freethinking, or socialist newspapers,
however, had no comparable associational backing. Moreover, the
churches had led the resistance to wartime oppression. Evangelical pastors in particular had stressed the intimate connection
between religious belief and German culture.
Heavy though the losses were among the German-language
newspapers, they were not indicators of the power of assimilation, as they were in the United States. In Brazil, the nine casualties were more than matched by the number of new ventures in
German-language journalism that were attempted in the postwar
period. A total of eleven newspapers were founded from 1919 to
1923, though only two survived the decade. But a variety of periodicals serving special constituencies, such as the members of
teachers or farmers organizations, were also founded in the years
immediately following the war. In the United States, where the assimilation of the German ethnic group was more advanced, the
war caused a permanent reduction in the number of German-language newspapers and periodicals that was proportionately much
greater than in Brazil. 13

The Effects of the War on the Churches and Schools
Similarly, in the United States the war had hastened the linguistic acculturation of the German churches-dramatically in some
cases. In Brazil this effect was much less apparent. Among the
German Catholics, the tendency to use Portuguese had always
been strong. Missouri Synod Lutherans, for reasons of their own,
12. Gehse, Die deutsche Presse, 24-26; Arndt and Olson, History and Bibliography, 91-221.
13. Gehse, Die deutsche Presse, 23-37; Wittke, The Gennan-language Press in
America, 274-76.
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had repeatedly emphasized the need to switch to the language of
the majority. But Evangelical synods continued to resist linguistic
acculturation, as they had before the war. Such conservative leaders as Provost Martin Braunschweig agreed unhesitatingly that a
substantial measure of acculturation was necessary and desirable;
they understood that prominent persons in the Brazilian government, as well as Luso-Brazilians generally, continued in the postwar period to expect Teuto-Brazilians to become totally integrated
into the life of the country. But they still insisted that it was possible and preferable to retain German distinctiveness in language,
culture, and customs, even though economic and political integration could be achieved and the Portuguese language mastered.
Braunschweig and others continued to believe that if the German
language were abandoned in worship, private devotional life, and
in schools, Evangelical Protestantism as they knew it would eventually disappear. Even though they welcomed the development of
new ties with North American Evangelicals, they refused to learn
from the North American experience that linguistic acculturation
of the church in Brazil was both possible and desirable. 14
Still, the churches had been changed by the war. They had been
forced by circumstances to depend on themselves rather than on
donations of money and men from Germany. The development of
financial self-sufficiency was essential, and they accomplished it
under trying circumstances. This was especially true of synodical
activities, as distinguished from the parish or congregational
level. Thus, the Brazilian synods had to assume the costs of administration, maintenance of synodical institutions, subsidies for
pastors and teachers assigned to congregations that were not yet
self-supporting, assistance for retired pastors who remained in
Brazil rather than returning to Germany-all of which had formerly been supported by German mission societies or the Prussian state church. 15
The fact that well-trained pastors and preachers were no longer
available had both immediate and long-range consequences. As a
first step, the churches began to employ laymen as deacons, teach14. Luebke, Bonds of Loyalty, 314-18; Braunschweig, "Die brasilianische Diaspora," 41, 46-48; Koseritz' Volkskalender, 1921, p. 102.

15. Fischer, "Geschichte der EKLB," 151.
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ers, and substitute pastors after they had been given brief training
and examination. But more important, they agreed that it was essential for them to establish their own Brazilian institutions for
the preparation of parish pastors. The Evangelical Synod of Rio
Grande do SuI therefore founded in 1925 a pretheological school
patterned on the German model in Cachoeira, which several years
later was moved to Sao Leopoldo. In this way the Evangelicals,
like the Lutherans, would encourage the development of a nativeborn clergy, even though the students would still be expected to
go to Germany for formal theological training. In the decades following, this institution developed into a full-fledged theological
seminary that educated nearly all of the pastors of what is today
called the Evangelical Church of the Lutheran Confessions in Brazil. German Catholics in Rio Grande do SuI recognized a similar
need and in 1924 founded a small institution to prepare teachers
for their schools. 16
Meanwhile, the several church organizations resumed their
regular schedule of conferences and conventions, and conducted
their business almost exclusively in the German language. The
Riograndenser Synod convened at Linha Brochier as early as May,
1919, but most church-related organizations did not return to accustomed patterns of meeting until 1920. Church leaders continued to debate the need for and consequences of programs for
nurturing the German language and culture. Some argued that
the cultural chauvinism of the past had naturally or understandably provoked Luso-Brazilians to repress the Germans; others
continued to believe that the church would disappear if linguistic
and cultural assimilation occurred. 17
Much more than the churches, the German schools continued
to be prime targets of nativists determined to force the assimilation of immigrants. A mild nationalism continued throughout the
1920S, leading to more regulatory legislation and the further establishment of "federal schools" by the government to render pri·16. Ibid·.; Braunschweig, "Die brasilianische Diaspora," 47; Becker, Deutsche
Siedler, 82.
17. Koseritz' Volkskalender, 1921, p. 102; Entres (ed.), Gedenkbuch, 224; Braunschweig, "Die brasilianische Diaspora," 48; Biihler, Dona Francisca, 81-83; Dedekind,
Brasilien, 57.
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vate schools superfluous. The study of Portuguese became a regular part of the curriculum, and Brazilian history and geography
were commonly introduced. By far the largest number of German
schools continued to be in Rio Grande do Sul, a fact one Evangelicalleader attributed to the Positivism that had become characteristic of that state's government. 18
Efforts were made in the postwar period to rebuild the system
of German schools, but with limited success. Many that had been
closed during the war never reopened; most of the others continued to be staffed by one teacher each. Although comparable
schools in the United States rapidly shifted to instruction in English and placed renewed emphasis on religious education, the
Brazilian schools seemed dedicated to cultural and linguistic maintenance. Schools run by churches were increasingly nonconfessional, as formal religious instruction tended to disappear or be
available only as Bible history. In some cases, parents who wanted
more rigorous religious instruction for their children could pay
extra fees and the school would make special arrangements. 19
Opposition to the German schools increased strongly in the
1930s. Various state governments enacted new limitations. For example, in 1935, Sao Paulo designated Portuguese as the only permissible language of instruction in grades one to four; in the
higher grades, only one hour of instruction in a foreign language
was allowed per day. By 1938, the national government eliminated
German entirely as a medium of instruction. In some districts the
result of such legislation, as Martin Braunschweig had predicted
in 1922, was illiteracy in two languages instead of only one. Decades later a pastor of a rural Evangelical congregation in Dois Irmaos (near Sao Leopoldo) elaborated on these effects. He described how his parishioners, living in rural isolation, normally
spoke the Hunsriicker dialect mixed with fragments of Portuguese. When their youngsters went to school, they heard what
was for them an unintelligible foreign language. Meanwhile, they
18. Fischer, "Geschichte der EKLB," 151; Der Familienfreund: 1920, p. 125;
Dressel, Der deutschbrasilianische Kolonist, 21; Schroder, Brasilien und Wittenberg,
357; Allgemeine Lehrer-Zeitung fUr Rio Grande do Sui (May, 1921), 4; Dedekind,

Brasilien, 25.
19· Allgemeine Lehrer-Zeitung (May, 1921), 4·
288-89·
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had no opportunity to learn to read and write German, which
was the language of the church. The result was that by the 1<)OOS,
illiteracy rates of over 50 percent were common in a district that.
years before had been entirely literate.20

Societies and Business
For the scores of German ethnic voluntary associations, the postwar years represented a return to the status quo ante bellum. It is
true that many Vereine did not survive the year of war, but most
did, and within a relatively short time they were able to conduct
their affairs as though nothing had happened. Recovery was
closely related to the individual society's activities-school societies dealt with matters of greater moment than did bowling
clubs. Location was also important; there was less tension in the
rural colonies than there was in the cities. Some cities had had
more difficulties than others. For example, in Bahia, located in the
northeast where there were few Germans, the leading German society, Germania-Verein, held its first official assembly after the
war on June 29, 1919; but in Porto Alegre, the city with the largest
German subsociety and where the worst riots had occurred, the
Germania-Verein (which became Sociedade Independencia) did
not convene again until April 12, 1920, at which time it took the
first steps to rebuild its elegant clubhouse that had been destroyed
three years earlier. In Rio de Janeiro, however, recovery was more
rapid. By November, 1919, the Gesellschaft Germania was considering plans for the construction of a new, expanded clubhouse, to
be erected at a new location. Ultimately this society chose to remodel its old quarters, but not because of faltering membership. 21
Anniversary publications and other reports of many other such
societies often ignore the events of the war. No doubt this means
that in many cases there were no unpleasant experiences to report; but it may also reflect a desire to ignore and forget them.
20. Fischer, "Geschichte der EKLB," 151; K1llender fUr den deut.-ev. Gemeinden
in Brasilien, 1935; Braunschweig, "Die rechtliche Stellung," 53; Dressel, Der
deutschbrasilianische Kolonist, 21-23.
21. Funfzig Jahre Deutscher Verein Germania, 160; [Sociedade Independencia),
Betrachtungen zu Ihrer Geschichte aus Anlass der Jahrhundert-Feier, 31; Hinden, Deutsche
und deutscher Handel, 524.
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Teuto-Brazilian and German-owned economic enterprises also
quickly returned to normal. Although it was impossible for such
giants as Theodor Wille and Company and the German-owned
banks to recapture their former dominance, most of the smaller
Teuto-Brazilian companies prospered as they exploited attractive
opportunities in the postwar period. In Porto Alegre, Germans
could be found in all branches of commerce-export, import,
wholesale, and retail. Although Germans constituted about Oneeighth of the population of Porto Alegre in the mid-1920S, they
accounted for nearly one-third of the commerce and industry in
that city. Many of the largest firms continued to be Germanowned, just as many German-born persons were part Owners or
managers of Luso-Brazilian firms. In Rio de Janeiro, the situation
was much the same, as German-born businessmen and Germanowned companies moved into industry and manufactured machines, beer, dyes, glass, textiles, and furniture. 22

The Tempo of Assimilation
Despite the success of Teuto-Brazilian business enterprise and despite the considerable efforts of the churches, the schools, the
press, and the voluntary associations to sustain ethnic vitality,
powerful sociological forces were at work that sapped the strength
of the movement. Linguistic and marital assimilation was a natural process and it accelerated during the 1920S, especially in the
cities and towns where frequent personal interaction of Germans
with Luso-Brazilians was inevitable. Bilingualism became common in the less isolated communities, and by the 1930S, many
young people in the German districts preferred to COnverse with
each other in Portuguese. Similarly, the adoption of Portuguese
forms of given or first names became standard. Even among
wealthier and better-educated persons, who were often contemptuous of Luso-Brazilian culture and who saw assimilation as a menace, the shift to Portuguese could not be prevented. In the centers
of urban population, linguistic acculturation was especially rapid
22. Hundert Jahre Deutschtum, 251-53; Hinden, Deutsche und deutscher Handel,506·
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among lower-class persons, who often perceived knowledge of
Portuguese as a means to social and economic advancement.23
Yet sociological forces could work in other directions, too.
Among German Catholics, the multi-ethnic character of the church
tended to reduce enthusiasm for maintaining private Germanlanguage schools, with the result that such institutions were increasingly identified with Protestantism. 24 The sense of cultural
distinctiveness was correspondingly increased, among Evangelicals in particular.
Even though a general spirit of tolerance prevailed in Brazil
during the postwar decade, a residue of bitterness remained. Just
as some Brazilian patriots continued to insist that national unity
demanded programs of forced assimilation, there were Teuto-Brazilians who felt more disillusioned and more alienated than ever.
Political involvement seemed pointless to such persons. Some
Teuto-Brazilian leaders observed this apathy, and while they could
not peer into the future, they recognized how unhealthy such isolation was and feared for its consequences; they urged Teuto-Brazilians to assume their political responsibilities as citizens of their
adoptive fatherland. Although there were differences of opinion
regarding the best means to achieve ethnic political goals, the
Teuto-Brazilians were generally more unified than were their
counterparts in the United States, who disputed endlessly about
the proper strategy to follow. 25
The times were such, however, that participation in the political
process was not always easy. The 1920S were a decade of political
ferment in Brazil, and violence was not uncommon. Rio Grande
do SuI especially experienced revolutionary unrest reminiscent of
the 1890S. In 1923, civil war engulfed some of the German rural
colonies and self-protection against revolutionary bands became
necessary in some communities. In Neu-WiirUemberg, for example, Germans formed a military organization of a thousand
23. Willems, "Linguistic Changes," 460-61. Cf. Fouquet, Der deutsche Einwanderer, 184.
24. Willems, "Linguistic Changes," 460.
25. Buchmann, "Die deutschsprachige Presse in Brasilien," 221; Fugmann, Die
Deutschen in Parana, 199. Cf. Frederick C. Luebke, "The Germans," in John Higham
(ed.), Ethnic Leadership in America (Baltimore, 1978),64-90.
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men for such purposes. Taken together, the experiences of the
postwar decade caused many German Brazilians with resentful
hearts to be receptive to the siren song of Volkspolitik. When Nazi
variations on that theme were played in the 1930S, some found the
music irresistible. 26 Given this history, it is no surprise that the
programs of forced assimilation undertaken by the Gerulio Vargas
regime and thereafter were more intense and prolonged than
were any such attempts during World War I.
The new wave of immigrants from Germany that entered Brazil
after the war was a source of concern for some Teuto-Brazilian
leaders. Most welcomed the newcomers, but some worried about
the possibilities of backlash. One writer was especially frank as he
composed ten commandments for them. His first injunction was:
Don't be a disgrace to Germans and to Germany; another was to
learn Portuguese, but never forget German; a third was even more
pointed-Don't criticize Brazilian circumstances as long as you
do not know the customs, usages, and ways of life of those who
were born here. 27
During the 1920S, immigration from Germany reached its highest level in history. The total for the decade was 75,839, a figure
that was more than double that of any previous ten-year period.
The banner year was 1924, when 22,170 persons fled runaway inflation in Weimar Germany for the promise of a better life in Brazil. Relatively few settled in the rural enclaves of Rio Grande do
SuI and Santa Catarina, where the governments were anxious to
restrict the growth of the German subsociety. Instead, the majority sought employment in such metropolitan centers as Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, and Porto Alegre. 28
Obviously the fact that Brazil had been an enemy of Germany
in World War I had no effect upon the image Germans had of Brazil as a land to which they might migrate. It is unlikely that most
newcomers had even heard of the anti-German riots of 1917,
much less other, minor manifestations of cultural clash. More26. Love, Rio Grande do Sui, 204-11; Becker, Deutsche Siedler, 84; Konigk, Die
Politik Brasiliens, 66.
27. Fugmann, Die Deutschen in Parana, 40.
28. Carneiro, ImigrQ/;ao e colonizat;ao no Brasil, table facing p. 60; Becker, Deutsche
Siedler, 84.
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over, it is clear that Teuto-Brazilian society had not been changed
in any fundamental way by the war. There were minor changes, of
course, as we have seen. Assimilation was accelerated in some respects, but at the same time, the war experiences had accentuated
the sense of differentness, if not of cultural superiority, that some
German Brazilians had, especially persons closely associated with
the Evangelical synods and most persons in positions of ethnic
group leadership. For them, the siege mentality that often develops among ethnic minorities was intensified. At the same time, a
substantial part of the rural Teuto-Brazilian population-marginal
farmers struggling for survival in an indifferent milieu-were
quite unaffected by the war and its concomitants. They sensed no
change; they had no reason to modify their behavior. For them assimilation was a glacially slow process of which they were scarcely
aware and which still remained incomplete decades later.

Comparisons with the United States
The great majority of non-German Brazilians-blacks, caboclos,
immigrants from Italy, Spain, and Portugal, as well as impoverished Luso-Brazilians-continued to perceive the Germans in the
1920S as they always had, some with envy, most with indifference.
But some of the Luso-Brazilian elite-members of the leadership
classes in that stratified society-were disturbed by the failure of
the Germans to assimilate and were determined to accelerate the
rate of change through legislation. In this respect, the Brazilian
experience was sharply different from that of the United States.
Brazil had nothing equivalent to the U.S. Supreme Court decision
(Meyer v. Nebraska, 1923) that declared unconstitutional the efforts
of state governments to eliminate foreign-language instruction in
American schools. Nor did Brazil restrict immigration as the U.S.
Congress did by means of the National Origins Act of 1924. 29
But the differences were more basic than that. In the United
States the natural process of assimilation (which is related to such
variables as rate of immigration, density of settlement, occupation
patterns, wealth, education, and degrees of cultural differences)
29. Luebke, "Legal Restrictions," 1-19.
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had advanced more rapidly than it had in Brazil. This meant that
when the crisis of a war with the homeland of a substantial ethnic
minority came in 1917 and 1918, the Germans in the United States
could adapt more quickly and effectively, and in the postwar years
consciously and deliberately make decisions to speed up the process. 30 In Brazil, where the social and cultural variations between
the German ethnic group and the host society were greater and
where the size of the German group was proportionately smaller
but at the same time spatially more highly concentrated, the war
produced destructive riots in addition to restrictive measures that
severely curtailed the freedom of Teuto-Brazilian citizens. In the
United States, the rate of assimilation continued at such a pace
during the 1920S and 1930S that when World War II arrived in 1941,
the country experienced no repetition of the anti-Germanism of
World War I. In Brazil, where the rate of assimilation continued at
a much slower tempo, and where German ethnic institutions and
behavior patterns had been only slightly modified by war-inspired
riots and restrictions, severe though they were, World War II was
the more traumatic experience. Once again, Brazilian programs of
forced assimilation were pushed far beyond anything perceived at
any time to be necessary in the United States.
Still, the experiences of the German ethnic groups in Brazil and
the United States provide a series of remarkable parallels. Both
countries received large numbers of immigrants from roughly the
same parts of German-speaking Europe at approximately the
same times in the nineteenth century and generally for the same
reasons. Both developed important German-speaking subsocieties that evolved and maintained full complements of the same
ethnic institutions-German-Ianguage newspapers, churches,
schools, and voluntary associations of all kinds. In both countries, the German groups confronted the same crisis-war against
the old fatherland-in much the same way. Presumably, circumstances in both countries illuminate how "enemy" minorities respond in times of national or international crises and how modem societies in tum treat such "foreign" elements.
When world war engulfed Europe in 1914, the governments of
both the United States and Brazil declared their neutrality. For
30. Luebke, Bonds of Loyalty, 329.
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most ordinary people in both countries, but especially in Brazil,
the war in Europe was a distant affair of no particular consequence. It seemed to affect their daily lives in no direct or discernible fashion. Still, the war tended to evoke sympathies for one side
or the other. Immigrants and their descendants naturally felt an
emotional bond with their ancestral homeland and were convinced of the justice of its cause. Leaders of the German ethnic
groups in both countries tended to be extravagant in their partisanship for Germany. They delivered speeches and wrote editorials defending German war aims and behaviors; their newspapers eagerly reported glorious German victories over French
and British arms; they organized rallies and bazaars to collect
contributions for the German Red Cross and for war widows and
orphans; and they bought German war bonds as German reservists in both countries responded to the call to colors. The two
German sub societies experienced similar excitement and rejuvenation as a horrible war was fought on distant battlefields.
Meanwhile, Germany sought to exploit pro-German sentiment
in both countries and in the same ways. Efforts were made to acquire control of newspapers to propagandize for the German
point of view. The German Red Cross was used as a cover for
agents in both countries-Albert Dernburg in the United States
had an equivalent in G. W. Zimmerli-and the latter's Germanische Bund was in some respects similar to the National GermanAmerican Alliance.
At the same time, dominant elements in both countries tended
strongly to favor the Allies. Their presses were harshly critical of
Germany, both warned against German spies and reported on
strange and suspicious behaviors as alleged evidence of German
plots and conspiracies. In the United States, organizations such as
the National Security League and the American Defense Society
propagandized for preparedness and for support for the Allies;
Brazil had its equivalent in the Liga pelos Alliados. If Theodore
Roosevelt can be identified as a major political figure who championed England and France, the eloquent Ruy Barbosa was his
counterpart in Brazil. Both countries had foreign ministersWilliam Jennings Bryan and Lauro Muller-who opposed the
pro-Ally drift in their respective countries during the neutrality
period, and both men were forced by circumstances to resign
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their positions, Bryan two years earlier than Miiller. The United
States and Brazil responded adversely to the British imposition of
the Black List in 1916, but in neither case was the pro-Ally sentiment seriously modified as a consequence.
In 1917 the neutrality period came to an end as both the United
States and Brazil declared war on Germany, ostensibly because
vessels in their respective merchant marines had been torpedoed
by German submarines. The ways in which the people of Brazil
and the United States responded to the problem of having many
Germans in their populations provide another set of comparisons.
In the United States, the war introduced a period of persecution
for German Americans. Many citizens of German origin were
suspected of disloyalty. Individuals were harassed in various ways
as the American people were swept up in a wave of anti-German
feeling. In effect, there was a war against the German language
and culture. The climate of suspicion produced such measures as
the ban on German-composed music and the renaming of persons, foods, streets, parks, and towns. German-language instruction in the schools was restricted or eliminated and German-language newspapers were closely regulated. There were scores of
patriotic demonstrations in which German Americans were forced
to kiss the American flag, buy war bonds, or sing the national anthem. There were other ceremonies in which German-language
books were burned. There were frequent instances of vandalism,
beatings, arrests for allegedly unpatriotic utterances, and even a
lynching of a German alien in Illinois. 31
But the American behavior pales in contrast to the Brazilian.
Following the Brazilian break in diplomatic relations with Germany in April, 1917, German Brazilians were victims of numerous
destructive riots. Property damage was enormous as hundreds
of residences, German-language newspapers' offices, churches,
schools, clubhouses, businesses of all kinds, factories, and warehouses were damaged or destroyed by mobs gone out of control.
Six months later, following Brazil's declaration of war in October, a
31. Ibid., 3-24; Wittke, German-Americans and the World War. A variety of studies on the local level have been published during the past decade, especially in
state and local historical journals. See above, Chap. 8, n. 29. See also Phyllis Keller, States of Belonging: German-American Intellectuals and the First World War (Cambridge, Mass., 1979).
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second series of riots resulted in more destruction. Martial law
was declared in Rio de Janeiro and all southern states, where the
great majority of the Teuto-Brazilians lived. All publications in the
German language were forbidden. All instruction in the German
language was banned in all schools at all levels. All Germanlanguage church services were outlawed. The president was empowered to seize the property of enemy aliens and to sell all
goods consigned to them. While it is true that enforcement of
these repressive measures was inconsistent and sometimes haphazard, the fact remains that Brazilian behavior was remarkably
violent and repressive compared to the American. 32
It is easy to explain the Brazilian response to the German problem in terms of the classic stereotype of the Latin temperament as
irresponsible, unrestrained, volatile, emotional, and spontaneous. That was how the young Clarence H. Haring, already one of
the most distinguished Latin Americanists in the United States,
interpreted the phenomenon in 1920. He wrote that the "Brazilians' attitude toward the war may probably be explained by the
difference between the Latin and Anglo-Saxon temperaments.
The Brazilian is easily aroused, as the violent anti-German demonstrations in some of the cities reveal, but he also easily forgets." 33 Thus Haring also used the stereotype to explain the rapid
return to normal attitudes and behaviors in the postwar era. Even
though stereotypes are often founded in experience as interpreted by participants in a particular culture and in that sense
convey a measure of "truth," it is also true that this interpretation
in fact explains very little because it fails to penetrate surfaces. It is
more useful to compare the Teuto-Brazilians' and the German
Americans' circumstances in the decades before the war.
While Germans represented a much smaller proportion of Brazilian than of American society, their settlement patterns were
more highly concentrated, exclusive, and isolated in Brazil. Usually better educated and often wealthier than the average Brazilian, the Germans there inevitably were more slowly assimilated,
compared to German Americans. This was also true of many German farmers in the rural enclaves who experienced downward mo-

Cf. Luebke, Bonds of Loyalty, 225-301.
33. Haring, The Germans in South America, 66.

32.
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bility as they struggled with the exigencies of a subtropical environment. As northern Europeans, the Teuto-Brazilians, in contrast
to the more numerous Italian, Spanish, and Portuguese immigrants in Brazil, had a language and a culture that were significantly different from those of the host society. Differentness in
tum promoted a heightened sense of minority group identity in
addition to a full complement of ethnic institutions-churches,
schools, social organizations, a German-language press-that
tended to be more closely tied to Germany than were their equivalents in the United States. All this combined to promote a general
sense of cultural superiority that had no real equal in the United
States. Moreover, leadership among the Germans of Brazil was
more often vested in the Reichsdeutsche, whose bonds with Germany were close. Finally, compared to their American cousins,
the Germans in Brazil wielded greater economic power, but their
political influence was weaker.
The comparison should be carried a step further. Brazilian society, compared to the American, was the more highly stratified:
Its rich were richer and its poor poorer. Illiteracy was pervasive.
Because its economy was less developed, it lacked the means to
provide its citizens with universal, free education. Indeed, the notion of schooling the masses as the responsibility of the state was
not advanced in Brazil, where education was the privilege of the
few, not the right of the many, as it had become in both Germany
and the United States by 1890. Moreover, Brazil had no longstanding constitutional tradition. Most Brazilians did not place
the same high value as Americans did on freedoms of religion,
press, and assembly. This was also true of the Teuto-Brazilians,
both as Germans and Brazilians.
Was Brazil the more violent country? Surely that is a question
that deserves more attention than what it can be given here. While
the stereotype many Americans hold of Latin American culture
answers affirmatively, it should be remembered that the United
States only a few decades earlier had experienced a civil war of
unprecedented proportions and that riots emerging from cultural
differences were remarkably frequent in the nineteenth-century
America. By the 1880s, cultural contrasts between immigrants
and old-stock Americans informed much political debate at the
state and local level, and conflict, sometimes violent, over alco-
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holic drink, Sabbatarianism, and schools was endemic in many
northern and western American communities. Ethnic antipathies
and prejudices, one suspects, were more deeply rooted in the
United States than in Brazil. Violence in Brazil, common though it
was in the southern states where the Germans lived, especially in
the 1890S and the 1920S, usually emerged from sources other than
ethnocultural diversity. But when it was visited upon the German
minority, it came with a severity surpassing anything generally
experienced by the Germans in the United States.
As the spirit of nationalism swelled early in the twentieth century, the Brazilians, like the Americans, naturally acted on the
basis of stereotypes that obscured individual differences and beclouded interpersonal relationships. Lacking both knowledge and
understanding of the separatistic German subsociety, its manners
and institutions, they demanded an unprecedented measure of
conformity to established Brazilian ways. Had the Germans in the
United States been as divergent from the American norms as the
Teuto-Brazilians were from the Brazilian, it is likely that they too
would have suffered from destructive riots, as the Chinese did in
mining camps of the American West in the nineteenth century, or
as American blacks did in Chicago, East St. Louis, Tulsa, and elsewhere in the immediate postwar period.
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A Federa~iio, Porto Alegre
Jornal do Commercio, Rio de Janeiro
A Noite, Rio de Janeiro
o Paiz, Rio de Janeiro
English-language newspapers consulted:
New York Times
Washington Post
The following German-language Brazilian periodicals were consulted:
Allgemeine Lehrer-Zeitung fur Rio Grande do SuI, 1914-17.
Deutsche Turnbliitter. Publication of the Turnerbund of Porto Alegre,
1915- 20.
Evangelisch-Lutherisches Kirchenblatt fUr Sud-Amerika. Porto Alegre,
1914- 17.
Mitteilungen des Deutschen Schulvereins fUr St. Catharina. Blumenau,
1917.
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1916- 17.

Government Publications
Brazil. Ministerio das Rela<;6es Exteriores. The Brazilian Green Book, Consisting of Diplomatic Documents Relating to Brazil's Attitude with Regard to
the European War, 1914-1917. As Issued by the Brazilian Ministry for
Foreign Affairs. Authorized English version, with an introduction and
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notes by Andrew Boyle. London: George Allen and Unwin; New York:
Macmillan, 1918.
- - - . Guerra da Europa: Documentos Diplomaticos. Attitude do Brasil.
1914-17. Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1917.
- - - . Guerra da Europa: Documentos Diplomaticos. Attitude do Brasil. 1918.
Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1918.
- - - . Relatorio, 1917-1918. Multivolume.
United States. Department of State. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations
of the United States, 1917. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1930.
- - - . Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917.
Supplement 1, The World War. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1931.

Yearbooks, Calendars
Titles of these publications are not consistent from year to year. Variations in publisher and place of publication also occur. Dates of publication precede years indicated by one.
Der Familienfreund: Katholischer Hauski1lender und Wegweiser, Porto Alegre:
Hugo Metzler, 1917, 1918,1920.
Kalender fur den deut.-ev. Gemeinden in Basilien, 1935. Porto Alegre: N.p.
Kalender fUr die Deutschen in Brasilien. Sao Leopoldo: Verlag Rotermund,
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Uhle's Kalender: Jahrbuch fUr das Deutschtum in Brasilien. Curitiba: Impressora Paranaense, 1917, 1918.
Volkski1lender fUr das Jahr 1917. Porto Alegre: Ludwig Irmaos.

Contemporary Documents and Books
In my search for these materials, as well as for reports, anniversary publications, and reminiscences, I chiefly sought works that appeared within
a few years after the war, on the assumption that they would be more
likely to yield information relevant to this study than would materials
published at a later date.
Aldinger, Dr. [Paul]. Deutsche Mitarbeit in Brasilien. Curitiba: Theodor
Locher, 1923.
Alemann, Theodor. Die Zukunft des Deutschtums in Ameriki1. Buenos Aires
and Stuttgart: Ausland und Heimat, 1923.
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